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ABSTRACT 
RECALLING DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL POLITICS, MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION, AND DALIT ASSERTION IN MODERN INDIA 
Michael A. Collins 
Lisa Mitchell 
This dissertation examines the entanglements of Dalit (formerly “untouchable”) 
activists in southern India with the ideas and practices of democracy. The research 
seeks to understand how democracy is understood, experienced, and put to use by 
marginalized groups to communicate political demands, represent their interests, and 
participate in deliberative processes from which they have been excluded. This project 
chronicles the political transformation of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, VCK or 
Liberation Panthers Party, from an outwardly militant social movement into electoral 
politics, charting its transition from boycotts to ballots. Through an ethnography of 
democratic integration and minority representation, the dissertation analyzes a 
layering of political strategies whereby VCK organizers struggled to represent Dalit 
concerns: legal advocacy, contentious street politics, and electoral democracy. 
Drawing upon more than three years of fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, India, hundreds of 
interviews with party organizers, and a wide breadth of primary and secondary source 
materials, the project illustrates that formal integration within electoral democracy 
does not inherently bolster minority representation, but, from the perspective of VCK 
leaders, it mired their party in a web of complex negotiations that compromised its 
early platform and undercut its capacity for robust minority advocacy. A diachronic 
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study of the VCK demonstrates that democratic politics does not necessarily erase, but 
may compound existing forms of inequality as its experience is mediated by prevailing 
socio-economic disparities premised on caste, class, gender, race, and religion. 
Altogether, the dissertation nuances our understanding of how democracy is 
understood and experienced by marginalized social groups, at once accounting for its 
powerful social imaginary and potent political vocabulary while remaining attentive to 
its limitations when approached as the principal platform for minority representation.
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INTRODUCTION 
Dalit Assertion and the Politics of Modern India: 
Entanglements with Democracy, Elections, and Representation 
 
In the weeks preceding August 15, 1997, India prepared lavish celebrations to mark 
the golden jubilee of Independence. In the national capital, New Delhi, organizers 
choreographed a commemorative program in parliament that re-enacted scenes from 
the freedom struggle, a re-staging of history replete with A-list vocals from Lata 
Mangeshkar and Bhimsen Joshi paired with redacted audio-recordings of landmark 
speeches by national icons like Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Subhas 
Chandra Bose.1 In the southernmost state of Tamil Nadu, M. Karunanidhi, the 
presiding Chief Minister and head of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party, 
pledged to redress what he considered a historical injustice against the Tamil people. 
Charging that the Tamils had not been allotted sufficient attention in popular accounts 
of the freedom struggle, Karunanidhi, or Kalaignar (the Artist) as he is known, pledged 
to set the record straight and pen a history of the vital contributions of “Dravida desam,” 
or the Dravidian nation, to Indian Independence.2 Addressing the press following a 
public rally in Trichi, he appealed to Tamil Nadu’s Dalit leaders (ex-untouchables), 
who proposed to observe Independence Day as a “black day,” to call off their planned 
bandh (general strike) and partake in the jamboree.3 The chief minister reportedly 
opined that bandhs had become routine in recent years, lamenting that such disruptions 
of law and order were all too often orchestrated “for flimsy reasons.”4 
 On July 27, 1997, against the backdrop of national preparations for India’s 
golden jubilee, Thol. Thirumaavalavan, chairman of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
(Liberation Panthers), Tamil Nadu’s largest social movement representing Dalits, 
dispatched postcards to district secretaries across the state. In handwritten 
correspondence, he extolled the movement’s “very successful uprising” in Chennai the 
previous week, but emphasized that the rally-cum-procession, which had brought the 
state capital to a standstill on July 23rd, was only the initial step in the movement’s 
two-pronged response to the recent atrocity in Melavalavu, where an upper caste gang 
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had murdered a Dalit panchayat (village council) president along with his five 
associates on June 29, 1997.5 Addressing his district secretaries, Thirumaavalavan 
wrote, “For the next phase, it is critical that you assemble a minimum of thirty district-
level organizers and convene a planning committee to prepare for the approaching 
August 15th protest.”6 Concurrent with nationwide preparations to commemorate the 
golden jubilee of Indian Independence, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers planned to 
burn the tri-colored national flag in protests across the state to highlight, as one 
organizer recalled, “that our community had not yet received independence from 
bonded servitude and casteism.”7  
 In preparation for the bandh, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal party workers distributed 
handbills and posted colorful wall posters in Dalit colonies across the state. One 
poster, which depicted the tri-colored national flag set ablaze, declared August 15th 
“the golden jubilee of independence for caste fanaticism,” while another posed a pair of 
rhetorical questions: “Do casteist gangs not run rampant here? Does the national flag 
not flutter amidst the smoldering ashes of the cheri (Dalit colony)?”8 The movement’s 
provocative propaganda not only attracted intense media scrutiny, but elicited strong 
rebuke from state authorities, some of whom pledged to incarcerate Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers under articles of national security legislation should they follow 
through with their plan to torch the national flag.9 As the chorus of state criticism 
reached a crescendo, even threatening to disband the movement outright, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers relented in their proposal and, instead, proposed to burn 
effigies representing the Indian nation, or desiya kodumbavi.10 Alerting the press to this 
alteration in plans on August 11, 1997, Thirumaavalavan seized the opportunity to 
juxtapose the Independence Day celebrations with the ground reality of “oppression 
meted out to Dalits.”11 
 Concurrent with the golden jubilee celebration, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers conducted parallel rallies that drew attention to the plight of India’s Dalit 
citizens and exposed the state government’s failure to ensure basic rights and redress 
quotidian practices of untouchability.12 In propagating their bandh in Dalit 
communities, movement activists questioned, “How can our people residing in cheris 
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(Dalit colonies) be declared free when they even lack the freedom to wear chappals 
(sandals)?”13 Further, Thirumaavalavan declared in Dalit, a vernacular journal: 
 
A free society is a society without domination, exploitation, and repression. The 
only society that can celebrate Independence is one that is able to determine its 
own political and economic livelihood. Does this right exist for the Dalit 
people? Still today, the Dalit people have not received liberation from the 
prison of the cheri. There is no rule of law here; instead, caste reigns. In Uttar 
Pradesh, a Dalit woman was paraded naked. In this condition, it is a travesty to 
celebrate the golden jubilee and identify it as Independence. The murders 
occurred in Melavalavu because the Dalit people opposed the hegemony of 
local caste fanatics. The Dalit people, who continue to live without freedom, 
consider such [Independence Day] celebrations to be shameful acts.14 
 
As Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activists conducted parallel rallies across Tamil Nadu on 
August 15, 1997, police battalions descended upon Dalit colonies and engaged in a 
lathi, or wooden baton, charge to disrupt their activities, arresting hundreds of 
movement activists in the process.15 
 In 2009, I met with M. Yallalan, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Madurai District 
Secretary (rural), at a public park in Arasaradi, Madurai. Situated on an open field 
circumambulated by residents enjoying a brisk evening stroll, the monotonous din of 
traffic drones on in the distance. Seated across from me, Yallalan discusses the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s electoral turn and recounts its transition from an extra-
parliamentary movement into a political party in 1999. As he chronicles the 
movement’s pre-electoral phase, Yallalan hails my attention to the golden jubilee 
protest to juxtapose the idea of freedom and, as he suggests, the promise of democracy, 
with the lived experience of Dalits across India. Recounting the 1997 golden jubilee 
celebrations, he recollects how teachers distributed sweets and miniature tri-colored 
flags in classrooms while bureaucrats and politicians draped floral garlands around 
busts of M. K. Gandhi, often considered to be the father of the Indian nation, and 
conducted elaborate flag-hoisting ceremonies.16 “All of this,” he emphasizes, “was to 
celebrate the fact that we had gained Independence.”17 Yallalan proceeds, “The rest of 
India celebrated its freedom, but a section of the people still couldn’t wear chappals 
(sandals) and experienced myriad forms of caste discrimination. We wanted to 
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highlight that this much-acclaimed ‘freedom’ was never extended to our people in the 
cheri.”18  
 Recounting the logistics of the Independence Day bandh, Yallalan recounts, 
“While the government celebrated the golden jubilee of its Independence, our 
organizers traveled from one colony to the next and organized a protest that we called 
sudandhirak kodumbavi erippuppor,” which translates as ‘the war to burn the effigy of 
Independence’. “We constructed figurines that represented the Indian nation and set 
them on fire in our colonies and public spaces across Tamil Nadu.”19 In defiance of the 
state government’s warning, he recalls that some activists even draped these effigies in 
the national flag prior to setting them ablaze in crowded public streets. Yallalan 
stresses that Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre used the occasion to entreat local 
communities to ponder what it means to celebrate freedom in a country that had failed 
to safeguard their basic rights enshrined in the Constitution. Independence had been 
won, he suggests, but freedom deferred. Following a short pause, I asked Yallalan why 
his movement entered electoral politics a brief two years after the golden jubilee 
protest. He responded without a moment’s hesitation, “We needed to show that there was no 
democracy.”20 
 
Objective of the Study  
This dissertation examines the entanglements of Dalit activists in southern India with 
ideas and practices of democracy. The research seeks to understand how democracy is 
understood, experienced, and put to use by socially marginalized groups to 
communicate political demands, represent their interests, and participate in 
deliberative processes from which they are excluded. This project chronicles the 
transformation of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), or Liberation Panthers Party, 
from an outwardly militant social movement into electoral politics, providing an 
ethnographic account of democratic participation and minority representation in 
modern India. Today, the VCK, whose name and inspiration draw from the Black 
Panthers of America, factors among the largest political parties representing Dalits 
(formerly “untouchables”), who comprise roughly 180 million, or nearly one-sixth of 
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India’s 1.2 billion inhabitants. In Tamil Nadu, Dalits, who comprise more than 20% of 
the state population, remain concentrated in rural areas where they work primarily as 
landless agricultural laborers.21 Despite constitutional safeguards and affirmative 
action programs introduced to promote their uplift, Dalits continue to lag in virtually 
all development indicators and experience myriad forms of discrimination.22 By 
juxtaposing successive strategies deployed by VCK organizers to represent Dalit 
concerns—legal advocacy (1982-1992), mass agitational politics (1992-1999), electoral 
democracy (1999-present)—the project culminates from more than three years of in-
country fieldwork, extensive interviews with party leadership, and a wide range of 
vernacular primary and secondary source materials to present a historically sensitive 
and ethnographically informed study of democratic integration and minority 
representation in modern India. 
 Without filtering my study through a western paradigm, the project draws on 
ethnography from the global south to inform our understanding of democracy more 
generally, as normative theory and lived-experience, by conveying how historically 
marginalized communities interface with, navigate, and at times contest its institutions. 
Academic scholarship and popular discourse have often interpreted the expansion of 
minority participation in elections as a triumph in itself that signals a more ‘inclusive’ 
society. A study of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics further nuances our understanding of 
the uses, constraints, and limitations of electoral democracy in affording a platform for 
socially marginalized groups to advocate their concerns and provides a lens into 
alternative strategies of political representation that operate beyond the electoral 
framework. The dissertation title, “Recalling Democracy” refers not only to the 
firsthand recollections of democratic politics proffered by my interlocutors, literally 
how they recall their experience of democracy, but it concurrently conveys an 
underlying anxiety that pervaded our conversations, an abiding concern that 
democracy, which they had once heralded as a means to achieve social and political 
equality, had ultimately proven faulty, perhaps warranting a recall.  
 This project offers two core contributions to our understanding of popular 
politics, minority representation, and democratic practice. First, the study provides a 
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longitudinal account of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition from boycotts to ballots, 
tracing the development and use of different strategies of political representation 
designed to advocate Dalit concerns. A diachronic study of VCK politics enables us to 
examine a layering of representative strategies across time without treating electoral 
democracy as its default, natural, or most effective expression, but as one among its 
possible forms. Secondly, the project contributes a unique perspective to the 
anthropological study of democracy in India and across the developing world. While 
existing scholarship has examined the integration of minority groups in electoral 
politics and the broad range of ideas and practices that are now associated with 
democracy in popular discourse, less attention has explored this theme through the 
personal narratives of the political leadership representing historically marginalized 
groups. To fill this void, this project examines how the leaders who navigated the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition into electoral democracy recount their experience of 
democratic politics and, thereby, considers how this contact generates new 
understands of the relationship between democracy, elections, and representation. As a 
whole, this dissertation demonstrates that democratic integration does not necessarily 
bolster minority representation, but, as the experience of democratic politics is always 
mediated through existing forms of inequality, such strategies may undercut robust 
minority advocacy when used as the primary instrument for articulating the political 
grievances of marginalized groups. 
 
Strategies of Representation 
The conventional view of political representation regards it as a device to facilitate 
decision-making processes in large groups that are unable to engage directly in policy 
deliberation.23 This view often casts representation as a relation between two 
constituted entities, the representative and the represented, such that the former is 
authorized and held accountable through elections. In her seminal study of the subject, 
The Concept of Representation, Hanna Pitkin maps the semantic terrain of representation, 
providing a taxonomy that continues to inform scholarship today. For Pitkin, a 
paradox lies at the very heart of representation as it consists of “the making present of 
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something which is nevertheless not literally present.”24 Her work meticulously 
catalogues four “views” of representation (formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and 
substantive) that capture the multiple forms that it may assume.25 Rather than 
proposing to clarify its internal contradictions, Pitkin encourages us to embrace the 
underlying paradox of representation and defines genuine representation as a 
“substantive acting for others,” stipulating that representatives must wield sufficient 
autonomy yet also act in a responsive manner to those that they represent. 26 Pitkin’s 
account provides an enduring conceptual vocabulary to discuss different aspects of 
political representation, but, by her own admission, her emphasis on elections as the 
primary mechanism for authorization and accountability mistakenly assumed a natural 
congruence between representation and democracy.27 
 Pitkin’s contribution features as a mainstay of political theory, but, from the 
1990s, a group of feminist and African-American scholars honed their critique on her 
claim that descriptive representation, which is when representatives are said to ‘mirror’ 
key attributes or traits of those represented, undercuts substantive representation and 
democratic accountability.28 Operating with the normative assumption that democratic 
institutions require an equitable representation of difference, these theorists raised 
questions in regards to institutional design, querying how to make representative 
institutions more equitable and responsive to the chronic problem of social exclusion. 
In her defense of descriptive representation, Jane Mansbridge argues for its capacity 
to strengthen democratic accountability in environments where minority interests have 
not yet crystalized and political contexts characterized by deep-seated mistrust.29 
Taken together, these scholars formulated a rejoinder to Pitkin’s critique of descriptive 
representation that inquired how to make representative institutions more responsive 
to minority interests, but their studies, which focused exclusively on western society, 
constricted their frame of analysis to forms of elected representation and democratic 
institutions. 
 More recently, scholarship has broadened our analysis of political 
representation outside of democratic institutions and beyond a narrow focus on 
electoral mechanisms in order to account for its changing, global dynamics. Andrew 
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Rehfeld calls for a general theory that disaggregates our study of political 
representation from representative government in order to reckon with the wide range 
of individuals and organizations claiming to engage in the work of representation 
today.30 Similarly, Laura Montanaro scrutinizes contexts in which claims of 
representation are made by individuals and groups not formally authorized through 
elections. Her work takes seriously the salience of “nonelected actors” to practices of 
political representation, noting that their claims are often made “in response to 
representative deficits produced by the institutions of electoral politics and by 
disparities in political weight and efficacy.”31 Taken further, Jennifer Rubenstein 
proposes a theory of “surrogate accountability” that considers how these nonelected 
actors might promote democratic accountability under conditions of severe inequality 
where less powerful groups would, under the conventional model, lack the capacity to 
sanction elected representatives and powerful authorities.32 Taken together, these 
scholars stretched our analysis of representation beyond its conventional emphasis on 
democratic institutions and an electoral mechanism in order to account for varying 
dynamics of representation across the globe. 
 In an account of current literature in the field, Matthias Lievens observes, 
“representation is now increasingly seen as a construction of the represented, as a form 
through which the invisible is made visible.”33 Instead of describing representation as a 
relation that makes present what is not actually present (i.e., Pitkin), Lievens draws 
upon the thought of Jacques Rancière to project the work of representation in terms of 
a discursive process that renders visible what may otherwise have gone unnoticed.34 
Building on what has since been termed the “constructivist approach,” Michael 
Saward calls for “shifting our frame of reference in order to explore what is going on in 
representation,” in order to inspect its dynamics and “examine representation as a 
creative process that spills beyond legislatures.”35 Hence, Saward proposes structuring 
our study around “the representative claim,” that is “seeing representation in terms of 
claims to be representative by a variety of political actors, rather than (as is normally the 
case) seeing it as an achieved, or potentially achievable, state of affairs as a result of 
election.”36 In effect, he suggests that “a conception of representation which stresses its 
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dynamic, claim-based character, its performative aspects as well as its narrowly 
institutional ones, and its potential for radical extension, can open up new ways for us 
to think about political inclusion and a more pluralistic representative politics…”37 
Unsettling Pitkin’s classic paradox, this new approach to political representation does 
not merely consist of the re-presentation of what is nevertheless absent, but entails a 
discursive process that renders visible what was previously unseen.38 
 This dissertation presents an empirical study that extends recent innovations in 
our study of political representation and provides an ethnographic lens into the 
strategies, practices, and methods through which historically marginalized groups such 
as India’s Dalits make claims on state authority. The project looks beyond the 
conventional dyad of representative/represented and instead calls our attention to the 
‘how’ and ‘where’ of political representation; that is, I study representation not as a 
concrete social fact or relation between two entities, but as a dynamic process in an 
attempt to uncover its variable modes of transmission and the multiple spaces of its 
articulation. Through a longitudinal study of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics, the 
project examines a layering of political strategies over the span of nearly three decades 
whereby Dalit organizers sought to represent their constituents’ interests.39 In 
juxtaposing different strategies of political representation across time, the study 
considers distinctive techniques through which movement leaders articulated Dalit 
grievances and struggled to insert these concerns on policy agendas. The study 
conveys how close attention to spaces and methods of representing minority concerns, 
including those that eschew a conventional focus on elections and formal institutions, 
enable us to understand how, in a context marked by severe inequality, historically 
marginalized groups engage in deliberative processes by recourse to a diverse 
repertoire of representative strategies designed to heighten their visibility and amplify 
their voice. Further, this approach enables us to examine movement among forms of 
“electoral” and “nonelectoral” representation, presenting this engagement as a dynamic 
process rather than a binary distinction.  
 The following chapters provide a diachronic account of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
politics that chronicles a layering of representative strategies whereby party activists 
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attempted to intercede on behalf of their community and represent Dalit interests. 
From the early 1980s, the first wave of movement activists espoused legal advocacy as 
a technique to articulate political demands, submitting official petitions through formal 
institutional channels that raised their concerns and sought to remedy their grievances. 
But, as institutional channels proved unresponsive and its membership expanded, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers retained their commitment to legal advocacy and 
extended their platform to encompass mass agitational politics. From the 1990s, 
movement organizers embraced contentious street politics as an additional means to 
articulate Dalit concerns and, therefore, embraced the public sphere as a 
complementary forum to express their grievances and make political claims. 
Confronted with the ‘liberal’ use of stringent national security laws in the late-1990s, 
movement leaders tentatively entered electoral democracy as an alternate strategy to 
advocate Dalit interests. This movement from legal advocacy to agitational politics and 
then electoral democracy does not signal a radical aberration of early movement 
politics or imply that one mode of political practice supplanted what had come before, 
but rather denotes a layering of representative strategies in response to an evolving 
political landscape. A close study of these strategies across time enables us to evaluate 
the challenges associated with representing minority concerns under conditions of 
severe inequality and, thereby, to revisit the popular correlation between democratic 
participation and political representation. 
  
A Democratic Revolution? 
At the cusp of decolonization, Jawaharlal Nehru, who would soon feature as the 
nation’s first Prime Minister, opined that caste was antithetical to the very project of 
democracy in India. In The Discovery of India, Nehru wrote: 
 
In the context of society today, the caste system and much that goes with it are 
wholly incompatible, reactionary, restrictive, and barriers to progress. There 
can be no equality in status and opportunity within its framework, nor can 
there be political democracy, and much less, economic democracy. Between 
these two conceptions conflict is inherent, and only one of them can survive.40 
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For Nehru and many of the western educated reformers and liberal elite who filled the 
ranks of the early Congress Party, caste was envisioned as a residual, immutable 
vestige of tradition that, despite jeopardizing the expansion of democracy in India, 
would eventually buckle and yield to the idea of modern citizenship and economic 
progress in due time.41 But, political developments in the ensuing decades gave ample 
reason to pause and reassess this early prognosis. 
 Beginning with M.N. Srinivas in the late-1950s, Indian sociology observed a 
transformation of caste coincident with the expansion of democratic politics, 
acknowledging the reorientation of a purportedly vertical caste ‘system’ structured on 
a principle of hierarchy into horizontal congeries of caste divisions that had adapted to 
the quantitative logic of electoral politics. In an early essay, Srinivas challenged 
conventional wisdom, which had forecast the enervation of caste following the 
development of modern economic and political systems, to suggest quite the opposite: 
caste was not waning in tandem with the development of Indian democracy, but rather 
experiencing a “horizontal consolidation.”42 Subsequent studies by A.M. Shah and 
D.L. Sheth extended Srinivas’ early observations, taking note that caste had proven 
surprisingly malleable in its interface with democracy, prompting both authors to 
pronounce that caste was no longer moored in a vertical hierarchy, but had in fact 
been rearticulated through horizontal alliances to augment the political stature of 
preponderant groups.43 Tracing this development, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, Rajni 
Kothari, and Robert Hardgrave contributed empirical studies that investigated how 
caste federations adapted to the exigencies of electoral politics by broadening and 
leveraging their social base.44 
 By the latter decades of the twentieth century, many caste associations had 
transformed into political parties. While the years surrounding the submission (1980) 
and implementation (1990) of the Mandal Commission Report are reputed to have 
been a driving force for a “recalcitrance of caste” in the political arena, such scholarly 
approaches to the heightened visibility of caste in electoral politics was, at first, Janus-
faced.45 Although some pundits interpreted the newfound salience of caste in electoral 
politics to be a corrosive element that contributed to heightened levels of corruption 
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and a criminalization of politics, the dominant thrust in academic literature envisioned 
caste as an integral aspect of modern democracy, if not a democratizing force in its 
own right.46 While scholarship posits the prominence of caste in contemporary politics, 
it differs markedly in its treatment of post-Mandal politics, deliberating what these 
changes have brought to bear on the everyday functioning of representative 
institutions.47 Driven chiefly by studies on shifting patterns of electoral participation 
and marked changes in the social profile of elected representatives, recent scholarship 
repudiates critics who interpreted the prominence of caste in post-Mandal politics as 
emblematic of the ill-health of democracy, arguing instead that it had contributed to a 
more equitable distribution of authority. In effect, these scholars maintained that the 
politicization of caste had spurred a ‘democratization’ of the political system. 
Regardless of normative assessments, whether framed as a narrative of decline 
or a tale of the advent of popular democracy, lower caste voters have redrawn the 
contours of democratic politics from the late-1980s. Though electoral turnout has not 
increased dramatically, Yogendra Yadav noted, “the social composition of those who 
vote and take part in political activities has undergone a major change. There is a 
participatory upsurge among the socially underprivileged, whether seen in terms of 
caste hierarchy, economic class, gender distinction or the rural-urban divide.”48 
Likewise, Zoya Hasan detected “a dramatic upsurge in political participation,” which 
she discerned particularly “among the socially underprivileged in the caste and class 
hierarchy.”49 Not only do social minorities now exercise their franchise in record 
numbers, but the period witnessed the formation of autonomous political parties 
advocating on their behalf.50 In a study of how these developments altered the social 
composition of state assemblies and the national parliament, Christophe Jaffrelot 
borrowed an expression from former Prime Minister V. P. Singh when he trumpeted a 
“silent revolution,” referring to a “mostly peaceful transition” of political authority 
whereby the “plebeians” began to dislodge an entrenched elite from elected office.51 
Considered together, these scholars captured a critical moment of transition in modern 
Indian democracy, which they conveyed through a new, and ostensibly optimistic, 
lexicon. 
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 But, subsequent studies tempered the ebullient tenor of these earlier works. For 
instance, Surinder Jodhka argues that the relationship of caste to democracy cannot 
be captured in “a single, general thesis,” but must consider caste politics contextually 
and remain attentive to local power structures and patterns of material access. He 
cautions that what is often referred to as a ‘democratization’ of the electoral arena in 
fact denotes the entrenchment of particular caste interests in state institutions, which 
routinely serves to undermine the democratic aspirations of alternative groups. As a 
corrective, Jodhka calls for a “differentiated discussion” on caste and democracy that 
takes into account a “diversity of effects that political mobilizations by different caste 
groups can produce for the working of democracy.”52 Recent anthropological studies 
lend ethnographic weight to Jodhka’s contention, illuminating how caste competition 
is rearticulated through democratic politics and directed towards securing preferential 
access to state resources and opportunities.53 Among these studies, Jeffrey Witsoe 
illustrates how networks organized around caste “connect state institutions with local 
relations of dominance and subordination… producing a state unable to impartially 
deliver services and enforce individual rights.”54 His account conveys the uneven 
effects and “markedly undemocratic” outcomes often generated by caste politics, 
noting that “a “democratization” of power did not result in an equal empowerment for 
all, or even most, subaltern groups.”55 
 In addition, anthropologists have called our attention to the micro-level 
dynamics of caste politics and its interface with popular conceptions of democracy. In 
her study of caste politics in Uttar Pradesh, Lucia Michelutti considers how “ideas and 
practices of democracy become embedded in particular cultural and social practices 
and in turn become entrenched in the consciousness of ordinary people.”56 She argues 
that a focus on “the practices and ideas of local people” provides a necessary corrective 
to existing literature preoccupied with “macro-level explanations of ‘transition’ and 
‘consolidation’ which stress the roles played by institutions and elites.”57 “Importantly,” 
she writes, “this new literature on the anthropology of democracy draws attention to 
the daily lives and political struggles of people living in non-elite sectors of society.”58 
While Michelutti’s study affords critical insight into processes by which democracy, 
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both as an idea and set of practices, becomes “vernacularized” within a given milieu, it 
posits an uncomfortable dichotomy of “popular” and “elite,” which, if understood not 
as a binary but as relational categories, enables us to account for myriad other subject 
positions. Although anthropological studies have often focused on the popular 
understanding of democracy among ‘ordinary’ people, presenting it as a foil to that of 
traditional “elites,” scholars are yet to provide a sustained analysis of how political 
organizers representing marginalized groups experience its institutions and, further, 
how this contact informs their understanding of democratic practice. 
 My project contributes a complementary vantage point to this research agenda, 
conveying ethnographically how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers experience 
democratic institutions and investigating what this brings to bear on their 
understanding of democracy, electoral politics, and minority representation, both in 
terms of normative theory and everyday political practice. Whereas existing literature 
often treats democratic integration as a telos or examines how caste groups make 
instrumental use of the election platform to gain preferential access to state resources 
and benefits, less attention has considered how these new political figures 
conceptualize democracy vis-à-vis their exposure to its institutions and, as of yet, no 
account has provided a longitudinal study tracing the development of these 
perspectives across time. This dissertation attempts to do both through a diachronic 
study Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics, charting its evolution from a social movement into 
party politics and providing an ethnography of democratic participation that 
investigates how Dalit organizers interface with democratic institutions. Further, the 
project demonstrates that democratic integration does not inherently bolster minority 
representation, but, as its experience is necessarily mediated by prevalent social 
disparities based on caste, class, gender, and religion, democratic politics may actually 
serve to compound existing forms of inequality.  
 
Deconstructing ‘Dravidianism’ 
Before proceeding further, the dissertation requires an overview of Tamil Nadu 
politics to provide historical context for the emergence of autonomous Dalit parties. 
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Popular discourse often narrates the political history of Tamil Nadu as a hagiography 
of the Dravidian Movement, opening with the distinguished career of E.V. Ramasamy 
(EVR), a fiery iconoclast popularly known as “Periyar,” or the ‘Great Sage’. But, in 
fact, the seeds of Dravidian politics were sown in the provincial countryside during the 
late-nineteenth century when a “tiny élite of rich peasants,” to borrow the phrase from 
David Washbrook, consolidated their grip on agrestic labor and the village economy, 
gradually expanding their economic portfolios to include credit, banking, and trade in 
addition to commercial agriculture.59 Over time, this emergent class of village magnates 
migrated to growing market towns where they founded political and economic 
associations and gradually integrated into municipal government. It was some of these 
individuals who, in the early twentieth century, fronted the startup capital for the 
South Indian People’s Association (1916), popularly known as the Justice Party, an 
early tributary of the Dravidian Movement.60 The Justice Party provided a political 
platform for an emergent cluster of influential landowning castes to demand the 
political stature and social status that they felt was commensurate with their rising 
economic position.61 
 As Marguerite Ross Barnett observed, patterns of urbanization, class 
formation, and capital accumulation in the countryside gave rise to new political 
aspirations among upwardly mobile groups that had experienced mistreatment at the 
hands of Brahmins and perceived an apparent asymmetry in their developing 
economic stature and stagnant social position. Seeking improved access to formal 
education and government employment, they began to lobby British authorities for 
augmented access to avenues of development and cited as evidence their relative 
deprivation to the Brahmins, who featured prominently in colonial administration and 
academic institutions. Borrowing a term from colonial philology, this cluster of 
upwardly mobile non-Brahmin castes referred to themselves as “Dravidian,” an 
ethnicized concept that, as Karthigesu Sivathamby has argued, provided the “cultural 
glue” for a consolidated platform that, while purporting to speak for “non-Brahmins,” 
articulated the interests of select affluent, intermediate castes.62 In sum, the growth of 
Dravidian politics was not so much a new phenomenon in the early decades of the 
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twentieth century, but an extension of earlier caste-driven politics emanating from the 
countryside where an emergent class of economically mobile caste groups advanced its 
collective interests through an ostensibly inclusive, yet highly restrictive, rhetoric of 
“Dravidianism.” 
 The emergence of E. V. Ramasamy, an iconic leader and political provocateur 
born into a wealthy merchant family in Erode, and the formation of the Self-Respect 
Movement proved a watershed moment in the history of Dravidian politics. In 1925, 
EVR founded the Self-Respect Movement, an early precursor to the Dravida Kazhagam 
(DK), commonly called the Dravidian Movement. Later rechristened “Periyar,” 
meaning the “Great Sage,” EVR professed principles of rationalism, self-respect, and 
caste eradication, blaming societal ills on the disproportionate influence of Brahmins in 
the late Madras Presidency. In particular, he launched a vitriolic critique of Brahmin 
authority through inflammatory rhetoric that pitted a reified ‘Non-Brahmin’ majority 
against a small Brahmin minority preponderant in colonial administration and 
educational institutions. The ‘Brahmin’ provided a malleable trope for Davidian 
politics, signifying a foreign ‘other’ distinguished by religion (Hinduism), language 
(Sanskrit/Hindi), and apocryphal claims to ethnicity (Aryan); in essence, the 
‘Brahmin’ provided the foil against which ‘Dravidian’ was counterposed.63 As an effect, 
EVR’s politics kindled an incipient ethno-nationalism that carefully glossed caste 
divisions rife within Tamil society and provided a social dichotomy that structured 
subsequent politics: “Brahmin” and “non-Brahmin.” 
 In 1949, C.N. Annadurai, a DK activist and an acclaimed scriptwriter, flanked 
by celebrated personalities in the Tamil film industry, led a breakaway faction of DK 
members into party politics when he established the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(Dravidian Progress Federation), or DMK. Keen to seek their fortune in the 
newfound era of electoral democracy, DMK leaders harnessed the power of cinema 
and galvanized popular support through their unique brand of cultural nationalism 
that found a receptive audience in the early decades of post-Independence India.64 
Then, in 1956, the States Reorganization Act redrew territorial boundaries with an 
intent to establish more linguistically homogenous states in southern India; this, by 
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implication, ensured a chiefly Tamil-speaking electorate in present-day Tamil Nadu.65 
Language politics soon turned the tide in favor of DMK. Although intermittent anti-
Hindi agitations had gripped Tamil Nadu since the 1930s, tensions came to a head in 
1965 when DMK politicians alleged that the central government conspired to renew 
its earlier commitment to “impose” Hindi as the national language. Speaking in a 
classical idiom evoking Tamil antiquity, DMK leaders stoked popular sentiments 
through an impassioned defense of an apotheosized ‘Mother Tamil’.66 As a testament to 
its broad social appeal, in 1967 the DMK featured among the first regional parties to 
wrest power from the Indian National Congress in state government. 
 Following his death on February 3, 1969, Annadurai was succeeded by M. 
Karunanidhi, a celebrated screenwriter known simply by the moniker “Kalaignar” (the 
‘Artist’). Alarmed by the precipitous rise of cinema stars through party ranks, the 
DMK patriarch cast his eldest son, M. K. Muthu, in party-sponsored films as a shrewd 
endeavor to curb his rivals and consolidate his family’s position in the party structure.67 
Whereas Muthu’s acting career soon faded to oblivion, M. G. Ramachandran (MGR), 
an early DMK ally, converted his silver screen reputation as a patron of the poor into a 
real-life political persona.68 Sensing a plot to arrest his rising stature in the party and 
convert his extensive fan base into Muthu supporters, MGR rattled sabers and raised 
allegations of rampant corruption against DMK leadership. Dismissed from the DMK 
in 1972, MGR converted the widespread network of cinema fan clubs established in 
his name into an extensive grassroots political infrastructure and, casting himself as the 
genuine heir to the principles of the late DMK founder, launched the Anna Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (Anna’s—ADMK), to which he later added the prefix “All India” 
(AIADMK).69 With MGR at its helm, the AIADMK drubbed the DMK in the 1977 
Tamil Nadu assembly polls, but health ailments cut short his tenure as Chief Minister. 
Following MGR’s death on December 24, 1987, his former leading lady in the cinema 
field, J. Jayalalitha, consolidated her position in the party, over which she presided 
until her passing in 2016.70 
 From the late 1980s, however, Dravidian parties faced an insurgent challenge 
from ‘below’. Whereas the DMK and AIADMK had peddled a monolithic vision of a 
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‘casteless’ Tamil society, the release of the Mandal Commission Report (1980), which 
endorsed a controversial extension of reservations (affirmative action benefits) to 
members of backwards caste groups, occasioned a wave of quota politics that 
undermined the Dravidian parties’ capacity to gloss caste-specific issues. Appeals to 
“Mother Tamil” failed to resonate as the vernacular of Tamil politics shifted from 
cultural nationalism to the politics of the backwards castes. First, in 1980, Dr. S. 
Ramadoss founded the Vanniyar Sangam, an fusion of twenty-seven Vanniyar 
organizations representing Tamil Nadu’s largest caste community, under a single-point 
agenda: he demanded an exclusive reservations quota for Vanniyars in government 
employment and academic institutions.71 After demonstrating the sheer depth of his 
political support through a 1987 road roko (obstruction) protest that crippled 
transportation infrastructure and caused food shortages in the state capital, Ramadoss 
launched the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), or Toiling People’s Party, in 1989, which 
siphoned Vanniyar votes from Dravidian parties, especially the DMK, and often 
played the role of spoiler in tight elections.72  
 The following year, in 1990, national celebrations honoring the birth centenary 
of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a prominent Dalit icon, law-maker, and chief architect of the 
Indian Constitution, spurred an upwelling of Dalit mobilization. Across the 1990s, 
Dalit activists and intellectuals launched virulent critiques against both Dravidian 
parties, refuting their rhetoric of a ‘casteless’ Tamil society and raising allegations of 
endemic anti-Dalit bias. Pledging “to turn the history of Tamil Nadu politics on its 
head,” Thol. Thirumaavalavan, among the most prominent figures of this new 
generation of Dalit activists, mobilized his community through impassioned rhetoric, 
often couched in a militant idiom, that envisioned political power as an “asset” and 
beckoned his community to demand their due share. By the end of the decade, the 
largest Dalit movements in the state, namely Dr. K. Krishnasamy’s Pudhiya 
Tamizhagam (New Tamil Society; PT) and Thol. Thirumaavalavan’s Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal (Liberation Panthers), had gatecrashed the electoral arena and entered 
party politics.73 This transformation of non-electoral caste organizations into political 
parties posed a sustained challenge to the DMK and AIADMK, not only undermining 
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their capacity to speak on behalf of a ‘unified’ Tamil community, but charging their 
leaders with shunting political concerns of social minorities and catering to a handful 
of affluent, numerically preponderant intermediate castes.74 
 The relationship of Dravidian parties to an uptick in caste-based mobilization 
and reported incidents of inter-caste violence from the late-1980s has been subject to 
scholarly debate. While Narendra Subramanian contends that Dravidian politics 
effectively curtailed what could have been an explosion in sectarian conflict, 
interpreting its decline as a catalyst for alternative forms of political mobilization, 
others including John Harriss diagnose the rise in caste violence, and particularly acts 
targeting Dalits, as symptomatic of Dravidian politics, which, by privileging the 
interests of powerful intermediate castes, sowed the seeds for caste conflict dating back 
to its foray into electoral democracy. For Harriss, democratic politics prompted an 
“ideological regression” of Dravidian politics, which relinquished its earlier 
commitment to a radical social agenda and, instead, pandered to numerically 
preponderant backwards caste groups, often at the expense of comparatively more 
marginalized and less electorally mobilized segments (i.e. Dalits). My reading of events 
echoes Harriss’ contention that the growth of caste politics is not antithetical to an 
earlier Dravidian platform, but its natural extension. Dravidian parties abetted the 
consolidation of intermediate caste clusters as significant vote-banks and often pitted 
caste groups against each other in electoral politics.75 In effect, heightened levels of 
caste mobilization did not occur despite Dravidian parties, but as a logical 
consequence of their politics.76 
 Although the emergence of caste-based parties splintered key Dravidian vote 
banks, the DMK and AIADMK acclimated to the electoral terrain. By the late 1990s, 
Dravidian parties had come to rely on political coalitions to contest elections, wooing 
erstwhile rivals with lucrative alliance pacts and, at times, allegedly financing select 
parties to contest elections independently with an aim to split votes in their favor.77 
Dravidian parties have maintained their dominance, abetted by their influence over 
state institutions, extensive party infrastructure, and vast economic portfolios believed 
to span construction, real estate, media, liquor, and private education, with additional 
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revenue streams allegedly derived in relation to illicit mining and quarrying activity.78 
Further, both parties dealt adroitly with successive national governments, leveraging 
their support at the center to secure influential ministerial berths and procure 
resources to sustain state patronage networks.79 Flush with financial means, the DMK 
and the AIADMK did not so much crowd out recent political contenders from the 
electoral arena as much as they made use of party coffers and cadre to position 
themselves as the twin gateways into state politics, entrenching themselves as the chief 
custodians of the financial means and organizational machinery critical for election 
campaigns, thereby enabling them to set the terms of coalition politics. Cast against 
this backdrop, the following chapters examine the emergence of autonomous Dalit 
parties and their impact on the changing landscape of Tamil Nadu politics. 
 
Source Materials & Methodology 
Across five chapters, this project examines the transition of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
from boycotts to ballots, scrutinizing the diverse strategies used by VCK organizers to 
represent Dalit concerns and advocate social and political equality. Initially operating 
in 1980s Madurai, Tamil Nadu as the Dalit Panther Iyakkam (Movement), a small 
collective of Dalit activists drafted legal appeals that petitioned state authorities for the 
delivery of rights, impartial administration of law, and equitable access to economic 
and social development. As membership expanded and its early model of legal 
advocacy foundered, often failing to elicit an official response from state authorities, 
movement organizers embraced mass agitational politics as a complementary means to 
make political claims, engineering tactical disruptions of critical transportation 
infrastructure as an alternative strategy to amplify their voice, augment their presence, 
and intensify pressure on bureaucrats and politicians to address their demands. 
Following stringent security measures that impeded collective mobilization and 
restricted public assembly in the late-1990s, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
tentatively waded into the crowded arena of electoral democracy as an alternative 
strategy to represent Dalit interests and legitimize the movement in the eyes of state 
authorities, who they feared might dismantle their organization. Cognizant that 
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electoral politics may stipulate compromises that undercut robust Dalit advocacy, 
VCK leaders entered electoral democracy in 1999 intent to transform the upwelling of 
Dalit support into a vote-bank in order to “capture power” and augment their leverage 
in political negotiations.  
 This analysis of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition from boycotts to ballots 
draws from more than three years of research in southern India, extensive interviews 
with party organizers conducted across a decade, and a wide breadth of primary and 
secondary source materials. My initial exposure to the party and familiarity with its 
core leadership date back to a year of study in Madurai, Tamil Nadu, through the 
UW-Madison Year in India Program (2007-2008). As an undergraduate, I conducted 
the first round of interviews with leading VCK figures, now ten years in retrospect, 
which provides a longitudinal perspective to this study. As a second-year doctoral 
student at the University of Pennsylvania, I returned to Madurai for an intensive year 
of Tamil language study with the American Institute for Indian Studies (AIIS), which 
afforded sufficient latitude to extend my networks in the party and conduct further 
interviews with VCK party executives, district organizers, and local operatives (2010-
2011). Then, building atop this foundation, the bulk of the research collected for this 
dissertation occurred over thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork from May 2013 
to May 2014 in affiliation with the French Institute of Pondicherry (IFP). In addition 
to protracted periods in the field, I conducted abbreviated research tours during 
winter (2008) and summer months (2012; 2016). 
 While affiliated with IFP, I committed the majority of my field research 
traveling across the state, sometimes in the presence of VCK operatives, to attend 
political functions, observe rallies, and conduct interviews with a diverse cross-section 
of party operatives. Rather than assuming the conventional role of the ethnographer 
embedded at a dedicated field-site, I preferred to stay mobile during fieldwork and, 
thereby, embedded myself in the community of social activists at the center of my 
study.80 This mobility permitted me to engage a wide range of party functionaries and 
conduct targeted research tours at multiple field-sites across Tamil Nadu such as 
Madurai, Chidambaram, Cuddalore, Perambalur, Villupuram, Tiruvallur, and 
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Chennai. Moreover, this mobility in the field delivered an unexpected boon: I 
encountered party members who joined the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal at different phases 
in its development and who worked in disparate regions. As I discovered, many of 
these individuals maintained a personal archive of original documents related to early 
movement activity in their district and readily shared these materials to advance my 
research, providing access to primary source materials never before reviewed by 
scholars. Following an interview, longtime organizers fetched boxes of original 
documents from household cupboards and, upon brushing off a thick layer of dust, 
retrieved early documents including original photographs, wall-posters, handbills, 
political pamphlets, intra-movement correspondence, and meeting minutes in addition 
to clippings from vernacular periodicals and newspapers that covered seminal events. 
With their permission, I digitized more than 500 pages of primary materials and nearly 
300 pages of rare secondary sources that contribute invaluable depth and add context 
to this study. 
 Further, the dissertation project draws substantively on secondary sources 
published in the English press. Most newspaper reports contained herein were 
gathered from activists in the field or accessed through the microfilm archive housed in 
the Van Pelt Library at the University of Pennsylvania and the international 
periodicals collection in the Perry-Castañeda Library at the University of Texas at 
Austin. The chapters utilize statistical reports on elections compiled by the Election 
Commission of India (ECI) and my transitions of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal political 
oratory, that is, published transcripts of speeches delivered at party rallies and 
available for sale at a bookstall adjacent to the party headquarters in Velachery, 
Chennai.81 These translations are my own and, therefore, I assume full responsibility 
for their accuracy. Considered together, this dissertation culls a breadth of primary 
and secondary source materials, extensive interviews with party organizers, and 
ethnographic fieldwork in order to provide an empirical study of minority 
representation and democratic participation that draws primarily on the perspectives 
of long-time operatives and party leadership, that is, the figures who navigated the 
movement’s transition from social protest to party politics. Stitching together a 
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narrative from disparate sources and fragmentary archives, this project contributes an 
ethnographic view on democratic politics and minority representation through a 
diachronic study the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal in Tamil Nadu, India. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
The dissertation contains five chapters, each of which opens with a review of theory 
tailored to its core intervention. The first three chapters present different approaches 
adopted by VCK organizers to represent Dalit interests and make political claims on 
state authority. The first chapter examines the movement’s initial platform of legal 
advocacy, the second focuses on its subsequent embrace of mass agitational politics, 
and the third charts the movement’s entry into electoral democracy. While these 
chapters, as outlined below, are organized chronologically to bring into focus the 
various strategies of political representation used by Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
to advocate Dalit interests, this is not intended to imply that one strategy supplants the 
next as the movement developed, but to call our attention to a layering of political 
strategies across time that enables us to evaluate why VCK organizers emphasized 
particular models of representation at specific junctures in response to a changing 
political landscape. The final two chapters delve deeper into how VCK leaders recall 
their direct experience of electoral politics and discuss its relationship to democracy. 
These chapters convey why these individuals discuss their electoral participation with 
severe trepidation, concerned that compromises stipulated by electoral competition 
have come at the expense of robust Dalit advocacy. Altogether, the project provides an 
ethnographic study of democratic integration and political representation, drawing 
foremost on perspectives of Dalit leadership and long-term political operatives. 
  The first chapter (1982-1992) examines the initial program of the Tamil Nadu 
Dalit Panther Iyakkam (movement), the early predecessor to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. 
As a small collective of Dalit lawyers, public-sector employees, and student activists, 
movement organizers lobbied government bureaucrats and political authorities to 
fulfill their professional obligations to Dalit citizens, submitting formal legal petitions 
through institutional channels. I present early DPI politics in terms of a struggle to 
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avail fundamental rights through a legal platform that demanded equitable access to 
social and economic development. In describing this early program, I draw principally 
on primary materials compiled by Vinoth Ambedkar, the son of M. Malaichamy, the 
inaugural DPI Chairman in Tamil Nadu. This archive consists of letters, legal 
petitions, political pamphlets, rally handbills, and wall posters that I have translated 
from Tamil to English. I supplement these materials with personal interviews taken 
with leading DPI activists and secondary sources such as local newspapers, vernacular 
journals, and rare, locally published and circulated political pamphlets. Combining 
historical and ethnographic methodologies, I examine early VCK attempts to employ 
legal advocacy as a principal instrument in lobbying for the delivery of basic rights, 
equitable administration of law, and equal access to avenues of social and economic 
development. Ultimately, the futility of this initial paradigm affords the backdrop 
against which to consider the movement’s subsequent turn to mass agitational politics.  
  The second chapter (1992-1997) investigates the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
embrace of mass agitational politics in supplement to its early legal advocacy. As the 
movement mobilized a mass cadre base, its activists engineered tactical disruptions in 
the public sphere to capture public attention and command broad media coverage. 
They embraced provocative, public displays of organizational strength that disrupted 
the ebb and flow of everyday life as a deliberate strategy to amplify their voice and 
communicate demands to higher echelons of state authority. Drawing from a 
repertoire of action including peranikal (protest marches), dharnas (hunger fasts), 
transit rokos (blockages), bandhs (general strikes) and unlicensed assemblies, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers executed tactical disruptions in the public sphere, focusing on 
critical transportation infrastructure, to amply pressure on authorities to redress 
specific occurrences of caste violence and recognize their grievances. The chapter 
draws upon primary materials such as political pamphlets, handbills, intra-movement 
correspondence, original photographs, newspaper microfilm, and Tamil-language 
journals, as well as in-depth interviews with VCK organizers. Conjoining primary 
sources with ethnography, the chapter conveys how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
recollect this radical phase of movement politics. Assembling these perspectives, I 
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convey their perspectives on why tactical disruptions in the public sphere provided an 
effective means to augment minority franchise and expand democratic participation. 
 The third chapter chronicles the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition from 
boycotts to ballots, attending to internal debates as well as external dynamics that 
spurred the organization toward electoral democracy at the turn of the millennium. 
Focusing on a three-year span preceding the movement’s electoral turn (1997-1999), I 
investigate how movement organizers evaluated the relative merits of direct electoral 
participation. Whereas a small number of VCK leaders pressed for an underground 
struggle, envisioning a militant movement in the likeness of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a clear majority of its leadership advocated a turn toward 
electoral democracy as a strategy to convert the upwelling of popular support into a 
vote bank that would serve to augment their leverage in negotiations with political 
authorities. Drawing on interviews with VCK leaders ranging from its chairman and 
general secretaries to long-term grassroots activists, the chapter examines different 
views of democratic participation that came to the fore at a critical juncture when 
organizers tread hesitantly towards the electoral arena. Synthesizing ethnography with 
primary and secondary source materials, the chapter provides a diachronic perspective 
on democratic integration, conveying why movement organizers reappraised their 
initial adherence to electoral boycotts and came to regard the state less as a recipient of 
petition (i.e., chapter one) or object of protest (i.e., chapter two), but as an ensemble of 
institutions that demarcated a new locus of political struggle. 
  While the opening chapters chronicle different strategies deployed by Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers to advocate Dalit rights—legal advocacy, agitational politics, 
electoral democracy—the final two chapters provide ethnography of direct electoral 
participation. The fourth chapter focuses on the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s tenure in 
electoral democracy (1999-present), conveying how VCK organizers recall their 
experience of democratic politics today, now fifteen years after their electoral turn. 
Although the movement has enjoyed some, albeit limited, electoral success, winning 
three seats in the state legislature as well as a berth in parliament, party leaders express 
concern that compromises stipulated by electoral competition have tempered their 
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movement’s earlier robust Dalit advocacy. To enter electoral politics was not to enter 
democracy, they claim, but to approach the electoral platform as a strategy, albeit not 
one entirely of their choosing, to realize what they understood to be core democratic 
principles such as panmaittuvam (pluralism), samattuvam (equality) and urimaikal 
(rights).82 While upholding an idea of democracy premised on these principles, they 
pinpoint tensions that inhere at the interstices of electoral politics and democratic 
values, identifying instances where electoral considerations undercut their capacity for 
robust minority advocacy. The chapter conveys ethnographically how Dalit activists 
evoke democracy as the battleground of their struggle for equality, selectively drawing 
on its political vocabulary and social imaginary to energize their political program and 
call for the extension of democratic principles from the domain of theory into the 
contested arena of social life. 
  Finally, the fifth chapter presents ethnography from the 2014 Lok Sabha 
Election to illustrate how VCK candidates navigate the contested terrain of an election 
campaign. Across four weeks, I tailed VCK General Secretary D. Ravikumar 
throughout his parliamentary bid in Tiruvallur District of northern Tamil Nadu. The 
chapter draws on this experience to provide ethnography of electoral participation, 
investigating how a VCK candidate experiences an election campaign as a minor 
player within a powerful coalition. In particular, the chapter conveys how caste, to 
which direct electoral appeals are banned by the Election Commission of India (ECI), 
surfaces on the campaign trail to structure vote-canvassing techniques, political 
rhetoric, and a marked division of campaign labor. The chapter examines instances 
where direct electoral participation appears to silence the very voices presumed to be 
‘surging’ within India’s expanding democratic arena, or as Ravikumar quips, how the 
election campaign may render Dalit candidates as “mute spectators” of their own 
campaigns.83 The chapter concludes with an ethnographic account of what VCK 
leaders perceive to be critical flaws in the present system of electoral reservations. 
Combining ethnography, election materials, and interviews conducted during the 
campaign, the chapter explores the institutional challenge of providing for substantive 
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minority representation in electoral democracy and conveys how Dalit organizers 
conceptualize this dilemma today. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Recasting Land, Labor, and Local Economy: 
From Dalit Panthers to Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, 1982-1992 
 
Introduction 
On December 6, 1982, A. Malaichamy convened the inaugural state conference of the 
Tamil Nadu Bharatiya Dalit Panther (BDP), known locally as the Dalit Panther Iyakkam 
(DPI) or Dalit Panther Movement.1 In preparation, he coordinated with local Dalit 
public sector employees, lawyers, and student activists to publicize the introductory 
conference across Madurai District. In pre-circulated handbills, Malaichamy beckoned 
his Dalit “brothers and sisters” to extend their support, exhorting local communities, 
“We must struggle for our rights and raise our voice against the injustice that has been 
done to us.”2 Malaichamy utilized the maiden DPI conference, likely the earliest mass 
assembly of Dalits in Madurai District, to demand the impartial administration of law 
and delivery of rights. Among the core grievances, he charged the state government 
with undermining Dalit development by fobbing off his community with welfare 
subsidies in place of enforcing the extant laws and recognizing their rights. In bolded 
text, Malaichamy proclaimed, “Our rights have been refused in the name of 
percentage-wise subsidies. This is detrimental to our economic condition.”3 Further, he 
underscored that the DPI had not entered the political arena to petition for augmented 
welfare benefits or provisional concessions, but to demand that the state fulfill its 
mandate to Dalit citizens, which he understood as the delivery of rights, abolition of 
caste discrimination, assurances for basic physical security, equal opportunity to 
participate in the economy, and the implementation of constitutional prerogatives 
promoting Dalit development. 
After Malaichamy’s sudden death on September 14, 1989, his firebrand 
successor, R. Thirumaavalavan, maintained his predecessor’s emphasis on rights-based 
assertion.4 In an early interview published in Kalki magazine, a Tamil weekly, 
Thirumaavalavan echoed Malaichamy’s contention that state officials had fobbed off 
Dalit communities with welfare concessions in lieu of enforcing their basic rights. 
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Alleging that political parties had grown anxious due to his movement’s consolidation 
of Dalit support, he surmised: 
 
The politicians are worried and, on this basis, they are announcing concessions. 
They think that they can satisfy us with such concessions. But, we are 
demanding rights. We want equal rights to living and participating in society 
commensurate to those enjoyed by the caste people… If the government and the 
dominant castes are ready to offer alms to us, it is because they consider this preferable to 
sharing rights equally among us.5 
 
Both Malaichamy and Thirumaavalavan, more than fifteen years apart, advanced a 
model of Dalit politics not predicated on extracting augmented welfare or wrangling 
concessions from the state, but foremost concerned with the enforcement of existing 
rights.6 
These two vignettes, drawn from the historical record of Tamil Nadu Dalit 
politics, contrast with the popular representation of lower caste assertion, which 
frequently depicts collective forms of protest that generate a visible and often 
disruptive public presence. It is presumably through such modes of political practice, 
which Partha Chatterjee has termed “political society,” that “subalterns” are said to 
deploy a calculative rationality that instrumentally leverages their electoral franchise to 
broker tenuous concessions with state authorities and access welfare subsidies that 
sustain their precarious livelihoods.7 While in agreement that social groups lacking 
inherited capital often regard the democratic state as a primary conduit for social and 
economic development, I caution that we cannot reduce their politics to collective 
demands for augmented welfare or provisional state benefits, and must attend to the 
substantive foundations undergirding such appeals. As this chapter demonstrates, 
Dalits approached the state less as a dispensary of welfare than as the adjudicator of 
law and guarantor of rights. And, as we shall see, early DPI organizers first espoused 
legal advocacy as a platform to petition state authorities through institutional channels 
qua democratic citizens. As these channels proved unresponsive, DPI organizers 
expanded their program to encompass mass agitational politics as a complementary 
means to make claims on state authority, amplify their voices to centers of power, and 
demand recognition as democratic citizens. 
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 Focusing on a ten-year period from 1982-1992, this chapter examines the initial 
stage of popular Dalit mobilization in Tamil Nadu. It shows that, across the 1980s, 
Malaichamy and his associates advanced a program concerned foremost with the 
administration of law and delivery of rights. Although the DPI later embraced a 
tactical deployment of mass agitational politics in the 1990s, this mode of political 
assertion did not provide a starting point for the early movement. Rather, DPI politics 
originates in legal appeals submitted through formal institutional channels that 
entreated government authorities to fulfill their professional obligations, seeking to 
remedy their grievances and redress specific instances of discrimination. These 
demands often pertained to the rights of Dalit laborers, equitable access to public 
resources, and the non-implementation of the reservations policy intended to bolster 
the social and economic development of their community. Throughout the 1980s, DPI 
organizers advanced a program of legal advocacy that, in citing pertinent laws and 
constitutional prerogatives, lobbied state officials to fulfill their obligations to Dalit 
citizens. As these petitions proved futile, DPI organizers re-appraised and expanded 
their early program to embrace alternative, and increasingly confrontational, styles of 
political engagement as a complementary strategy to represent their constituents and 
make claims on state authority. 
 
Writing Dalit Assertion 
In The Politics of the Governed and his subsequent works, Partha Chatterjee (2004) 
highlights a critical disjuncture between actually existing democratic practice and how 
it has been conceptualized in liberal theory.8 Seeking to capture “a new moment in the 
democratization of Indian politics and society,” his distinction between civil and 
political society provides an entry point for thinking alternative forms of engagement 
deployed by differentiated groups of citizens.9 Chatterjee describes political society as 
the domain where ‘subalterns’ make claims on the state not as full rights-bearing 
citizens, but as population groups whose collective demands that often “transgress the 
strict lines of legality” and often involve claims “grounded in violations of the law.”10 It 
is through such tenuous negotiations in political society, where marginalized 
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populations make use of “a large range of connections” and “exercise their franchise as 
an instrument of political bargaining,” that these groups wrest tentative concessions 
from governmental agencies and gain access to the welfare subsidies that sustain their 
precarious livelihoods.11 Of course, these concessions are best understood as products 
of political expediency rather than formal, recognized rights. 
Whereas political society serves as the primary mode of political participation 
for large swathes of India’s poor and underprivileged, Chatterjee characterizes civil 
society as “the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider 
popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and 
rational law.”12 He envisions civil society “as an actually existing arena of institutions 
and practices inhabited by a relatively small section of the people.”13 In effect, civil 
society provides an avenue of political engagement accessible to a “demographically 
limited” stratum of middle class and urban elite.14 Whilst civil society encapsulates the 
normative ideals of liberal modernity, political society provides the murky terrain upon 
which democratic politics actually “takes place on the ground in India.”15 Attending to 
how marginalized population groups navigate dense networks of political clientelism 
and broker tenuous concessions with authorities, Chatterjee encourages us to consider 
how nominally recognized citizens experience democratic politics through everyday 
negotiations that occur outside the purview of liberal democratic theory. 
Chatterjee’s contribution continues to animate scholarship on popular politics 
in South Asia and beyond, but scholars have called into question the limits of his 
analytical framework.16 Critiques tend to either disrupt his dichotomization of society 
into distinct domains or challenge his attribution of particular styles of political 
engagement to discreet populations. For example, Nivedita Menon (2010) unsettles 
the dichotomy of civil and political society when perceived as separate domains, 
populations, and practices, suggesting instead that these heuristics be interpreted “as 
conceptual distinctions rather than as actual empirical groupings” and, therefore, as 
representing “two styles of political engagement that are available to people—the 
former style is more available to an urbanized elite, the latter to the rest.”17 Whereas 
Menon accentuates divergent styles of engagement, Aparna Sundar and Nandini 
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Sundar (2012) advise against classifying discreet population groups as either civil or 
political society, pointing to instances where marginalized groups draw selectively 
from both repertoires. Significantly, Sundar and Sundar stress that the poor and 
underprivileged not only stake “contingent claims to livelihood or recognition,” but 
share “a common idea of citizenship” and frame political demands on the basis of 
property rights and law.18 Taken together, Menon and the Sundars caution that 
attributes of political society cannot be ascribed to discreet populations, which, despite 
myriad forms of engagement, routinely advance rights-based claims grounded in law. 
Although civil and political society provide enduring heuristics that distinguish 
styles of political practice, the latter has most often been interpreted in a manner that 
hitches subaltern assertion to welfare functions of the postcolonial state and, in doing 
so, elides robust scrutiny of the substantive basis motivating much political claim 
making today. While Chatterjee acknowledges that “the culturally equipped middle 
class” is better suited to navigate the political system than “the poor or 
underprivileged,” his account portrays subaltern demands as “grounded in violations of 
the law” and foremost concerned with issues related to “habitation and livelihood as a 
matter of right.”19 That is, subaltern political claim making is presumed to draw upon 
an understanding of rights whose legitimacy derives not from formal interpretations of 
legal statutes or constitutional norms, but instead through what he terms “the moral 
assertion of popular demands.”20 On the contrary, as this chapter demonstrates, early 
DPI organizers approached the state less as a dispensary of welfare than as the 
adjudicator of law and guarantor of rights, adopting legal advocacy as a primary 
strategy to petition state authorities qua democratic citizens and articulate claims 
grounded in law. 
This argument resonates with contemporary scholarship examining how Dalits 
take recourse to law in their struggle for dignity and equal rights. In her analysis of 
depressed class politics in the late Madras Presidency, Rupa Viswanath documents 
attempts whereby an earlier generation of Dalit leaders petitioned colonial 
administrators to enforce what they perceived to be fundamental rights.21 Further, 
recent ethnographic studies stress the centrality of law and advocacy to Dalit 
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movements today. As Suryakant Waghmore observes, Dalits routinely approach the 
state in their struggle for justice, seeking to draw caste contestations out of systems 
imbued with ‘traditional’ authority and into modern liberal institutions.22 In their study 
of western Tamil Nadu, Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve illustrate how Dalit 
movements invoke the law and combine litigation with social mobilization to oppose 
caste-based offenses and contest chronic asymmetries in inter-caste relations.23 
Further, Suryakant Waghmore and Jens Lerche have both examined instances where 
Dalit activism inflects global human rights discourse, investigating the utility and 
limitations of transnational advocacy for Dalit mobilization.24 Drawing upon varied 
methodologies and diverse field sites, these studies highlight the salience of legal 
advocacy and rights delivery as a constant feature of Dalit politics. This chapter 
contributes an additional perspective to the existing literature, demonstrating how the 
early DPI sought to utilize legal advocacy as an instrument to represent Dalit interests, 
lobby for equal rights, and demand equitable access to the means of social and 
economic development. 
 
Chapter Outline 
Focusing on the period of 1982-1992, this opening chapter chronicles the emergence of 
the Dalit Panther Iyakkam (DPI) in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. I examine early DPI politics 
in terms of a struggle to avail basic rights through a legal platform that advanced 
demands for equitable access to social and economic development. In describing this 
early program, I draw principally upon primary materials in the Tamil language such 
as personal missives, formal petitions, photographs, and original movement 
propaganda such as handbills, rally pamphlets, and wall posters.25 To supplement these 
primary sources, I integrate a breadth of secondary source material including Tamil 
newspapers, vernacular journals, early interviews, and small locally published and 
circulated pamphlets. Further, I incorporate personal conversations with early Dalit 
Panther and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers to convey how these individuals 
recollect their initial program and why they recall their early politics in terms of a 
	
 
38 
democratic assertion that demanded the delivery of rights, equitable administration of 
law, and equal access to avenues of social and economic development. 
 This chapter opens with a discussion of the development of the Tamil Nadu 
Bharatiya Dalit Panthers (BDP), more commonly referred to as the Dalit Panthers of 
India (DPI) or Dalit Panther Iyakkam (movement). First tracing its antecedents in the 
northern state of Maharashtra, I examine how networks forged through kinship and 
labor migration contributed to a widening sphere of Dalit activists across India and 
facilitated the DPI’s initial expansion to Madurai, Tamil Nadu, in 1982. Yet, in 
contrast to the confrontational street politics espoused by its counterparts in 
Maharashtra, the early DPI in Tamil Nadu addressed issues pertaining to Dalit rights, 
labor security, and economic access by way of legal petitions submitted through 
formal, institutional channels. Initially operating as a de facto labor union that 
concentrated on the travails of Dalit employees in the public sector, the DPI gradually 
expanded its political program to promulgate popular rights-based awareness and 
promote Dalit access to higher education and technical training. 
 Next, this chapter traces the origins of the DPI’s successor, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, or the Liberation Panthers. After the death of A. Malaichamy, the 
inaugural DPI Tamil Nadu State Convener, on September 14, 1989, movement 
activities stalled until a handful of early activists conferred leadership upon Thol. 
Thirumaavalavan at a modest ceremony convened on January 21, 1990. Rechristened 
as Viduthalai Chiruthaigal shortly thereafter, movement activists embraced a provocative 
model of political assertion and projected an ostensibly militant culture in the likeness 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in neighboring Sri Lanka. Attentive to 
the socio-economic plight of Dalit communities, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal intervened 
directly following instances of caste discrimination and into economic disputes as it 
amassed a cadre base across Madurai District. The movement not only demanded that 
state authorities safeguard Dalit rights, but intervened directly in anti-Dalit violence 
and discriminatory practices that they felt impeded Dalit development, often 
concentrating on matters related to local political economy.  
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Finally, the chapter concludes with ethnographic material that conveys how 
DPI organizers recollect their early politics as a form of democratic assertion that 
demanded the delivery of fundamental rights, administration of law, and equitable 
access to social and economic development. In our conversations, early movement 
leaders acknowledge that untouchability was not strictly characterized by social stigma 
and caste hierarchy, but predicated on a basic principle of exclusion that structured 
differentiated access to the local economy and state resources. Despite shifting 
strategies in Dalit mobilization, from a petition based politics to popular mobilization, 
these demands remained a constant feature of early movement politics. An account of 
early DPI politics not only provides a window into the initial phase of DPI activity, 
but also a backdrop against which to consider its subsequent development. Prior to 
inspecting the contents and principal issues advanced by these early appeals, the 
chapter first situates the emergence of the Tamil Nadu DPI within its broader 
historical context, investigating how networks forged by kinship and migrant labor 
integrated an expanding, pan-national sphere of Dalit activists. 
 
Precursors in Maharashtra 
In the mid-twentieth century, revolutionary ideas bloomed amidst the squalor of 
Bombay’s sprawling chawl tenements. Dalit youth, some of whom were the first 
generation to attain postgraduate education through reservations, observed that the 
lived reality of caste belied their aspiration for social progress.26 They embraced 
literature as a medium to express their revulsion with the present state-of-affairs and 
convey their frustration at the slow pace of socio-economic change. Toward the end of 
the 1960s, a new wave of Dalit literary production flooded Maharashtra, stretching 
well beyond its early epicenter in Bombay. Collectively referred to as the Little 
Magazine Movement, these poets, authors and street artists deployed a range of 
literary forms to express their aversion to the Congress government and caste system, 
as well as their dismay with the state of Dalit electoral politics. Noted for flouting 
literary conventions in a language often steeped in vulgarity, literary magazines such as 
Vidroh (Revolt) and Magova (Search/Hunt) provided vehicles through which Dalit 
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poets decried their subjection to ritual indignities and routine humiliations and 
critiqued the political, social, and economic crises besetting their community.27 In 
particular, their writing assailed the ruling Congress Party, described as nothing more 
than a continuation of earlier feudal rule, the caste system, interpreted as a by-product 
of the Hindu religion and its varnashrama dharma, and the ineffective leadership of the 
Republican Party in the post-Ambedkar era, which, they alleged, had compromised 
core principles in exchange for nominal political status. 
  In 1972, prominent Dalit writers from the Little Magazine Movement 
congregated to discuss the stagnation of Maharashtrian Dalit politics and explore 
alternatives to the Republican Party. On September 9, 1972, these poets expanded 
their literary assertion to encompass political action and formally launched a new kind 
of Dalit organization at a public meeting at Siddhartha Nagar, Bombay. Drawing their 
name and militant demeanor from the Black Panthers of America, they christened 
themselves Dalit Panthers. ‘Dalit’, the past participle of the Sanskrit verb “dal” 
meaning “to split or crack,” referred to those who are “broken or reduced to pieces 
generally.”28 Not merely descriptive, these young men and women embraced the term 
‘dalit’ to signify “a new oppositional consciousness.”29 Thus, as Eleanor Zelliot writes, 
“Dalit implies those who have been broken, ground down by those above them in a 
deliberate and active way. There is in the term itself an inherent denial of pollution, 
karma, and justified caste hierarchy.”30 Endorsing an electoral boycott, the Dalit 
Panthers mounted a virulent attack on the Indian government, caste system, and 
Hindu religion. Disavowing M. K. Gandhi’s model of ahimsa, or non-violence, the 
Dalit Panthers embraced provocative displays of public dissent that sometimes 
culminated in violent altercations with backwards caste communities. 
 The Dalit Panthers espoused a radical political agenda in their 1973 manifesto. 
Drafted by Namdeo Dhasal, one of the movement’s primary ideologues, the document 
conveyed early synergy between Dalit Panther and Communist politics, particularly 
with the Naxal movement emanating from West Bengal. The manifesto designated 
enemies of Dalits as ‘power, wealth, price; landlords, capitalists, money-lenders and 
their lackeys; those parties who indulge in religious or casteist politics, and the 
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Government which depends on them.”31 Further, it dismissed Congress rule as no 
more than a thin democratic veil cast over an earlier feudal system that had subjugated 
Dalits for centuries. Conveying the Panthers’ disillusionment with the present political 
order, the manifesto signaled the movement’s expanding political ambition, declaring, 
“Change of heart, liberal education will not end our state of exploitation. When we 
gather a revolutionary mass, rouse the people, out of the struggle of this giant mass will 
come the tidal wave of revolution.”32 Acknowledging the futility of “legalistic appeals, 
requests, demands for concessions, elections, satyagraha (nonviolent resistance),” the 
Panthers embraced provocative displays of public dissent alongside confrontational 
street politics that aggravated communal tensions with rival groups including the 
Hindu and Maratha majoritarian Shiv Sena, which was closely interlinked with local 
police.33 
 From 1967, agrestic upheaval drove hordes of rural migrants into Bombay’s 
crowded slums, an influx of urban poor that peaked in 1972 following a severe 
statewide drought. The Panthers’ critique of the present political order and their 
community’s socio-economic stasis found a receptive audience among these migrants, 
many of whom sought employment and security. In coming years, Dalit Panther 
politics fused an acerbic appraisal of the Congress government with labor politics 
brought them into alignment with Communist movements.34 For example, Dalit 
Panther organizers exerted their muscle in mobilizing their community behind the 
1974 Communist-led labor strikes in Bombay’s textile mills. Shortly thereafter, the 
confluence of Dalit and Communist labor politics came to a head during the 1974 Lok 
Sabha By-election in central Bombay when the Dalit Panthers’ bonhomie with the 
Communists pitted them against the Congress, Shiv Sena, and Republican Party.35 On 
January 5, 1974, the Dalit Panthers convened a public meeting at Ambedkar Ground 
in Worli where their leaders were expected to declare the movement’s stand for the 
upcoming election. The assembly devolved into chaos when non-Dalit youth residing 
in adjacent chawls, accompanied by Shiv Sena supporters and backed by local police, 
disrupted the rally and an all-out riot engulfed the BBD chawls of Worli. 
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 Ultimately, the apogee and near collapse of the Dalit Panthers coincided in 
1974. Through a display of strength in the Worli Riots and its effective boycott of the 
Lok Sabha by-election, in which the participation of almost 20,000 Dalits contributed 
indirectly to a Communist victory, the movement demonstrated commanding influence 
over a substantial share of Bombay’s Dalit electorate, not to mention considerable 
sway among the city’s informal labor market. Yet, this fusion of labor with radical 
politics contributed to its precipitous decline. The Dalit Panthers incited the ire of the 
ruling Congress party, which capitalized on the suspension of democratic procedures 
during Indira Gandhi’s State of Emergency (1975-77) to dismantle its infrastructure 
and incarcerate its core leadership.36 Dalit Panther leaders defied Emergency rule, but 
heavy-handed police repression drove the movement underground. Moreover, strong 
state pressure exacerbated an already contentious rift between leading Dalit Panther 
ideologues, Namdeo Dhasal and Raja Dhale, which further sapped the movement’s 
early vitality and spurred its swift fade from prominence in Bombay politics.  
 
Beyond Bombay 
Following the termination of the Emergency in 1977, core Dalit Panther organizers 
including Arun Kamble, Ramdas Athawale, S. M. Pradhan, and D. Mhaske founded 
the Bharatiya Dalit Panther (BDP).37 From the 1980s, the BDP expanded beyond its 
initial epicenter in Maharashtra through kinship and labor migration networks linking 
its organizers with an expanding sphere of Dalit activists across India. Discussing 
these efforts, Ramdas Athawale informed me on February 22, 2014, that, by the early 
1980s, the organization had established branches in nearly twenty states across India 
including Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
and Tamil Nadu. Referencing Tamil Nadu, Athawale recounted the active 
participation of Tamil Dalits in his movement, many of whom had migrated from 
Madurai and Tirunelveli to Dharavi, a sprawling slum in central Bombay. Twice 
yearly, national networks of Dalit activists converged in Nagpur to participate in 
massive public ceremonies commemorating the birth and death anniversaries of Dr. B. 
R. Ambedkar on April 14th and December 6th, respectively. 
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 On one such occasion in the early 1980s, Athawale’s supporters introduced him 
to A. Malaichamy, a Madurai-based law student and Dravida Kazhagam youth-wing 
coordinator, who he subsequently recruited to usher the movement into Tamil Nadu. 
Born March 11, 1954, Malaichamy, the son of a government clerk, became the first 
college graduate in his family when he completed a Bachelor of the Arts (B.A.) in 
economics at Madurai Wakf Board College. He joined Madurai Law College in 1981 
and received board certification from the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu in 1984.38 While 
still working toward his Juris Doctor (J.D.), Malaichamy formally accepted 
responsibility as state convener in Tamil Nadu at a public ceremony presided over by 
Arun Kamble at Kāndiccāl Tiḍal in Dharavi, Bombay, on April 24, 1982.39 After 
accepting his role in the Bharatiya Dalit Panther, referred to in Tamil as the Dalit Panther 
Iyakkam (DPI), or Dalit Panther Movement, Malaichamy resigned his position in the 
Dravida Kazhagam to concentrate exclusively on the challenges besetting local Dalit 
communities.40 
 On September 18-19, Malaichamy organized a public symposium at Tantai 
Periyar Maligai in Tallakulam, Madurai, to chart the future direction of the Tamil Nadu 
Bharatiya Dalit Panther, which was more commonly referred to by it English name, the 
Dalit Panthers of India (DPI) or Dalit Panther Iyakkam (movement). To bolster 
attendance, the DPI solicited donations from Dalit government employees that 
provided participants with lodging and meals. The symposium agenda foregrounded a 
core principle that governed subsequent movement politics: the DPI had not entered 
the political arena to lobby for augmented welfare subsidies, but to demand the 
impartial administration of law and delivery of rights.41 On the symposium agenda, 
Malaichamy wrote: 
 
Today, the oppressed people expect humanitarianism and basic human 
decency from others; but, rather than providing a means for our people to 
live in this country, they are offered only a percentage-wise quota. Our 
rights have been denied in the name of subsidies (saluhai); this is 
detrimental to our economic condition.42 
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The 1982 symposium set the tone for subsequent DPI politics, demanding rights 
delivery in unequivocal terms and declaring that Dalits would no longer be fobbed off 
with state subsidies. But, Malaichamy acknowledged the challenge of instilling rights-
based awareness among local communities, writing, “Presently, the oppressed people 
live without physical and economic security and suffer such intense hardship that they 
do not even have time to think about their rights. Even the few who understand their 
rights are unable to attain justice. For them, justice is an unreachable horizon.”43  
 Building momentum, Malaichamy convened his movement’s inaugural state 
conference on December 6, 1982, at Tamukkam Ground in Madurai city.44 The 
function occurred in the presence of Savitha Ambedkar, wife of the late Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar and Ramdas Athawale, both of whom were national Bharatiya Dalit Panther 
organizers, alongside BDP leaders from neighboring states. The state conference 
touted an ambitious political agenda that aimed to coordinate national Dalit 
cooperation, petition the enforcement of reservations policy, demand the eradication of 
untouchability, and consolidate Dalit communities to safeguard their physical and 
economic security. In handbills, Malaichamy proclaimed: 
Our oppressed people will gather en masse waving flags and shouting 
slogans. We have lived as slaves of caste Hindus for too long, without kanji 
(plain rice gruel) to eat, without clothing to wear, and without a house to 
live in. We must struggle for our rights and raise our voice against the 
injustice that has been done to us.45 
Presenting the Dalit Panthers as an alternative to current political parties, Malaichamy 
stressed the importance of an autonomous organization to advocate Dalit concerns: 
No political party in our land will struggle on our behalf. All political 
parties in our country are under the control of caste Hindus. We, ourselves, 
must be ready to struggle to claim our community rights. We must 
ameliorate our present condition in which we are broken and shattered into 
pieces.46 
Summoning his “brothers and sisters to extend their cooperation,” Malaichamy 
beckoned Dalit communities to “flow like an ocean’s waves to the first state 
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conference… May our people join hands and participate in the conference with great 
passion! May battalion upon battalion set off for Madurai.”47 
 In the following year, Malaichamy began preparatory work for a second state 
conference slated for September 19, 1983, at Tamukkam Ground in Madurai. In 
preparation, Malaichamy convened public meetings across Madurai and neighboring 
districts to network with Dalit politicians and local social organizers. For example, he 
convened a public meeting at Tiruccuḷi-Paccēri Community Hall on August 13, 1983, 
with Ukkirapandiyan, an ex-MLA from Pārttibaṉūr, R. Pandiyan, a former panchayat 
leader near Tirucculi, and local social movement organizers to publicize the event 
among local communities and garner support from Dalit elders.48 At these meetings, 
Malaichamy distributed handbills stressing that the DPI’s second state conference 
aimed to promote rights awareness and Dalit solidarity to collectively safeguard the 
community’s physical and economic security.49 
 In the months preceding the conference, Malaichamy again solicited donations 
from Dalit government employees and DPI supporters pooled funds in local 
communities to commission private transportation services, hiring lorry and bus 
operators to ferry participants to the venue. In a letter describing groundwork for the 
day’s event, Malaichamy claimed that more than 500 lorries had been commissioned to 
carry supporters from surrounding districts to the conference venue in Madurai city.50 
But, on the day of the function, DPI organizers discovered that a majority of lorry and 
private bus operators, who had already collected an advance deposit, buckled under 
pressure from police and reneged on their commitments. Throughout the district, 
police obstructed the passage of private vehicles commissioned by the DPI, detaining 
them well before the venue and directing their passengers to return home. DPI leaders 
nevertheless conducted the inaugural state conference before a projected crowd of 
around ten thousand, but the ceremony ultimately fell short of the grandiose 
expectations envisioned by its organizers.51 
 Following the conference, Malaichamy remonstrated to representatives in the 
state assembly and national parliament, citing a “government conspiracy” to obstruct 
Dalit mobilization. In an undated letter from 1983, he wrote: 
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We had completed preparations to assemble approximately 2 lakh people. 
But, the police department conspired, planned, and obstructed [our 
efforts]. They stopped [our] people everywhere, declaring that they should 
not arrive in lorries. In some places, the police department intimidated and 
threatened the [private vehicle] owners to ensure that lorries or buses 
should not be leased to Harijans. The police immediately instructed the 
lorry owners who had taken an advance [deposit] to return the money to 
the oppressed people. The police entered the houses of our comrades who 
had coordinated the transportation and harassed them. In all, more than 
300 lorries were detained in this manner. The poor people, even though 
they subsist without adequate food, pooled their hard-earned money to 
book lorries and participate in their community’s conference, but the 
government, intent to impede their consolidation, conspired and obstructed 
[their efforts]. Within the present context, the very people who are 
deprived of their rights are even prevented from assembling to petition for 
their rights.52 
Underscoring the state government’s inconsistent treatment of caste organizations, 
Malaichamy pointed out that Madurai-based ministers had endorsed and participated 
in a recent conference convened by the Mutharaiyars, an influential landholding 
community. Dubbing the affair “a government conspiracy against the Dalit people,” 
Malaichamy wrote, “We think that the government banned our activities to prohibit us 
from condemning forms of discrimination including social prejudice, murder, 
swindling, and rape that are spreading in Tamil Nadu against the Dalit people.”53 
Entreating elected representatives to redress the situation, he concluded, “We request 
with great humility that you speak in your parliament/assembly about this grave 
injustice… We believe that you will bring forward a favorable solution for our 
problems.”54 There is no record of any response to Malaichamy’s request. 
 
Petitioning State Authority 
Despite projecting itself as a state-wide organization, DPI activity was generally 
confined to Madurai District and surrounding areas where it enlisted early support 
from Dalit public sector employees in the banking, transportation, and insurance 
sectors as well as from local lawyers and student activists. Early DPI backing cut 
across sub-caste lines, drawing participation from the state’s three largest Dalit groups: 
	
 
47 
Arundhathiyars, Paraiyars, and Pallars. Initially, the DPI relied heavily on public 
sector employees who, barred from direct political activity, preferred instead to finance 
its activities. In contrast to the provocative brand of street politics deployed by its 
counterparts in Maharashtra, the DPI drafted legal petitions that, in citing relevant 
laws and constitutional provisions, appealed to pertinent authorities to redress their 
grievances. A comprehensive review of Malaichamy’s personal documents reveals that 
he submitted formal appeals seeking to remedy known abuses of reservations policy, 
resolve complaints of workplace discrimination, and avail greater access to education 
and economic opportunities. 
  Malaichamy attempted to leverage his capacity as DPI chairman to pressure 
state officials to perform their duties and redress specific Dalit concerns. For example, 
on October 26, 1983, Malaichamy petitioned the Tamil Nadu Director of Adi-
Dravidar and Tribal Welfare to rescind its stipulation of 90% attendance for availing 
SC/ST scholarships. On January 18, 1984, K. Arumugam, Director for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, responded to Malaichamy, informing him that the 
matter had already been raised and ‘the orders of the government are awaited,’ 
intimating that bureaucratic gridlock made the change unlikely, at best. Then, on 
December 6, 1985, Malaichamy wrote to the administrative director of the Pandiyan 
Transportation Federation, stating, “We are distressed upon learning that your 
administration has not fulfilled the 18% quota allocated for oppressed people hailing 
from Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities as per the Tamil Nadu 
government’s reservations policy.”55 Not only had a mere 5% of the reservations quota 
been implemented, he alleged, but SC/ST employees had been barred from entering 
managerial positions and strictly appointed to low-level posts such as gardeners and 
sweepers. He objected: 
State and central governments allocate reservations for SC/ST people to 
uplift those who, having lived without equality due to casteism, have been 
subdued and suppressed in our society. It is enshrined in the Constitution 
and written into law by Dr. Ambedkar that SC/ST people will only attain 
equal footing in society through the reservations system. State and central 
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governments should observe this legal obligation and fulfill reservations 
quotas.56 
He proceeded to request “with affection” that the director act expediently to satisfy 
“our lawful and reasonable appeal and fulfill the 18% reservations quota for the SC/ST 
people.”57 Again, there is no record of Malaichamy having received any response. 
  Beyond petitioning the enforcement of quotas, Malaichamy drafted formal 
appeals that lobbied higher authorities to redress specific abuses of the reservations 
system. For example, in an undated 1985 letter, Malaichamy exposed a specific 
instance of abuse and petitioned successive tiers of state authority to rectify the 
situation. Malaichamy charged that Dr. K. Rajmohan of the Illathu Pillaimar caste, a 
Backward Class (BC) in Tamil Nadu, furnished a forged Scheduled Tribe (ST) 
certificate to gain admission to medical college. In his appeal, Malaichamy alleged that 
Rajmohan, a relative of ex-mayor Muthu Pillai, exploited channels of personal 
influence to matriculate in M.B.B.S. and D.C.H. courses under the ST quota.58 
Malaichamy claimed that Rajmohan again presented the forged certificate when he 
joined the Public Health Clinic (P.H.C.) at Samayanallur where, despite the 
counterfeit having been detected, the doctor remained in service due to “some politics 
and extraneous influence.” Requesting swift intervention, Malaichamy wrote in stilted 
English:  
If B.C’s are make utilise such privilege of S.C and S.T. it will affect the 
whole SC and ST Society. So, I pray to the Honourable Government of 
India and kind request that you may take necessary action against the said 
Doctor according to the principle of natural Justice. 
To increase pressure on local officials, Malaichamy directed his appeal to P. N. 
Bhagwati, the presiding Chief Justice of India, and copied national, state, and district-
level government offices including SC/ST Commissions in New Delhi and Madras, 
Tamil Nadu Directorate of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Tamil Nadu Public Service 
Commission, Tamil Nadu Department of Health and Family Welfare, and District 
Collectors in Madurai and Tirunelveli.59 
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  Attempting to position the DPI as a de facto labor union, Malaichamy also 
addressed the concerns of Dalit public sector employees. For example, on receipt of an 
undated 1985 letter from Dalit employees at Madurai Mail Motor Service (MMS), a 
branch of the Post & Telegraph Department, Malaichamy sought to leverage his role 
as DPI chairman to intervene in a workplace dispute between Dalit employees and 
department managers. In their letter, Dalit employees decried abuse at the hands of 
company managers who, they alleged, referred to them by their caste names and 
derided them with derogatory slurs such as “the crowd that cleans latrines,” “dogs,” 
and “asses.”60 Further, they related that management explicitly forbade them from 
raising the matter before the SC/ST Workers’ Union and then foisted false disciplinary 
reports against them after they registered a formal complaint. At their behest, 
Malaichamy wrote to the Chairman of the Madurai Post & Telegraph Department on 
September 12, 1985, to request a personal consultation: “A five-person team from our 
movement wants to meet with you to discuss discrimination in your workplace and 
general problems faced by SC/ST employees at Madurai Mail Motor Service.”61 Five 
days later, on September 17, 1985, K. Santhanam, Assistant Director of Postal 
Services Madurai Region, stonewalled the effort, responding: “Sir, I am directed to 
inform you that only recognized unions/Associations are entitled to have any 
meeting/interview with Administration regarding service matters of P&T employees 
and hence the question of grant [sic] of any interview to you for the purpose 
mentioned does not arise.”62 
  As reconstructed from a fragmentary archive of personal letters and legal 
appeals, these early documents provide a representative sample of how Malaichamy 
attempted to leverage his role as DPI chairman to lobby state authorities to redress 
Dalit grievances. He pressed hiring managers to fulfill existing reservation quotas, 
urged state officials to rectify known abuses of the reservations system, and sought to 
intervene on behalf of Dalit public sector employees to remedy their grievances of 
workplace discrimination. Printed on DPI letterhead with an image of Dr. Ambedkar 
opposite a snarling panther, Malaichamy forwarded his appeals to different branches 
and multiple tiers of state and national government, likely an attempt to ratchet up 
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pressure on local officials to take decisive action. Considered together, these original 
materials provide an intimate account of the initial phase of DPI politics in 1980s 
Tamil Nadu. But, preserved documents signal that petition-based advocacy waned 
from 1986, possibly due to the ostensible failure of these early appeals to motivate state 
officials to uphold the laws they were tasked to uphold and intervene on behalf of 
Dalits.  
 
Retiring the pen 
Malaichamy initially approached the state as the adjudicator of law and guarantor of 
rights, utilizing the DPI as a platform to petition authorities to redress specific 
instances of caste discrimination and lobby for the delivery of rights. But, as the 
decade progressed, he appears to have retired the pen and reappraised his early 
program. From 1986, preserved documents indicate an attenuation of DPI petition 
politics, but this need not imply an enervation of the movement. On the contrary, 
Malaichamy appears to have lost confidence in the impartiality of state officials to 
enforce the laws they were tasked to uphold and, instead, focused his energy on 
developing a political constituency, networking with Dalit organizations, and 
promoting Ambedkarite philosophy in local communities. Throughout his tenure as 
DPI Chairman, Malaichamy convened biannual public ceremonies that 
commemorated Ambedkar’s birth and death anniversaries on April 14th and December 
6th, respectively.63 A holistic review of materials distributed at these functions reveals 
an expanding list of DPI office bearers and external collaborators. For example, a 
handbill distributed at a movement rally on June 11, 1989, identifies the widest 
breadth of DPI functionaries including taluk, panchayat, and village-level leaders, 
indicating a gradual institutionalization of the early movement.64 
 Although the early DPI likely experimented with agitational politics, the 
preserved record is too fragmentary to convey a definitive account. Still, allusion to a 
handful of striking instances surface within the archive. In his earliest recorded 
intervention, Malaichamy spearheaded a public rally protesting the murder of a local 
Dalit man in Māṇikkampaṭṭi village who was killed on January 17, 1983, for drawing 
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water from a public well located in an upper-caste settlement.65 Several months later, 
on July 23, 1983, Malaichamy coordinated joint action with Ambedkarite 
organizations and local Dalit students to dispute the encroachment of public lands 
earmarked for Dalits in Peruṅguḍi village near Madurai. Following a protracted 
silence, the archive reveals that, on November 8, 1987, Malaichamy organized a public 
procession in Melur taluk to protest the murder of Kandan, a DPI activist killed for 
challenging the allotment of local granite tenders, or leasing contracts on government 
resources.66 Malaichamy exhorted Dalits to bring their families and join the protest en 
masse, charging that Dalits had been barred from staking claim to local resources and, 
thereby, from participating in the local economy (1987). Then, on March 30, 1988, the 
DPI organized a public rally to demand a formal inquiry into the murder of S. 
Paakkiyam, a cobbler from Mēlavācal colony in central Madurai who was killed for 
her staunch opposition to the local arrack (illegal alcohol) production that she charged 
with preying on Dalit families and livelihoods.67 
 Despite offering only fleeting references to agitational politics, preserved 
materials demonstrate that Malaichamy’s political interventions extended well beyond 
the DPI platform. Malaichamy established charitable trusts to create new avenues for 
economic progress, improve access to education, and promote professional 
development among Dalit communities. For example, in 1985, he launched the 
Madurai Milk Society in collaboration with Dalit bank managers to provide 
microcredit loans for Dalits to purchase cows and initiate small-scale milk production. 
A. Ravikumar, a Madurai High Court lawyer and early DPI associate, recalled on 
January 6, 2014, that Malaichamy founded the milk society with the explicit intent to 
nurture an emergent class of Dalit entrepreneurs. Later, on December 6, 1985, 
Malaichamy inaugurated the Ambedkar Educational Society (AES) at a ceremony 
commemorating the death of the Dalit icon.68 Offering a range of free educational 
services, the organization specified seven core objectives69: 
 
• To strive for the educational development of the oppressed people 
• To motivate the oppressed Dalit people to study further by increasing the 
accessibility of education and spreading awareness about its benefits. 
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• To extend educational amenities in every way possible to all students who 
cannot afford to receive an education 
• To provide training for interviews and examinations for students who are 
applying for employment 
• To confer awards upon Dalit students who excel in secondary and higher 
secondary schooling to encourage them in their studies 
• To provide educational training to eradicate discrimination against the 
oppressed people by the central government based on their birth and to 
illuminate the path of their liberation 
 
Among its staple offerings, the society provided academic training geared toward Dalit 
students who had passed their plus-2 exams and intended to pursue advanced degrees. 
To sponsor early AES activities, Malaichamy solicited donations from Dalit 
public sector employees. AES handbills identify V. Karuppan, a Dalit officer in the 
Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.), as its primary patron. When I spoke with 
Karuppan, he stressed that AES held a strategic long-term vision that prioritized 
education over immediate economic gains, recalling how Malaichamy viewed 
education as key to inculcating political awareness and promoting social and economic 
development. Karuppan acknowledged early resistance to the AES mission, noting, 
“Many people prefer to restrain the working class by limiting their education. They 
fear that their local labor force will be spent if these people develop.”70 But, he 
stressed, “Whereas uneducated workers are easily preyed upon, we knew that 
educated workers would demand their rights as well as higher wages.”71 Karuppan 
emphasized that AES fostered a robust collaboration between Dalit activists, 
government employees, and local communities through activities that commemorated 
the educational achievements of Dalit students, provided free access to academic and 
professional training, and instilled a popular appreciation for education as a critical 
asset for social and economic development. 
 
From Dalit Panthers to Viduthalai Chiruthaigal72 
In 1988, A. Malaichamy chanced upon a news caption in Tarāsu, a Tamil political 
magazine, claiming that the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party intended to allot 
a seat in the upcoming 1989 Legislative Assembly Election to R. Thirumaavalavan, a 
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young Dalit government employee who recently relocated to Madurai on April 4, 
1988.73 But, as is often the case with political weeklies, the article liberally blended fact 
with speculation. Thirumaavalavan, publicly employed as a grade-two scientific 
assistant in the Madurai Forensic Science Department, had in fact requested an 
assembly seat from the DMK. Yet, his request was denied, which was hardly 
surprising considering his lack of financial means and political pedigree. However, this 
was not the first occasion that Thirumaavalavan was brought to Malaichamy’s 
attention. Earlier, Malaichamy’s younger brother Vijayan, an advocate at Madras 
High Court, informed him that Thirumaavalavan, his former classmate at Madras Law 
College, had recently accepted a government posting in Madurai. In a letter, Vijayan 
elaborated upon Thirumaavalavan’s commitment to social activism as well as his 
capacity for impassioned oratory that had enraptured students at pro-Eelam rallies 
during their school days.74 When Malaichamy first met Thirumaavalavan, he knew 
that he was speaking with his brother’s acquaintance, but he also thought he was 
meeting a future DMK candidate. 
  Thirumaavalavan accepted Malaichamy’s invitation to participate in DPI 
events, but participated in only a handful of meetings in addition to the professional 
coaching courses offered by the Ambedkar Educational Society.75 Thirumaavalavan 
recalls that when he arrived in Madurai the Dalit Panther of India was, at least from 
an operational standpoint, defunct as Malaichamy instead channeled his efforts 
through the Ambedkar Education Society.76 But, their collaboration was short-lived. 
On September 14, 1989, Malaichamy’s sudden death brought his independent 
endeavors and DPI activity to a standstill. Following several months of inactivity, 
Thirumaavalavan contacted Ramdas Athawale, national convener of the Bharatiya Dalit 
Panthers, to coordinate a remembrance ceremony for Malaichamy, but Athawale 
conveyed with regret his inability to attend any funerary arrangements.77 
 On December 31, 1989, Thirumaavalavan convened a modest condolence 
meeting to commemorate Malaichamy’s achievements at Tamukkam Ground in 
Madurai. During the meeting, a handful of DPI cadre from Melur, the largest taluk in 
Madurai District, insisted that Thirumaavalavan assume DPI leadership and revive 
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the defunct movement. During our conversation on November 4, 2013, 
Thirumaavalavan recalled how a group of activists from Melur pressed him at that 
meeting to assume responsibility as the next DPI chairman. At first, he rebuffed their 
request, citing his unfamiliarity with local politics and emphasizing that, as a 
newcomer to the city, he lacked the local connections required to sustain the 
movement.78 Suggesting that a condolence meeting was not an appropriate venue to 
deliberate on such topics, he instructed the cadre to organize a separate meeting to 
determine the DPI’s future course. Shortly thereafter, at a modest gathering on 
January 21, 1990, that drew no more than twenty early supporters, Thirumaavalavan 
accepted leadership of the DPI at Traveler’s Bungalow, a government guesthouse in 
Mapalayam, Madurai.79 
  After assuming leadership, Thirumaavalavan contacted Ramdas Athawale to 
apprise him of recent events and discuss the movement’s future direction. Athawale 
requested that the Tamil Nadu DPI merge with the recently launched Bharatiya 
Republican Party in order to consolidate Dalit organizations across India in a public 
display of solidarity prior to the centenary of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s birth.80 Drawing 
instead from his personal background as a student organizer of Tamil Eelam politics, 
Thirumaavalavan spurned Athawale’s request for national consolidation and, rather, 
anchored the movement in Tamil Nadu to focus on quotidian problems faced by local 
Dalit communities and, in particular, on price hikes, usury, poverty, and caste 
discrimination. When recalling the circumstances in 1990, Thirumaavalavan 
reaffirmed that he met Malaichamy on only a handful of occasions and candidly 
admitted his unfamiliarity with the history, politics, and principles of the Bharatiya 
Dalit Panthers, acknowledging that his background drew from student politics 
pertaining to issues of Tamil sovereignty. Not only was he unfamiliar with Dalit 
politics, Thirumaavalavan was a newcomer to Madurai who lacked social networks 
and a broader knowledge of the city. 
  Thirumaavalavan assumed leadership of the DPI at a seminal moment for Dalit 
politics across India. In the year of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s birth centenary, national and 
state government initiatives translated, published, and propagated Ambedkar’s 
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biography and his lifeworks in vernacular languages across the country. As S. Anand 
of Navayana Press writes, “Even those not directly exposed to the political philosophy 
of Ambedkar, those who had not read his works, became alive to a certain Dalit 
consciousness.”81 Thirumaavalavan acknowledges that the Ambedkar centenary 
spurred his movement’s growth, noting, “After the Ambedkar Centenary, many youth 
who had digested the emerging politics began to take Dalit movements into their own 
hands.”82 While the centenary infused fresh life into Dalit social organizations and 
promoted rights-based awareness among local communities, Thirumaavalavan 
suggests that it also instilled dissatisfaction among the youth regarding the present 
state of Dalit politics. He recalls, “Ambedkarite movements typically concentrated 
their attention on the demands of the oppressed people’s middle class and, in 
particular, on issues such as reservations and matters related to [welfare] 
concessions.”83 But, he alleged that his movement operated with a different aim, 
acknowledging, “We were taking into our own hands the problems of our people who 
endure violence on a day by day basis.”84 
  Thirumaavalavan focused on grassroots mobilization and tailored the 
organization to address quotidian forms of caste discrimination, often targeting 
impeded access to the local economy. From 1990 until early 1992, Dalit Panther 
activities operated locally on a modest scale. Upon completing their professional 
obligations, Thirumaavalavan and his associates cycled to Dalit colonies across 
Madurai city and outlying areas to mingle with residents, inquiring about their 
problems and inculcating rights awareness. Paavalan, a government engineer who 
volunteered alongside Malaichamy and Thirumaavalavan in the Ambedkar 
Educational Society, recalls that under Thirumaavalavan the Dalit Panthers generated 
rights-based awareness and actively intervened in recurring problems confronting 
local communities. In doing so, Paavalan recalls that Thirumaavalavan secured 
popular support behind the movement.85 
  In contrast to Malaichamy’s DPI, which intervened on the behalf of Dalits but 
never maintained a consistent presence within local communities, Thirumaavalavan 
focused on popular grassroots mobilization that integrated local communities within 
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the movement. Senkannan, a DPI activist who accompanied Thirumaavalavan on his 
local tours, recalls: 
 
In the evening hours after completing their day’s work, Thirumaavalavan and 
his associates would visit Dalit colonies across Madurai city. One day 
Tallakulam, another day K. Pudur, another day Pandalkudi, another day SIT 
Colony. Like that, each and every day, he used to travel with his associates by 
bicycle or public bus to meet with Dalit communities and inquire into their 
daily problems. They convened propaganda meetings and requested that the 
people join their movement.86 
 
Senkannan recalls how local communities embraced Thirumaavalavan, perceiving him 
as an ostensibly simple young man with unwavering dedication. In our conversations, 
early supporters recounted similar memories of Thirumaavalavan seated on the 
ground, eating kanji, a plain rice porridge, and conversing with the people about their 
problems.87 
  While these individuals commented on his approachable demeanor, they also 
acknowledged that his public speeches were markedly different than the oratory of his 
predecessors. As a student enrolled in Presidency College and Madras Law College, 
Thirumaavalavan honed his rhetorical skills at pro-Tamil Eelam rallies, in which he 
collaborated with the DMK student wing. In the 1990s, Thirumaavalavan began to 
fashion an ostensibly militant movement culture for the Dalit Panthers. As movement 
ranks continued to swell, he inaugurated the first DPI branch at Tallakulam on April 
14, 1990, conducted in public view beneath a banner reading “vidutalai kidaippadu 
yuttattal, pudiya vidikal pirappadu irattattal,” or “liberation will be attained through war, 
new horizons will be born through blood.” The movement unveiled its flag: two thick, 
conjoined, red and blue stripes with a white star in the center. The star’s five points 
represented the organization’s five-fold objectives: caste annihilation, Tamil 
nationalism, women’s emancipation, anti-imperialism and the liberation of the 
proletariat.88 Upholding the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a model of 
rights-based assertion, his speeches, both in terms of content and style, energized local 
communities and mobilized youth behind the movement. 
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  The Dalit Panthers spread in an unorganized and decentralized manner, often 
at the initiative of local youth. When they ushered the movement into their residential 
colonies, Thirumaavalavan joined them alongside local DPI supporters to inaugurate 
the branch through a flag hoisting ceremony.89 In 1992, with implicit reference to the 
LTTE, he dubbed DPI cadre as “vidutalai siruttaigaḷ,” or liberation panthers. At first, 
the movement bore both names interchangeably, Dalit Panthers and Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, until the latter assumed prominence by the mid-1990s.90 Thirumaavalavan 
infused an ostensibly militant culture of political assertion in residential Dalit colonies, 
referring to its local branches as “mugam,” or military encampments, and dubbing its 
subsequent land rights struggle as a “mannurimai por,” or a land rights war. As the 
movement expanded, its supporters occupied prominent, public spaces by organizing 
peranikal, or protest marches, which they called as anivahuppu, or military parades, 
through the streets of Madurai. Frequently, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
conducted these early processions to commemorate the birth and death anniversaries 
of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.91 
  In the 1990s, while its provocative language captured public attention, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics gravitated toward questions of local economy. Initially, 
the movement staged public demonstrations to call attention to quotidian challenges 
confronting Dalit communities such as price hikes, usury, practices of untouchability, 
and impeded access to public goods. But, early movement activities were not entirely 
limited to public assemblies highlighting the socioeconomic plight of Dalit 
communities. An long-term activist who requested anonymity recalls that Dalit 
communities shared a common grievance regarding the predatory practices of local 
moneylenders, including their aggressive and sometimes violent techniques to collect 
repayment on usurious loans. Ravikumar, former Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Madurai 
District (city) Secretary, recalls that moneylenders “used to loan money, particularly at 
the time of festivals, with exorbitant interest rates. Then, they would return after 
wages had arrived and demand interest payments. At times, Dalits were beaten and 
even locked in their huts to pressure them to fulfill their debts.”92  
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  In response, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers first mobilized affected 
communities and marched en masse to local police stations to register a First 
Information Report (FIR) against errant moneylenders. If, or more often when, police 
neglected to redress the issue or declined to record the FIR, a mandatory first step in 
criminal procedure, a handful of Dalit activists took matters into their own hands. In 
direct retribution, two prominent moneylenders were severely beaten. Local activists 
familiar with the matter recall that direct reprisals temporarily quelled tensions 
between moneylenders and Dalit communities and, moreover, publicly projected the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal as a social and economic safety net for the Dalits. As one early 
member underscored, “the people brought their complaints to us and they integrated in 
our movement to safeguard their interests. In this manner, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
was gradually born in Madurai.”93 
 
Chennagarampatti 
As the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal consolidated an urban base across Madurai city, the 
movement ventured further into nearby villages. Pandiyaraja, an early roommate and 
close confidant of Thirumaavalavan, recalls that the time was ripe to mobilize Dalits in 
proximate villages due to a gradual restructuring of the agrarian economy.94 He notes 
that rural Dalits once worked primarily as landless agricultural laborers, frequently 
accepting food grain as a form of payment under “panda marru murai,” a system of 
exchange.95 Yet, he points to a shift in labor patterns in the late-1980s when Dalit 
agricultural laborers progressively abandoned the fields and secured work in Madurai 
city as daily wage laborers, most often in the burgeoning construction industry. Early 
supporters contend that this transition to labor-commuting began to sever “feudal 
relationships” with landowners, thereby enabling the movement to forge inroads in 
local villages.96 Yet, when the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal mobilized rural Dalits they 
encountered a different set of challenges. While both rural and urban Dalits were often 
excluded from meaningful participation in the local economy, rural communities 
complained not of predatory moneylending or harassment in the workplace, but more 
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commonly of wages paid not in cash but in kind, physical harassment by locally 
dominant castes, and impeded access to public land and resources.97 
  Throughout the 1990s, “tenders,” or leasing rights over government owned 
property, featured among the most contentious socio-economic issues. A tender refers to 
a temporary lease on government land and/or resources availed through a competitive, 
public auction. Thayappan, an early movement sympathizer, insists that when Dalits 
transgressed local custom and applied for these leasing contracts, communal tensions 
sometimes exploded into caste riots that engulfed the entire district. He recounts: 
 
At that time, it was not safe for a Dalit to participate in these auctions because 
members of locally dominant castes monopolized government resources… 
Tenders existed for agricultural land, temple lands, mango groves, whatever 
land and resources belonged to the government. This included tamarind trees 
on the roadside; there were even tenders for road maintenance. As per custom, 
the dominant castes utilized these facilities for exorbitant profit. They 
prohibited Dalits from participating in tender auctions and, in effect, barred us 
from experiencing even a meager share of the local economy.”98 
 
Similarly, Paavalan recounts, “At that time it was customary for only caste Hindus to 
be eligible for participation in leasing-auctions to make use of and profit from public 
lands,” further averring that these communities regarded such lands as their 
“birthright.”99 When Malaichamy’s DPI had earlier contested the exclusion of their 
community from the local economy, their activities elicited a violent blowback from 
locally dominant communities.100 In the early 1990s, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
confronted a similar response. 
  In July 1992, caste tensions reached a crescendo across Madurai District 
following the dual murder of Ammasi and Velu, two Dalit men residing in nearby 
Chennagarampatti village who had entered a tender auction to harvest tamarind fruit on 
local Ammachigundu Ayyanar Temple lands owned and leased through the Hindu 
Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, a branch of the Tamil Nadu State 
Government.101 As per custom, participation in the tender auction was restricted to a 
limited section of the dominant Kallar community. Over the past year, the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal had amassed a strong base within Melur Taluk, Madurai District, and 
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expanded into adjacent villages including Chennagarampatti. In 1992, when 
preparations were underway during May and June for a tender auction for rights to 
harvest tamarind fruit along the roadside, local movement cadre exhorted Ammasi and 
Velu to flout prevailing custom and enter the auction. Shortly after securing the tender, 
both individuals submitted a joint petition to local police detailing allegations of crop 
sabotage by members of the locally dominant Kallar community. In lieu of filing a First 
Information Report (FIR), local police organized inter-community peace talks, the 
first of which occurred on July 3, 1992; seven Dalits and no Kallars participated. On 
July 5, 1992, while returning from a second peace talk, which Kallar leaders similarly 
boycotted, an upper caste mob intercepted their bus en route and, wielding agricultural 
instruments, bludgeoned to death Ammasi and Velu.102 
  The Chennagarampatti dual murder was a watershed event for Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal politics. In response to the violence, Paavalan recounts:  
 
They took the issue to the public platform and staged a demonstration against 
the state, demanding that the state government intervene and take action 
against the culprits. Only then, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal became quite popular 
among the people. In fact, it was a turning point through which they organized 
the people as a movement against the caste Hindus on the one hand and the 
state on the other.103 
 
The dual murder revealed the DPI’s tenuous position vis-à-vis the state. The movement 
vented its fury not only against dominant caste magnates who monopolized local 
resources and orchestrated violent reprisals when Dalits transgressed ‘custom’, but 
also toward state authorities for an apparent unwillingness to safeguard Dalit rights 
and ensure basic security. In the wake of the dual murder, Thirumaavalavan recalls 
that he mobilized ten to fifteen different Dalit outfits around Madurai, but this early 
attempt at collective action failed to elicit a response from the state.104 Moreover, as 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers continued to argue over the following decade, the 
government’s failure to investigate the matter and apprehend the culprits further 
emboldened the criminal nexus behind local anti-Dalit violence.105  
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  As authorities continued to drag their feet without intervening directly in the 
matter, Chennagarampatti provided a clarion call for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, whose 
ranks had begun to swell in and around Madurai city. Paavalan recalls that the 
Chennagarampatti murders focused DPI activity squarely on the theme of mannurimai, 
or land rights, which energized its political agenda throughout the 1990s. He recounts: 
 
The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal used Chennagarampatti to mobilize our people under 
a banner of land rights, saying ‘You have been living for generations, both 
landless and politically powerless, so you must be allotted land to cultivate 
agriculture and sustain your livelihoods. We must fight to capture these lands. 
We should live equal to the caste Hindus, politically, socially, economically.’ 
The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal established itself as a popular movement through 
this event.106  
 
While Viduthalai Chiruthaigal publications and political rhetoric commemorate Ammasi 
and Velu as the Chennagarampatti “martyrs,” the 1992 dual murder focused early 
movement politics on themes connected with land rights, including access to public 
lands and state resources. Prior to considering this new political platform, let us first 
consider the broader context surrounding the movement’s emergence.  
 
A Shifting Equation 
On October 13, 2013 I met with VCK General Secretary Sinthanai Selvan at his home 
nestled just off the national highways running through Villupuram, Tamil Nadu. 
Selvan charts an intellectual genealogy of realignments in Tamil Nadu electoral and 
extra-parliamentary politics, discussing tensions that surfaced between Marxist-
Leninist (M-L) movements, Tamil Nationalist organizations, and the Communist and 
Dravidian parties surrounding the question of caste. “The communists,” he claims, 
denoting political parties as well as underground movements, “did not concern 
themselves with matters pertaining to caste, but rather collapsed caste within a broader 
agenda of class struggle.”107 Then, referring specifically to underground M-L 
movements, Selvan contends that they not only elided the caste question, but focused 
too narrowly on the national question and, in doing so, were unable to adapt to 
contentious ethnic and regional issues. In particular, Selvan harkens back to the 1980s 
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when a heightened demand for Tamil Eelam, or a sovereign homeland, gained traction 
across Tamil Nadu following “Black July” (1983) in neighboring Sri Lanka, an anti-
Tamil pogrom that witnessed widespread violence against the island’s Tamil 
minority.108 Noting the presence of Tamil nationalist movements across Tamil Nadu in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, Selvan underscores that the brutality of Black July pressed 
the Tamil nationality question to the forefront of state politics, which in turn 
exacerbated fissures among some Marxist-Leninist cadre operating in Tamil Nadu.109 
Selvan recalls: 
 
At the time, I felt an ideological resonance with the Tamil nationalist 
organizations; these were LTTE supporters based here in Tamil Nadu. But, 
there was always a lingering question in my mind, ‘I may support Tamil 
nationalist groups on an ideological level, but what is their role when Dalits are 
affected?’ This question remained with me.110  
 
In particular, Selvan recounts that the popular outcry against Black July, when placed 
in juxtaposition to domestic politics, exposed fault lines among these movements’ Dalit 
cadre who, at that time, observed heightened levels of caste violence in Tamil Nadu.111 
Further, he concedes, “While speaking about atrocities in Eelam, the Tamil nationalists 
never spoke about Dalit atrocities here in Tamil Nadu.”112 This, he points out, became 
eminently clear in 1992 following the dual murder in Chennagarampatti. 
  As our conversation turns away from extra-parliamentary movements, Selvan 
recalls that many Dalits like himself had lost faith in the Dravidian parties (DMK; 
AIADMK), which had long espoused, if only rhetorically, a radical anti-caste agenda. 
“The Dravidian parties,” he notes, “always compromised on caste. They opposed 
Brahmanism, but never challenged Hinduism and its associated caste structure. While 
they may have supplanted Brahmins from political power and converted Sudras into a 
powerful community, they were not concerned about the Dalit people.”113 Likewise, 
current Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers are quick to acknowledge that the Dravidian 
parties’ egalitarian rhetoric rarely translated into practice, an allegation they evince by 
highlighting that Dalits were not allotted significant portfolios or ministerial berths 
within Dravidian governments prior to the growth of autonomous Dalit parties. For 
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example, Tamizharasan, a local organizer in Chingelpattu, stressed this point and 
emphasized that prior to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, “the Dravidian parties, both the 
DMK and AIADMK, only allotted ministerial positions to Dalits in the Adi-Dravidar 
Welfare and Dairy Milk ministries.”114 
  Further, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a political upsurge surrounding the 
initial submission (1980) and, in particular, the subsequent implementation (1990) of 
the Mandal Commission Report, which, advised extending reservations in government 
and educational institutions and provided fresh impetus for caste-based mobilization 
among Tamil Nadu’s Backwards Classes (BC). Selvan recalls, “The VP Singh 
government created a special classification called the “Backward Classes,” this became 
the primary category of mainstream politics. The rights of backward classes, 
reservations for backward classes; these became the mainstream political issues, but 
these rights never included Dalits.”115 While an earlier Dravidian politics of “non-
Brahminism” was forged in counter-opposition to the Brahmin, he notes that the 
political upwelling of Backward Classes developed in counter-opposition to Dalits, 
who were sometimes derided as “government Brahmins.”116 Selvan emphasizes that in 
the 1980s and largely in response to provisions recommended by the Mandal 
Commission Report, backwards class mobilization across Tamil Nadu shifted the 
entire vernacular of state politics from “non-Brahmin” to “Backwards Class,” a process 
further abetted by the conversion of previously non-electoral caste associations into 
formal political parties.117 
  When the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal emerged as a social movement in the 1990s, 
Selvan acknowledges that Dalit support was scattered among Dravidian parties, Tamil 
nationalist organizations, Communist parties, and a handful of Marxist-Leninist 
factions. While the Ambedkar Centenary (1991) generated a popular upsurge of Dalit 
activism across Tamil Nadu, Selvan contends that there was not a strong centralized 
Dalit movement to absorb this upwelling of support. He recalls, “Dalit youth had lost 
their faith in the Communist parties. They had lost their faith in the Dravidian 
movement, the Communist movement, the Tamil nationalist movement,” and, 
moreover, they recognized “an absence of strong leadership willing to take up Dalit 
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causes.”118 In consequence, he recounts, “Many of these individuals were drawn to 
Thirumaavalavan and the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal.”119 Regardless of their political 
inclination, Dalit activists observed how caste-bias pervaded existing political 
structures and came to acknowledge that although political and social movements 
profited from their support, they rarely voiced Dalit concerns in a meaningful way.120 
 Upon its formation in 1990, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal drew Dalit support from 
across the political spectrum and this confluence of activists from divergent 
backgrounds ignited internal debate regarding the trajectory of the movement.121 
While the commitment to Dalit liberation remained steadfast, the route to liberation 
proved more contentious. A. Kannan, an early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizer based 
in Madurai, recalls, “One thing was clear in our minds; our goal was Dalit liberation. 
It could be any sort of struggle—armed or unarmed—but that was our only mission, to 
liberate our people.”122 Some early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal members, including a handful 
who came out of extra-parliamentary movements, pressed for an armed struggle to 
liberate Dalits and argued that the upheaval of the present political system and 
establishment of a new social order was required to truly emancipate the Dalits. 
Although this ‘call-to-arms’ resonated among some cadre, movement leadership 
mooted the prospect of an armed struggle.123 Recollecting this internal discussion, 
Sinthanai Selvan recalls, “When only a few people were there, some individuals 
contemplated various forms of revolutionary struggle,” and underscores that the 
consolidation of popular Dalit support precipitated a different kind of strategy.124 
 In tandem with the movement’s precipitous growth, media persons routinely 
pressed Thirumaavalavan on the nature of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics, sometimes 
projecting the movement as a militant outfit in the likeness of other extra-
parliamentary groups.125 In differentiating his movement, which operated in plain view 
of the public, Thirumaavalavan clearly stated, “We do not engage in premeditated 
violence.”126 He elaborated, “Let me speak truthfully, I do not have any intention, not 
even in the slightest, to become a leader by disturbing peace and instigating 
violence.”127 Thirumaavalavan qualified his discussion of “peace,” not by framing it in 
contradistinction to violence, but by querying conditions that may project an overt 
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facade of social harmony, which he alleges is often misconstrued as peace. He 
continues:  
 
If oppressing the weaker sections produces peace, is this an authentic peace? 
Just as a family may appear, on the surface, to be a happy family despite, in 
private, the woman lives on the receiving end of her husband’s violent blows. In 
there actually happiness in that family? If she raises her voice against her 
husband’s violence, would many in our society not deem her an unruly woman? 
This is the question that we are posing.128 
 
Referring to a discernable growth of anti-Dalit violence in Tamil Nadu, 
Thirumaavalavan warned, “We cannot tolerate this continuously,” stressing, “While a 
common peace may be desirable, at the same time, our people’s democratic rights must 
be protected. We operate with this awareness.”129  
 
Claiming Rights 
On February 24, 2014, Tada Periyasami retrieves materials from a rusted filing 
cabinet.130 He slaps a thick layer of dust off the old documents, lightly soiled by dirt, 
oxidation, and hand oils, before proceeding to narrate the transformation of the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal from a small outfit confined to Madurai city into a ‘pakka’, or 
premiere, Dalit movement across Tamil Nadu. I sit beside him on his house veranda as 
he avidly thumbs through an extensive personal archive of early wall posters, 
newspaper articles, and personal letters, elaborating upon critical events and 
circumstances surrounding the movement’s expansion in the early 1990s. As the 
afternoon progresses, Periyasami, who served as a Viduthalai Chiruthaigal general 
secretary from 1992 - 2004, provides a firsthand account of the movement’s emergence 
and expansion, a development that he discusses in terms of a rights-centric program 
that intervened directly in matters related to social and economic exclusion. He first 
introduces his political background and provides a synopsis of the political climate in 
1990s Tamil Nadu before delving into a protracted account of early Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal politics. 
  Periyasami’s political background began with communist politics in the 1980s. 
Having first entered the Students’ Federation of India (SFI), a prominent CPI(M)-
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affiliated student movement, and then, upon completing a diploma in tractor 
mechanics at the Government Industrial Training Institute (ITI)–Ariyalur, Periyasami 
joined the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI-(ML), as a grassroots 
organizer. After five years of underground activity, including collaboration with Tamil 
nationalist groups active in the state, Periyasami’s political activity reached an abrupt 
standstill due to his entanglement in a bomb blast case. In 1987, Periyasami was 
convicted and sentenced to capital punishment under the National Security Act (NSA) 
for allegedly abetting a bid to target a passenger train. After three years of 
incarceration in Madurai Central Prison accompanied by a lengthy appeals process, he 
was acquitted of all charges in 1990. 
  After his exoneration, Periyasami observed that a new political climate had 
surfaced in Tamil Nadu. When we spoke, he recalls that the 1980s witnessed the 
gradual enervation of Marxist-Leninist politics across the state, which he attributes 
both to increased police action targeting M-L movements and a gravitation of 
underground movements toward the question of Tamil nationalism. Periyasami 
pinpoints “Black July,” referring to an anti-Tamil pogrom in Sri Lanka in July 1983, 
as a watershed event for Tamil nationalist outfits in Tamil Nadu.131 While Marxist-
Leninist and Tamil nationalist organizations continued to operate in the state during 
the 1990s, Periyasami alleges that, to the displeasure of their Dalit cadre, both 
movements bracketed caste concerns while pursuing broader agendas of class struggle 
and ethnic sovereignty, respectively. He recounts, “They evaded the caste question; no 
one was even raising the issue,” which, he suggests, generated resentment among Dalit 
cadre who came to view the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal as a political alternative.132 
  Although Periyasami began collaborating with Thirumaavalavan as early as 
1990, he formally joined Viduthalai Chiruthaigal in 1992 following the dual murder of 
Ammasi and Velu in Chennagarampatti. Periyasami identifies this caste atrocity as a 
seminal moment for Tamil Nadu Dalit politics and, visibly riled, he proclaims, “After 
Chennagarampatti, what did the communists do? What did the Tamil nationalists do? 
Nothing! It was a caste problem so they simply ignored it!”133 The failure of these 
movements to step forward and address the issue aggravated latent resentment among 
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Dalit cadre. Periyasami, who coordinated Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activity alongside 
Thirumaavalavan from 1992, recalls that many of his former associates filed into the 
movement’s ranks following the Chennagarampatti dual murder. He recounts, “In the 
early 1990s and, in particular, following the Ambedkar Centenary (1991), the caste 
question resonated more strongly among Dalit cadre within Marxist-Leninist and 
Tamil nationalist movements,” many of whom were attracted to the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal’s ostensibly militant demeanor and, like Periyasami himself, joined the 
movement en masse.134 
  Reflecting on the growth of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, Periyasami recounts that 
the movement was initially confined to “Madurai and roughly fifty surrounding 
villages,” but, from 1992, the movement “spread rapidly on an issue-basis to areas 
where casteism and caste dominance were most pronounced.”135 He recalls that early 
movement activities were centered on providing immediate response to instances of 
caste violence and discrimination including restricted access to public resources, 
drinking wells, temples, public streets, ration shops, and tender auctions alongside 
quotidian practices of untouchability. Yet, when the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal intervened 
directly in these matters, he acknowledges that its activities frequently elicited a violent 
blowback from the locally dominant caste. While Periyasami professes that the 
Chennagarampatti dual murder “ignited the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal in Madurai,” he 
emphasizes that it was not an isolated incident, but rather a disconcerting pattern that 
replicated as the decade progressed.  
  Periyasami rummages through the stack of material and retrieves an early 
pamphlet distributed during the movement’s “mannin maindarkal anivahuppu,” or the 
sons-of-the-soil military parade. Clasping the document, he locates a passage that 
enumerates instances when Dalit attempts to secure tenders on government owned 
lands and resources were met with a violent backlash. He reads aloud a section from 
the early pamphlet: 
 
The oppression and exploitation of caste fanaticism continues unabated across 
Tamil Nadu. Recently, because the cheri people requested their due share in the 
tamarind tree tender in Vazhudhaavuur Villupuram, caste fanatics killed the 
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innocent Arumugam. In 1992, because the cheri people secured a tender among 
tamarind trees in Narasingampatti village near Madurai, caste fanatics torched 
sixty huts and then proceeded to make a mockery of our people’s plight… [in 
the same year] two innocent men, Ammasi and Velu had their throats slit for 
taking a lease on temple lands in Chennagarampatti village.136 
 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal leaders such as Periyasami often alluded to the 
Chennagarampatti murders and other atrocities to evince how caste structures access 
to the local economy.137 In response, early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics gravitated to 
issues surrounding equitable access to these government owned, yet publically leased 
lands and resources. 
  Acknowledging that caste clashes peaked concurrent with the development of 
his movement, Periyasami recalls, “when we gathered to mobilize our people and 
condemn instances of caste violence, riots would erupt.”138 But, he categorically refutes 
the common interpretation that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal spread through violence, 
succinctly stating, “We cannot say that we spread because of violence, we spread 
because we demanded our rights; because we began to claim our rights.”139 Periyasami 
notes that a sole emphasis on caste violence and atrocities as catalysts of Dalit 
mobilization ignores how caste conflicts were often precipitated by Dalit demands for 
equitable economic access. He recalls, “We wanted our rights as prescribed by law. 
We were allotted reservations, but the posts were not filled. We were promised rights 
to government properties, but they were denied… as a people, we demanded that the 
government abide by its own rules and follow its own laws; the government was not 
implementing its own laws!”140 For Periyasami, the heightened level of caste violence 
was not itself a byproduct of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal mobilization as much as it was a 
result of collective Dalit attempts to avail constitutionally prescribed rights and secure 
equitable access to public goods and the local economy.141 
  Periyasami emphasizes that throughout the 1990s land rights served as a focal 
point of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s political program. Frequently referred to as 
‘mannurimai por’, or the “land rights war,” movement organizers did not define land 
rights narrowly to denote property ownership, but more broadly in terms of equitable 
access to publicly held lands and resources.142 Indeed, early movement materials, in 
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which rights to land surface as a central theme, corroborate Periyasami’s recollection. 
For example, consider demands issued at one of the movement’s largest rallies: 
 
Because we have been refused our right to request a tender and take a lease on 
government property and resources, it is not possible for our people to 
experience economic development. While this property is referred to as public 
resources, in practice powerful individuals hailing from the dominant castes 
monopolize these resources.143 
 
The pamphlet proceeds to expose the caste-bias in land allotments and tender auctions 
administered by government authorities, stating: 
 
Many resources are leased out by the Home Ministry through local 
government for things like tamarind trees, black babul, palmyra, bulrush used 
for thatched roofing, fisheries in lakes, belonging to the Home Ministry. Even 
though these leases are allocated through a ‘public’ auction, it has become a 
custom for caste Hindus to procure exorbitant profit by taking these tenders at 
a heavily devalued rate and then re-leasing them at a much higher rate. The 
cheri people are neither permitted to participate in these tender auctions nor 
procure even a meager share of their profit…144 
 
The pamphlet alleges that Dalits were not only barred from participating in tender 
auctions but, moreover, many government lands had already been usurped by the 
locally dominant castes: 
 
A recent government report on the Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Department reveals that among five lakh acres of land, four lakh 
have been encroached; it said that only the remaining one lakh acres are 
auctioned for lease… Moreover, the Forestry Department auctions leases for 
resources including many lakh acres of cashew nut forests, mango and guava 
groves, and eucalyptus trees. The cheri people are similarly denied permission 
to take a public share among these leases… Additionally, contracts auctioned 
through the Public Works Department as well as TASMAC store leases 
provided through the Home Department are administered in the same way; the 
cheri people are barred from participation.145 
 
Not only were Dalits barred from participating in tender auctions and prevented from 
claiming a share of local economic productivity, the document moreover correlates 
Dalit landlessness with the community’s chronic impoverishment. 
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  As our conversation draws to a close, Periyasami discusses early movement 
politics as a rights-based assertion targeting questions of local political economy. He 
discusses caste bias not only as a basis for social exclusion, but moreover as a 
determinant of economic access and, in effect, an impediment to social development. 
This point became exceedingly clear, Periyasami stresses, during Dalit attempts to 
secure tenders to public lands and resources. He emphasizes: 
 
Let us think about tender rights and issues surrounding public lands; for 
example, the right to harvest tamarind fruits from the trees. We had been 
denied our right to access these tender auctions. We had been denied our right to 
access public lands, to access public spaces. We could not acquire, or even 
submit, applications for these public contracts. We could not fish in public 
ponds. The Dalit people could not avail any of these rights. In response, we, as 
a movement, began speaking about our rights, particularly our right to land. 
We demanded that these rights be granted to our community.146 
 
Periyasami underscores that early movement politics were not premised on availing 
augmented government concessions or introducing new legislation, but rather 
petitioning state authorities to fulfill their legal, reneged obligations to Dalit 
communities. Periyasami recalls, “We pressed rights-based issues. At first, our people 
were not familiar with their rights. We ensured that they understood their rights and 
then, collectively, we demanded their implementation.”147 
 
Conclusion 
Analyses of ‘subaltern’ politics often accentuate ‘illiberal’ forms of political practice as 
the primary, if not the preferred, means whereby marginalized populations make 
claims on state authority. While recognizing the contribution of “political society” to 
our study of popular politics, this chapter demonstrates that such a paradigm did not 
provide a starting point for the Dalit Panthers in 1980s Tamil Nadu. In fact, it was 
only after the movement’s early advocacy foundered that the modus operandi of DPI 
politics gravitated beyond official channels of legal redress and, over the following 
decade, expanded to encompass forms of mass agitational protest that indeed, as 
Chatterjee writes, sometimes “transgress strict lines of legality.”148 One might postulate 
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that DPI organizers entered political society after futile attempts to lobby state officials 
through formal institutional channels. But, to suggest such a transition would imply a 
rupture and overemphasize the style of political engagement at the expense of its 
substance. In the 1980s, state institutions were neither inaccessible to DPI leaders nor 
lacked the capacity to redress Dalit grievances; instead, they were simply 
unresponsive. Shifting strategies of Dalit mobilization do not merely highlight 
alternate styles of political practice, but expose the challenge of representing the Dalit 
grievances to state authorities and eliciting a meaningful response. Although DPI 
politics retained its focus on legal advocacy and rights delivery, its paradigm expanded 
to embrace extra-legal techniques as movement organizers engineered tactical 
disruptions in the public sphere, which, in the 1990s, they came to regard as a 
complementary, if not more conducive, arena to make political claims. 
 This chapter examined early DPI politics as a rights-based assertion that 
responded to incidents of caste discrimination, exposed violations of reservations 
policy, and lobbied for equitable access to education and economic development. 
Initially, DPI organizers submitted written appeals invoking pertinent laws that 
petitioned state authorities through institutional channels to listen to their demands 
and redress Dalit grievances. Early DPI politics was neither predicated on availing 
augmented welfare provisions nor wrangling tentative concessions from authorities, 
but rather advocated the delivery of basic rights alongside an impartial administration 
of law. In hindsight, it appears that Malaichamy may have underestimated the degree 
of political pressure required to motivate an intractable bureaucracy to adhere to its 
own laws. But, he lobbied the state from an unfavorable bargaining position, lacking a 
mass cadre base and proven electoral clout. Preserved documents signal the futility of 
DPI advocacy from 1986 as Malaichamy appears to have diverted his energy to 
projects vesting less faith in the impartiality of government. In his final years, 
Malaichamy fostered political awareness in Dalit communities and established 
charitable trusts designed to advance their social and economic development. 
  Following the revitalization of the defunct Bharatiya Dalit Panthers in the 1990s, 
later rechristened the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, movement leaders believed that legal 
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rights were unlikely to be attained in the absence of robust social pressure.149 
Highlighting the inability of Dalits to avail tender rights, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers emphasized that caste-based exclusion structured differentiated access to 
the local economy and, thereby, served as a primary impediment to their community’s 
development. As institutional channels of redress proved unresponsive to their 
grievances, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal refashioned its program and leveraged its 
expanding support base to amplify its voice and compel state authorities to remedy, or 
at least acknowledge, its demands. Of course, this tactical shift is unsurprising, because 
political representation is not strictly predicated on making political claims, but must 
prioritizes being heard and, therefore, often requires a means of expression that effects 
an audience in order to elicit a response from authorities.150 As the decade wore on, 
movement organizers came to view the state less as an adjudicator of rights, and, thus, 
as a recipient of petition, but rather as an antagonist and, in effect, an object of protest; 
a shift in political orientation that the following chapter chronicles in detail. 
 An account of early DPI politics seemingly entails a narrative of barren 
attempts to induce state authorities to implement existing laws and policy directives. 
Considering this, how do we interpret these early efforts that ostensibly failed to 
actualize substantive rights? In her analysis of rights claiming as performances of 
democratic citizenship, Karen Zivi (2012) represents such activities as generative 
moments in themselves:  
 
‘…it is through the making of rights claims that we contest and constitute 
the meaning of individual identity, the contours of community, and the 
forms that political subjectivity take. Rights claiming is a practice that 
allows us to question and reconstitute the very meaning of what is common 
or sensible and what is not, and this is, as some democratic theorists remind 
us, precisely what it means to engage in democratic politics.’ (Zivi 2012, 
119) 
 
Zivi reminds us, “Democratic citizenship comes for the doing—the making of rights 
claims rather than the having of rights,” a move that looks beyond a one-to-one 
correspondence of rights claiming and rights delivery.151 The futility of its initial 
program does not signal a failure of early DPI politics, but marks an initial stage of 
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concerted political activity that generated a powerful political imaginary, fostered an 
emergent conception of democratic citizenship, and cultivated fertile terrain for mass 
mobilization in the following decade. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Missed Connections: 
Disruption and the Methods of Deliberation, 1992-1997 
 
Introduction 
In the early morning hours of Saturday, February 12, 1994, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
activists clutching colorful movement flags gatecrashed the Madurai Junction Railway 
Station, congregating on the railroad tracks and delaying the departure of the 
Chennai-bound Vaigai Express by ten minutes.1 While police struggled to detain this 
initial group, dragging activists one-by-one back atop the platform, a second batch of 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre swarmed the railway station and picketed the tracks of the 
Kanyakumari Express, delaying the train by more than forty minutes. As chaos engulfed 
the station, a third squadron of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre attempted to gatecrash the 
railway junction to stall the departure of the Tirupathi Express. Barring station entry to 
this third group, which the Indian Express estimated at 200 persons, city police 
hurriedly locked the entrance gates and erected a line of barricades to stall the 
advancing crowd.2  
 When activists stood their ground and collectively refused to withdraw from 
the entrance, a scuffle erupted between police personnel and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
cadre. Amid the ruckus, Arumugam ‘Theepori’ Murugan, a prominent Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal firebrand, seized a microphone from a nearby van and exhorted the 
activists by chanting movement slogans over a loudspeaker. As the police battalion 
observed fresh batches of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre converging upon the station, 
officers descended upon the demonstrators and aggressively dispersed the crowd with 
a lathi (wooden baton) charge. In retreat, activists defaced nearby signboards 
prompting shop owners to swiftly shutter their storefronts as the melee spilled into the 
bustling West Masi Street situated in the heart of Madurai’s commercial center. From 
the street, movement supporters improvised a road roko (blockage), obstructing traffic 
and pelting government buses with small stones and nearby debris.3 In all, five batches 
of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters spearheaded by local leaders descended upon 
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Madurai Junction Railway Station, generating a crowd that some observers estimated 
at 1,000 strong.4 After suppressing the protest, city police re-mobilized and conducted 
raids on Dalit colonies across the city to nab prominent movement organizers, 
culminating in an estimated 250 arrests.5 
  The rail roko sent tremors across Madurai as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, which 
had existed previously as a relatively unknown outfit, captured media attention over 
the following days. Local newspapers featured the roko agitation as front page news, 
while Makkal Kural (People’s Voice), a Chennai-based nightly, published the story in 
the state capital under the headline, “Riot and lathicharge in Madurai Railway Station; 
250 people arrested.”6 On the following day, the Indian Express reported, “The entire 
area in and around Madurai railway junction looked like a war-ravaged place and 
traffic was disrupted for more than four hours.”7 Media outlets elaborated eyewitness 
accounts of police excess and carried stirring images of city constables brandishing 
lathis over subdued, discernably incapacitated Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters. 
Dinamalar, a popular Tamil daily, printed a graphic photo of three activists carrying a 
colleague, visibly in trauma, to the hospital while the local edition of Indian Express 
circulated a photograph of an activist, clearly immobilized on the cement floor, 
shielding himself from flailing police batons.8 The caption read, “One of the agitators 
reportedly involved in Dalit violence in Madurai city on Saturday being ‘mobbed’ and 
caned by police men.”9 A separate article struck a more empathic tone, decrying 
brutality, “Setting an unwelcome precedent, the city police on Saturday went almost 
berserk and thrashed innocent bystanders, and even some journalists, indiscriminately 
during the lathicharge resorted [sic] ostensibly to disperse the Dalit demonstrators 
near [the] railway station.”10 
 The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal conducted the rail roko agitation to demand the 
arrest of Bal Thackeray, the charismatic and controversial leader of the Maharashtra-
based Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji), and to insist that his movement, a rightwing hindutva 
outfit, be banned after widespread anti-Dalit violence followed in the wake of his 
vociferous opposition to renaming Marathwada University in honor of the late-Dr. B. 
R. Ambedkar, a national Dalit icon and chief architect of the Indian Constitution.11 
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Newspapers accurately conveyed these demands, noting that the movement conducted 
a rail roko agitation calling for “the arrest of Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray” and a 
“ban on the Shiv Sena.”12 When Thirumaavalavan addressed the media on February 
16, he reiterated these demands and condemned the heavy-handed police response 
against his movement cadre, which he described as a violation of manita urimaikal, or 
human rights, as well as an unprecedented display of police excess. Further, he 
announced that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Women’s Wing, which had participated in 
the rail roko, would conduct a perani (protest march) followed by an indefinite 
unnavirutam (hunger fast) to petition the immediate release of 114 movement activists 
who remained in police custody.13 
  The Madurai rail roko featured among the first instances of an innovative 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal political strategy centered on capturing public attention and 
commanding media coverage through tactical disruptions of the public sphere that 
articulated movement demands to higher authorities and captured media attention to 
broadcast its presence across the state. This early rail roko offers a glimpse into this 
new paradigm that soon ushered the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal into the limelight of Tamil 
Nadu politics. In marked contrast the early Tamil Nadu Dalit Panthers’ platform of 
legal advocacy discussed in the previous chapter, which entailed the submission of 
formal petitions through institutional channels, this new brand of mass agitational 
politics compelled state authorities to respond, or at least acknowledge, Dalit 
grievances. In the 1990s, these strategic forays into the public sphere adapted to 
concurrent changes in the Tamil Nadu media landscape and, in particular, the 
widening circulation of daily newspapers. While the 1994 rail roko agitation left many 
supporters hospitalized, it also sparked extensive media coverage that kindled the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s budding reputation for robust Dalit advocacy and broadcast its 
presence across the state.  
 More than twenty years after this early protest brought central Madurai to a 
standstill, Thayappan, who was attending college in Tirunelveli at the time, recalls 
learning about the rail roko through flyers distributed by Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activists 
in surrounding districts. Recounting how supporters publicized the protest through 
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handwritten posters pasted on city, mofussil, and inter-district buses, he details the 
day’s logistics: 
 
Our people arrived in groups; first one batch then the next, like that from 
morning until afternoon; each of these groups consisted of a core of our cadre 
hailing from a particular cheri (Dalit colony) in Madurai city. We organized this 
protest strategically and, in the end, it was quite successful… This was among 
the landmark events that made the movement popular because, on the 
following day, it was headline news in Madurai and all over Tamil Nadu.14 
 
Recounting his participation, Nataraj Ambedkar recalls, “When we conducted the rail 
roko, we disrupted all the day’s trains. Our intent was to delay train departures so 
travelers would miss their Bombay connections in Chennai.”15 He continues, “Police 
lost their patience and lathi charged many Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters; they 
returned bandaged and bruised to the cheris (Dalit colonies).”16 With a smile, Nataraj 
recalls that news of the roko agitation spread like wildfire, disseminated within and 
beyond Madurai through print media and word of mouth. “The Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal,” he emphasizes, “had arrived.”17 
 
Democracy Interrupted? 
Theories of participatory democracy identify the public sphere as a critical site of 
political action and critique. In his seminal work, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas examines how congregational spaces including salons 
and coffeehouses provided early fora where citizens engaged in free public 
discussion.18 This classic formulation portrays the public sphere as a space of voluntary 
association where private citizens join in rational discussion as equals. Successive 
critiques, however, including those proffered by Nancy Fraser and Michael Warner, 
have challenged the degree of inclusivity once posited by Habermas and called into 
question his emphasis upon speech as the sole medium of rational deliberation and 
political communication.19 In response, critics have underscored that not all voices are 
heard equally, if at all, and, as Michael Saward writes, the dominant concern of 
democratic theory in recent years has concerned “who gets to deliberate, where and 
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how…”20 Thus, if we accept the centrality of the public sphere as a critical arena for 
political debate, the question naturally arises, ‘How do historically marginalized groups 
contest its exclusionary norms and participate in deliberative processes critical to a 
democratic society?’ 
  Recent scholarship extends our theorization of the public sphere to encompass 
emergent forms of political practice and engage critically with how we might 
accommodate ostensibly ‘disruptive’ activities, including those ostensibly in violation of 
liberal norms, within our theorization of democratic practice. For example, road and 
rail rokos (blockages), peranikal (protest marches), dharnas (hunger fasts), gheraos 
(encirclement of officials), bandhs (general strikes), and unlicensed assemblies feature 
prominently as modes of being political that may appear, at times, to grate 
uncomfortably with normative understandings of liberal democracy. By reorienting 
our focus from political institutions to local and sometimes extra-legal modes of 
political participation, recent scholarship has examined the myriad forms of everyday 
practice through which historically marginalized communities exercise democratic 
franchise, represent their concerns, and come into contact with state authorities. These 
practices are not strictly premised on making political claims, but must prioritize being 
heard and, therefore, often require a means of expression that effects an audience. This 
chapter queries how ostensibly ‘disruptive’ spatial occupations may serve as integral 
components of democratic practice that, when deployed tactically, augment minority 
franchise in a context of severe inequality where the law is suspended or administered 
inequitably. 
  Recent ethnographic studies, spurred by popular occupations from Zuccotti 
Park to Tahir Square, refocus our attention on the public sphere as a primary site of 
political struggle. In a comparative ethnography of the Occupy and Oaxaca 
movements, Ivan Arenas examines how physical acts of spatial occupation generate 
new forms of community and political subjectivity, arguing that “the production of a 
collective subject takes place through encampments and the modality of the 
assembly.”21 In the context of urban India, Thomas Blom Hansen considers how the 
public sphere provides the contested terrain upon which emergent communities are 
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imagined, mobilized, and rendered visible through acts of political performativity.22 In 
effect, Hansen reorients our focus from democratic institutions to public culture as the 
formative political space of Indian democracy. He proposes, “Performances and 
spectacles in public spaces—from the central squares to the street corner in the slum… 
must move to the centre of our attention,” in order to “chart and understand how 
political identities and notions of rights and citizenship are formed and given life 
through acts of representation.”23 Taken together, these ethnographic studies 
encourage us not only to accept the salience of the public sphere as a primary site of 
political action and critique, but moreover to consider the variable means and media 
whereby differentiated groups of citizens inhabit this space alongside the generative 
effects produced through collective acts of spatial occupation. 
  In her recent analysis of everyday political practice in modern India, Lisa 
Mitchell traces genealogies of common protests including alarm chain pulling on 
public transportation, road and rail rokos, dharnas, bandhs, and gheraos to query how 
these quotidian practices “can help us to understand where and how individuals come 
to engage with representatives of the state, and the specific means and media through 
which they choose to communicate their concerns and opinions.”24 While these 
ostensibly disruptive tactics are often “ignored or dismissed as signs of the “ill-health” 
of a democracy,” Mitchell advises that we interpret them as strategies of political 
communication deployed by social groups that often lack direct access to state 
institutions. In effect, Mitchell underscores that these disruptions are often not 
intended to undermine public debate, but to make one’s presence seen and one’s voice 
heard. Her work enables us to conceptualize how tactical disruptions of public space 
feature among the ways of exercising democratic franchise in modern South Asia.  
  This chapter explores how physical acts of spatial disruption were utilized to 
augment minority franchise and advance rather than foreclose democratic possibilities 
in 1990s Tamil Nadu. A close analysis of how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activists 
engineered tactical disruptions in the public sphere as an integral component of a 
broader political strategy casts light on the means and media through which 
historically marginalized groups communicate their demands to state authorities and 
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participate in debates from which they have, hitherto, been excluded. While such 
methods of political participation may appear to grate uncomfortably with liberal 
democratic norms, these disruptive tactics feature among the early attempts to 
represent Dalit concerns and participate in deliberative processes that my interlocutors 
deemed critical to the functioning of a democratic society. Envisioning representation 
not strictly as an articulation of demands, but a corporeal act that effects its own 
audience, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal turned to tactical disruptions of the public sphere 
to facilitate communication with state authorities and advance what its leaders 
perceived to be a democratic program premised on the equitable administration of law 
and delivery of rights. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter investigates the relationship between physical acts of spatial disruption 
and democratic practice in 1990s Tamil Nadu, India. The chapter assembles 
information from the private archives of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers that contain 
original letters, photographs, rally handbills, political pamphlets, and wall posters. To 
supplement these primary materials, I incorporate personal interviews taken with early 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers and supporters across eleven months of ethnographic 
fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, India, and in prior years. Additionally, the chapter integrates 
early newspaper and journal articles published in the English and vernacular press 
collected from activists during fieldwork as well as through archival research in the 
newspaper microform collection housed in the Van Pelt Library at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the international periodicals holdings in the Perry-Castañeda 
Library at the University of Texas libraries. Combining ethnography, primary 
materials, and print media sources, the chapter interrogates how the early Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal strategically engineered tactical disruptions in the public sphere to 
advance what they understood to be a democratic program that made political claims 
on state authority and demanded recognition as rights-bearing citizens. 
  In the previous chapter, I chronicled early Dalit Panther Iyakkam (DPI) politics 
in Tamil Nadu, elaborating upon how the movement pressed legal demands through 
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official channels that petitioned government authorities to fulfill their stated obligations 
to Dalit citizens. The ultimate futility of this early program prompted Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers to pursue an alternative method to safeguard Dalit rights and 
secure political recognition. As the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal mobilized a mass support 
base, movement activists engineered tactical disruptions in the public sphere in order 
to capture public attention and command broad media coverage. They embraced 
provocative, public displays of organizational strength that disrupted the ebb and flow 
of everyday life as a deliberate strategy to amplify their voice and communicate their 
demands to higher echelons of state authority. Selectively drawing upon a broad 
repertoire of political action including peranikal (protest marches), dharnas (hunger 
fasts), transportation rokos (blockages), bandhs (general strikes) and unlicensed 
assemblies, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers executed tactical disruptions in the public 
sphere to represent Dalit concerns and ratchet up pressure on authorities to redress 
specific incidents of caste violence and recognize Dalits as rights-bearing citizens. 
  In what follows, I first examine the expansion of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal in 
1990s Tamil Nadu through a close analysis of its early protests and style of political 
media, which included impassioned oratory, bellicose slogans, and militant 
iconography. In conversation with early activists, I consider how this self-fashioned 
militancy signaled the arrival of a new kind of Dalit movement that projected Dalits as 
assertive political subjects who demanded recognition as such. I draw upon these 
conversations to convey how movement organizers perceived their early activities not 
strictly as a manifestation of popular dissent, but as a strategy of visibility and political 
communication that ensured Dalits were seen and their voices were heard. When these 
early activities routinely failed to elicit an amenable solution, or even as simple 
response, from state authorities, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers turned to tactical 
disruptions in the public sphere as a deliberate effort to represent Dalit concerns, 
command media attention, and broadcast its voice and visibility across the state. The 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal utilized this political paradigm to bypass local officials and 
appeal to higher tiers of government authority.  
	
 
88 
  Next, I dissect the anatomy of a protest, which I present not as an isolated, 
collective act, but as an accrual of concerted activity that articulated specific demands 
directed to pertinent authorities. With this aim, I provide a specific example through 
which to consider Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Chairman Thol. Thirumaavalavan’s early 
contention that the very act of protest provided Dalits with “the means to speak clearly 
to the state.”25 In chronicling the movement’s response to the 1997 joint murder of 
Murugesan, a Dalit panchayat president, and his five associates in Melavalavu, 
Madurai District, I exhibit how the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal executed a series of tactical 
disruptions in the public sphere with the explicit aim to project its voice to centers of 
political power. I offer a critical reading of materials distributed at these protests to 
consider how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers deployed fierce rhetoric couched in a 
militant idiom to advance what they heralded as a democratic program. Despite 
exhorting Dalits to “march on Chennai like a war battalion,” movement organizers 
conducted a mostly peaceful procession that culminated in the presentation of a 
memorandum to the Tamil Nadu Governor that listed specific political demands.26 
  Finally, the chapter concludes with an ethnographic account of how Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers recall their early protests. Although anti-Dalit violence was a 
recurring feature of Tamil Nadu politics in the 1990s, it does not serve as the primary 
register through which my interlocutors recollect their early activities. While they 
acknowledge that violence against Dalits provided the immediate context for 
movement expansion, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers discuss their politics through a 
motif of voice, emphasizing that they organized tactical disruptions of public space as a 
deliberate political strategy to ensure that Dalits were seen and, moreover, that their 
voices were heard. Alluding to DPI politics in the previous decade, they underscore 
that this new paradigm proved more effective than institutional channels in 
communicating demands to state authorities. Assembling the perspectives of early 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, I convey how these individuals recall their early 
protests and why they turned to tactical disruptions of the public sphere as a means to 
represent Dalit concerns, augment minority franchise, and expand democratic 
franchise in 1990s Tamil Nadu.  
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The ‘New’ Media 
On January 20, 1990, movement organizers of Tamil Nadu’s then defunct Dalit 
Panthers Iyakkam (DPI) conferred leadership to R. Thirumaavalavan, who soon 
thereafter, in 1992, rechristened the movement as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, or 
Liberation Panthers.27 Upon completing his workday at the Department of Forensic 
Science, Thirumaavalavan and his associates traveled by public bus or bicycle to Dalit 
settlements across Madurai District, convening public meetings on house verandas or 
common areas in Dalit colonies and delivering impassioned speeches that instilled 
rights-based awareness among their residents. Beginning with the inaugural flag 
hoisting ceremony in Thallakulam on August 14, 1990, movement iconography 
surfaced in Dalit cheris (sērikaḷ), or residential colonies, across Madurai District. 
Paavalan, who factored among the movement’s earliest supporters, recalls: 
 
Thirumaavalavan traveled throughout Madurai and surrounding areas to instill 
political awareness among our people. They had never tasted political 
authority; they were denied access to political power and lacked influence 
within local politics. Thirumaavalavan instructed them to consolidate 
themselves as a political force and exhorted them to struggle to capture political 
power. He emphasized, “Our people are landless and powerless; socially, 
economically, politically. We must seize our rights.”28 
 
When inaugurating a new movement branch, Thirumaavalavan hoisted a red and blue 
flag with a white star at its center to designate the colony as a mugam, or military 
encampment, of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal.29 As the movement spread, do did its 
iconography as its flags and wall murals surfaced in Dalit cheris across Madurai 
District.30 
  When Paavalan recollects these early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal meetings, he recalls 
that Dalit youth such as himself, “were impressed by Thirumaavalavan’s speeches. We 
were drawn to his ideology of caste annihilation and the emphasis he placed on seizing 
our rights.”31 Yet, Paavalan emphasizes that it was not only the rhetorical content of 
these early speeches, but also their outward militancy that appealed to Dalit youth.32 
These early speeches, fashioned in a Dravidian style of political oration yet laden with 
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militant slogans, presented the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, as an 
inspiration and political model, exhorting Dalits to rise up and seize their rights.33 
During my fieldwork, many respondents corroborated Paavalan’s observation, citing 
the movement’s style of political oration and its self-fashioned militancy as primary 
conduits that attracted early supporters. Moreover, they emphasize that the speech-act 
itself, a powerful symbol of Dalit assertion, became a principal feature of early 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal assemblies. 
  In our conversations, my interlocutors recalled how Thirumaavalavan exuded 
defiance atop the makeshift stage, re-enacting images of him twisting the tips of his 
mustache into skyward pointing spears and thrusting his fist into the air, exhorting 
Dalits to rise up and seize their rights, insisting: “adanga maru, attumiru, timiri ezhu, 
tiruppi adi!” (Refuse to be restrained, transgress barriers, rise up in struggle, and hit 
back!).34 As one supporter recounts:  
 
Thirumaavalavan was proclaiming ‘tiruppi adi!’ (hit back) and twisting his 
moustache. This may have been a customary practice for others, but it was the 
first time that we, as Dalits, were doing this and proclaiming ‘adanga maru!’ 
(refuse to be restrained); his words alone created a revolution. In the history of 
revolutions across the world, most people were armed with guns or other 
weapons, but, for us, our language was our revolution. Because the caste 
Hindus shackled our people with chains of dependence, we didn’t have the guts 
to rise up. This was the first time for it to happen. The phrase, ‘tiruppi adi’ itself 
started a revolution. It did not advocate violence; it was for our protection; it 
was for our defense.35 
 
Elaborating further, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary D. Ravikumar locates 
the novelty of his oration not only for its rhetorical content, but also in the way that it 
refashioned Dalit subjectivity. He recalls, “Thirumaavalavan’s oration was key. There 
were no other Dalit leaders like him. The earlier generation of leaders were so humble, 
so restrained, but he was a firebrand.”36 
  As Viduthalai Chiruthaigal membership expanded, so did its locus of activity, 
which extended beyond the spatially confined Dalit cheri through physical and visual 
forays into the public sphere. Beginning in its first year, movement organizers staged 
peranikal, or protest marches, to commemorate the birth and death anniversaries of Dr. 
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B. R. Ambedkar alongside global icons such as Malcolm X. Initially modest in size, 
these marches traversed the city and, in doing so, solidified connections across 
otherwise spatially disconnected Dalit colonies. Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General 
Secretary Sinthanai Selvan stresses that these processions featured prominently 
“among the strategies that we used to mobilize Dalits and establish linkages among our 
people.”37 As the movement’s physical presence expanded within the public sphere, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers fashioned a new style of media that similarly 
occupied the city’s visual landscape, promulgating its presence across Madurai.  
  Acknowledging that early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal iconography captured public 
attention and amplified its visibility, Senkannan describes one particular strategy that 
reaped dividends: 
 
Movement organizers utilized public transportation to spread their 
propaganda. They pasted small banners that featured a militant slogan wrapped 
around an image of a snarling panther. They placed them on all three sides of 
city buses in the early morning hours. This activity proclaimed their message 
and heightened their popularity across Madurai.38 
 
Activists pasted these flyers, which were originally hand painted and later typeset, to 
public transportation as a means to publicize upcoming rallies and bolster its visibility 
across the city. Recalling this change, an early sympathizer emphasizes the difference 
between the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and its predecessors. He remembers that, in the 
1980s, the DPI’s visibility was confined to small pockets of support in and around 
Madurai, but, when he returned to Madurai in the early 1990s, he recalls observing 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s presence throughout the city. “At the time,” he recounts, 
“wall posters were not so popular, but movement activists used this form of media 
effectively. They also started scrawling attractive slogans directly onto walls and 
painting elaborate murals,” adding, “This is how the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal initially 
captured public attention in Madurai.”39 
  With its propaganda circulating across the city, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
consolidated Dalit communities through physical acts of spatial occupation and protest 
that solidified an interconnected social geography. Movement organizers staged 
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protests, most often before the Collector’s Office, that made specific demands on state 
authority. M. Yallalan, an early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal District Secretary in Madurai, 
recalls that the movement staged public protests that called for state authorities to 
intervene in the daily challenges confronting Dalit communities. Among these issues, 
he pinpoints restricted access to public goods and services, caste violence, price hikes, 
and routine practices of untouchability including a “two-tumbler” system as recurring 
targets of early protests.40 Providing a specific example, Yallalan recalls when 
movement activists spearheaded a procession, which they referred to as aṇivahuppu, or 
a military parade, that culminated in a mass assembly before the Collector’s Office. 
There, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activists placed a large cauldron filled only with water 
over an open fire to symbolize how recent price hikes had prevented them from 
purchasing food staples.41 He recounts, “We were chanting, ‘The water is boiling, but 
where is the rice?’”42 Yallalan adds, “We spearheaded these protests to address major 
issues confronting our people who, at that time, were voiceless.”43  
  While Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers avow that their early protests spread 
rights-based awareness among Dalit communities and sensitized them to pressing 
political issues, they acknowledge that their activities, more often than not, failed to 
produce an amenable solution. Just as the earlier DPI’s legal petitions were met with 
silence, early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal protests often failed to elicit a response from local 
authorities. Beyond the alleged indifference of local authorities, Senkannan recalls, 
“Our people were totally ignored by the mainstream media. Initially, they paid no 
attention to us; they never carried news of our movement. They wouldn’t even carry a 
small bulletin about our protests or activities.”44 He correlates the limited success of 
early protests with the movement’s inability to effect an audience. But, with a wry 
smile, he affirms, “We came to understanding this,” emphasizing that the early 
organizers “developed a new strategy to capture public attention by deploying tactics 
available to people’s movements at the time,” citing as an example salai mariyal, or road 
roko agitation.45 Organizers couch their discussion of this strategic adjustment within a 
broader discussion of concurrent developments in print media. 
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  In the 1990s, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers observed changes in the state’s 
print media landscape, spurred by a steady advancement in print technology coupled 
with infrastructural development. Historically, the circulation of daily newspapers 
grew extensively following the termination of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency, which 
suspended democratic governance for three years between 1975-77.46 From 1976, 
which marked a nadir point of press freedom in India, to 1981, newspaper circulation 
increased nationally by 65 percent, an expansion from roughly 9.3 to 15.3 million 
copies a day.47 By 1988, daily circulation had grown to 22.6 million copies a day, 
reaching 28.1 million by 1992.48 The development of offset printing in the 1980s 
spurred economies of scale, enabling a single printing center to produce 25,000 copies 
of a 16-page newspaper within an hour.49 While these advancements in print 
technology enabled expanded print-runs, simultaneous infrastructural developments, 
particularly in road transportation, facilitated the mass transport and deeper 
penetration of newspaper dailies.50 Then, in the early 1990s, the availability of 
computing technology coupled with the domestic production of offset presses allowed 
newspaper-printing centers to crop up across the state in smaller towns, thereby 
decreasing the distance of transportation and enabling local editions.51 
  From 1994, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers engineered tactical disruptions in 
the public sphere as a deliberate strategy to command media coverage and, thereby, to 
broadcast their voice and effect a mass audience. In particular, movement organizers 
targeted prominent roadways and key nodal points of transportation networks in order 
to amplify the effect of their activities. An early manifestation of this strategy 
(described in the chapter introduction) occurred on February 12, 1994, when 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers conducted a rail roko agitation at Madurai Junction. 
While both English and Tamil language newspapers printed images and published 
articles chronicling the event, select media outlets even carried the story as headline 
news. Following the railway roko, a temporary lull overtook movement activity as 
many Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters remained in police custody for their 
participation in the protest.52 Following their release, movement organizers 
orchestrated another provocative display of organizational strength: an airport roko 
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designed to blockade the tarmac of the Madurai airport and obstruct outgoing flights 
to New Delhi, the nation’s capital.  
  The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organized the airport roko to protest a recent attempt 
by the Supreme Court to intervene in Tamil Nadu’s reservations policy, an affirmative 
action program that earmarks posts in government and educational institutions for 
individuals hailing from historically disadvantaged castes. Although reservation quotas 
were capped nationally at 50 percent, Tamil Nadu adhered to, at least in principle, a 69 
percent reservation policy accessible to a projected 87 percent of the state’s 
population.53 In an attempt to standardize reservation policies across states, the 
Supreme Court ruled on November 16, 1992, that the total reservations quota must 
not exceed 50 percent in Tamil Nadu. In addition to protesting against the legal 
amendment, Dalit activists pressed for an extension of the existing reservation policy 
to include women and religious minorities, who, like Dalits, lacked equitable 
representation in government bodies and educational institutions.54 
  At eight o’clock on the morning of July 22, 1994, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre 
congregated before the statue of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in Perungudi and marched 
towards the Madurai airport, which serviced major domestic hubs across India. The 
movement organized the roko, according to Paavalan, in an attempt to “halt all aviation 
operations” with an explicit intent “to rattle the central government, those sitting in 
New Delhi.”55 In a flyer (Appendix) circulated among Dalit colonies prior to the rally, 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal announced a roko agitation to demand the reversal of the 
recent Supreme Court decision to cap reservation quotas.56 Moreover, the movement 
insisted that allotments be determined on the basis of population ratio and applied to 
promotions and managerial posts. Further, the movement called for a separate inner-
quota for women alongside the extension of reservation benefits to religious minorities, 
including Muslims and Christians. Although police disrupted the procession and 
booked rally participants en route, activists are again quick to point out that local 
newspapers carried stories and images of the mass procession.57 Likewise, the 
movement spread its own media in subsequent days, pasting posters (Appendix) on 
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city walls and public buses that read, “A DPI airport obstruction in Madurai over the 
reservations issue; R. Thirumaavalavan and 5000 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal arrested!”58  
  The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s rail and airport roko agitations of 1994 stand in 
stark contrast to early movement politics in their style of physically occupying the 
public sphere. These tactical disruptions of transportation systems and roadways 
consolidated the movement’s burgeoning reputation as an assertive social movement, 
while simultaneously capturing media attention and broadcasting its visibility across 
the state. Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers underscore that newspaper coverage 
provided an initial vehicle through which the movement spread beyond Madurai 
District, recalling, “Dalit people outside of Madurai only came to know about 
Thirumaavalavan through the print media and, in particular, through newspaper 
coverage of VCK protests.”59 Thayappan corroborates this account when he recounts, 
“In the south, we learned about the movement through newspapers that covered their 
events – the rail roko in Madurai and the procession toward the airport. Both activities 
were highlighted in print media.”60 The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s militant speeches and 
iconography coupled with its provocative public presence signaled the arrival of a new 
kind of Dalit politics that projected their community as assertive political subjects and, 
according to early activists, that expressed an ideology of agitation, or 
kalavarattattuvam. When long-term activist Thalaiyari recalls this seminal period, he 
quotes a recurring argument in Thirumaavalavan’s early speeches, stating: 
“Thirumaavalavan stressed, ‘Every community is guided by ideology. Just as 
Christians are guided by the Bible, let Dalits be guided by an ideology of agitation.”61 
But, the movement’s radical rhetoric and rapid growth grated uncomfortably with the 
prevailing social hierarchy.62 
 
The Cultural Economy of Caste 
Sinthanai Selvan, a Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary, couches his discussion of 
the movement’s expansion within a broader conversation regarding the modification of 
village economies spurred by an outward flux of labor migration as Dalits sought non-
agrarian employment in nearby cities and towns. Selvan points to Pongal, a four-day 
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harvest and livestock festival celebrated across Tamil Nadu, as exemplar of how a new 
pattern of labor migration interfaced with an ingrained socio-economic order. While he 
acknowledges that Tamils generally “commemorate Pongal as a festival that showcases 
our culture,” he contends, “in practice it also served to reinforce a feudalistic agrarian 
structure and, in doing so, to renew the caste system.”63 Over the following hour, 
Selvan discusses why Pongal featured as a perennial fault line for Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal politics as well as a catalyst for its expansion, demonstrating ways in which 
Pongal celebrations rendered visible caste relations as well as their transformation 
across the 1990s. 
  To commence the Pongal holiday, Selvan recalls that local upper castes boiled 
the first rice of the season in an open pot filled with milk to symbolize how the sun’s 
warmth provides for a bountiful harvest. Once this initial ceremony had ended, Dalit 
laborers visited local landholders, asking, “Ayya, pal pongiccalaa?”, inquiring 
respectfully, ‘Sir, did the milk boil over?’, a euphemism used to request a share of the 
harvest, referring to a nominal donation. Selvan continues, “Customarily, the 
landholder replied, “Ah, ah, pal pongiccu. Ingee va,” or ‘Yes, the milk boiled over. Come 
here,’” at which Selvan gestures as if small money was placed in the shirt pocket of the 
laborer. He pauses to recollect his thoughts before proceeding, “Every Dalit laborer 
visited the landowner in this manner. It was a demeaning exercise. It was not simply 
begging; it was an annual enactment of cultural subordination.”64  
  Selvan acknowledges that this practice gradually diminished as Dalits gradually 
severed their economic dependence on local landowners and Dalit families secured 
supplementary income through labor migration, often non-agrarian employment in 
cities or nearby towns. Additionally, Dalit students left their native villages to pursue 
advanced studies. Selvan elaborates: 
 
At that time, many Dalits migrated to Bangalore and Bombay, and even locally 
to Coimbatore, Chennai and Trichi. These migrants, many of whom were 
university students or laborers employed either by small businesses or in the 
construction or hotel industries, would purchase a fresh shirt to commemorate 
Pongal. Fashioning new clothes, shoes, and even sunglasses, they returned to 
their native villages with a new identity during the festival season. Upon their 
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return, they performed puja in the local temple and, passing upper castes in the 
streets, they would ask, “Nalla irukkiringalaa?” (Are you well?). Caste elders 
could not digest this transformation.65 
 
Selvan underscores the significance of this transformation, describing how Dalits 
returned to their native villages emboldened and refused to perform traditional 
displays of subservience. “During every Pongal festival, each and every time,” he 
stresses, “there will be a clash. We would inquire with each other, “Pongal 
kalavaramaa?”, meaning ‘Did a Pongal riot occur?’66 
  As our conversation turns to movement expansion in the state’s northern 
districts, Selvan recalls that the movement expanded quickly in a decentralized 
manner, most often in the wake of instances of anti-Dalit violence that became 
emblematic of the decade’s politics.67 In particular, he attributes the movement’s 
precipitous growth to its novel media (described in the previous section), referring 
jointly to early protests, visual iconography, rhetorical content and oration style, all of 
which projected a self-fashioned militancy that appealed to Dalits across the political 
spectrum, particularly the youth. Further, he points to the movement’s hardline 
response to anti-Dalit violence, which he then casts in stark relief to an earlier, more 
reticent generation of Dalit leaders. Selvan underscores that, as the decade progressed, 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal amassed a strong cadre base that embraced its provocative 
forms of protest and highlights the importance of Dalit youth in spreading the 
movement during the festival season. Similarly, Thirumaavalavan underscored this 
point in an early interview, “Following the Ambedkar Centenary, a new generation of 
young Dalit leaders emerged who, having digested the emergent politics, were 
frustrated with Dravidian movements. They took Dalit movements into their own 
hands and transformed the culture of Dalit politics.”68  
  Similarly, Maria Johnson, who collaborated with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal as a 
law student in Madurai, recounts how the movement’s refashioning of Dalit 
subjectivity inspired Dalit students such as himself. He recollects, “It was easy for 
Dalits to discuss Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics amongst themselves in the city,” noting 
that Adi-Dravida, or Dalit, student hostels on university campuses and densely 
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populated urban colonies housing Dalit laborers provided residential spaces where 
they conversed at length about these issues. But, when these individuals returned to 
their native villages, Johnson recalls that they arrived with audiocassettes of 
Thirumaavalavan’s speeches and journals detailing the movement’s politics.69 As a 
consequence, many Dalits residing in rural stretches of northern Tamil Nadu, who had 
neither met Thirumaavalavan nor attended a Viduthalai Chiruthaigal rally, heard his 
speeches broadcast over public announcement systems commissioned during holiday 
festivals.70 These individuals spread Viduthalai Chiruthaigal media and, at times, hoisted 
the movement flag in Dalit colonies, providing a visual manifestation of Dalit assertion 
that frequently elicited a violent blowback from locally dominant castes. As these 
clashes intensified, movement organizers underscore, “We, in the name of Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, entered those areas and provided our organization’s protection and 
assistance to affected communities.”71 
  As the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal gained traction across northern districts, 
particularly in the wake of caste violence, Tada Periyasami, a native of Thittakudi, 
recalls that the movement spread through strong inter-village networks already present 
in the region. “You see,” he says, 
 
the people throughout this area are interconnected; there are many marriage 
alliances. My wife and my mother are from nearby villages. Just as there are 
joint households, there are joint villages. We understood that even though our 
people are scattered geographically, they are still interconnected. Marriage 
alliances established bonds among the villages. We built upon these bonds 
when we travelled from village to village and organized our people through 
protest.72 
  
This interconnectedness was key, he emphasizes, to propagate the movement and 
coordinate mass rallies. “We did not own cell phones. So, as soon as an issue arose, we 
distributed posters and flyers throughout Dalit colonies. In the beginning, we wrote 
directly on walls and public buses to spread our materials and propagate our message 
from one village to the next.”73 
  Over coming years, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal spread rapidly across the state’s 
northern districts, most often following in the wake of caste violence or, after 1995, 
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police violence targeting Dalit communities. When the movement responded to 
specific incidents of violence or in support of a particular issue, it collaborated with 
local Dalit organizations. Then, as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal developed, it absorbed 
many of these smaller, local movements. Punitha Pandiyan, editor of Dalit Murasu, 
acknowledges this when he recalls, “Once the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal had gained 
momentum, so many people and organizations, including small Ambedkarite 
movements that dotted the countryside, merged with the VCK.”74 However, the 
movement’s fortification within the state’s northern districts began in Thittakudi, 
Cuddalore District, where, in January 1995, caste clashes erupted during the Pongal 
holiday when Dalit youth installed a flag of the Republican Party of India, founded by 
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, alongside the flags of other political parties in the main village 
quarter. 
 
Turning Points 
Thittakudi 
By his own admission, Thirumaavalavan acknowledges that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
first established its presence in the northern districts in January 1995 following caste 
clashes in Thittakudi, Cuddalore District. During the Pongal holiday, Dalit youth in 
proximate villages attempted to hoist a flag of the Republican Party of India, a Dalit 
political party with multiple factions stemming from Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s Scheduled 
Caste Federation, in a public square alongside the flags of other political parties. This 
symbolic act drew the ire of locally dominant castes, including Vanniyars and 
Mudhaliyars, which promptly demanded its removal. When the Dalits refused, a 
scuffle ensued between the two groups, which they reported to Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers who scheduled a public meeting in Thittakudi on January 18, 1995. When 
local authorities, who share the caste affiliation of the locally dominant castes involved 
in the melee, banned the public assembly, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre organized a 
road roko that upper castes, backed by local police constables, forcefully dispersed 
before descending upon the town’s largest Dalit settlement. While dominant caste 
persons approached from the front entrance, police entered through the rear, firing 
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and injuring several Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters.75 Amidst the commotion, two 
Dalits, Ramesh and Shanmugam, were killed by police fire and many others were 
hospitalized.76 
  Sithan, an early organizer in Cuddalore, recalls that the altercation ushered the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal into the region. While the movement possessed a growing 
support base in Dalit colonies across the district, many of these individuals had neither 
met nor seen an image of Thirumaavalavan, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal chairman. Yet, 
shortly after the outbreak of violence, Thirumaavalavan arrived on the scene to 
spearhead a public rally and address affected communities. Sithan recounts that he 
was in Krishna Hospital of Cuddalore town visiting Mahendran, a movement 
supporter wounded by police fire, when a young man entered the ward proclaiming, 
“Thirumaavalavan has come!” Sithan followed the man outside where, unable to 
recognize his leader, he asked, “Which man is Thirumaavalavan?” After a pause, the 
young man replied, pointing, “He is.” Sithan recalls, “I was surprised to be facing a 
young man whose moustache had barely begun to sprout and with only stubble for a 
beard; He was probably in his early 30s, sitting on a two-wheeler alongside Sinthanai 
Selvan.”77   
  Recounting the incident, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers emphasize that the 
Thittakudi violence sparked the movement’s expansion across the northern districts of 
Tamil Nadu.78 In particular, Thirumeni, an early Cuddalore District organizer, 
underscores that Thittakudi marked “the first time that the government,” referring 
specifically to local police constables, “was involved directly in attacking our people, 
even deploying lethal force,” noting further, “These events initiated a wave of public 
protests across the northern districts.”79 In response, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organized local Dalit movements and announced a full day bandh (general strike) 
across Cuddalore and Villupuram Districts.80 Noting the importance of the public 
demonstrations that followed, Sinthanai Selvan avers that, from his recollection, it was 
the first time that an occurrence of anti-Dalit violence ignited protests not only locally, 
but across the region and in neighboring districts. Thittakudi provides an emblematic 
example of how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal expansion occurred in tandem with incidents of 
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caste violence and demonstrating how, as Thirumeni stresses, “the movement 
developed through its response to such atrocities.”81  
 
Melavalavu 
The 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution formally converted its democracy into 
a three-tier political system, introducing formal elections within village councils, or 
panchayats, throughout the country.82 Initially floated by the Narasimha Rao 
government in 1991, the amendment passed Parliament in 1992 and then, in 1993, 
received ratification by the required two-thirds of state assemblies. In proportion with 
each state’s population of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), the 
amendment reserved positions in panchayats across the nation such that individuals 
from SC/ST communities may contest elections. This initial round of panchayat 
elections was especially contentious in Tamil Nadu, where panchayat presidents are 
elected directly by popular vote as opposed to other states where an elected panchayat 
council selects the president. In 1996, the village of Melavalavu, nestled in Madurai 
District proximate to Chennagarampatti, was among the first reserved panchayats in 
the state to hold elections. For the first time in village history, only Dalits would be 
permitted to vie directly for presidency of the local panchayat, the highest-ranking 
position on the village council.83  
  In promising to install a Dalit as panchayat president, the 73rd Amendment 
incited staunch opposition from the locally dominant Thevar community, which 
resorted to tactics such as intimidation and violence in an effort to undermine electoral 
procedures. Originally scheduled for October 1996, three Dalits filed nomination 
papers to contest the election, but soon thereafter rescinded their candidacy in light of 
escalating hostility with some local Thevars, who vowed to organize a social and 
economic boycott if a Dalit were to assume responsibility as panchayat president. 
Times of India reported that prominent Thevar leaders had warned that if a Dalit were 
elected, landowners from their community would fire all Dalit farmhands, prohibit 
their access to public drinking wells, and prevent their cattle from grazing on 
unutilized lands.84 The following month, elections were rescheduled and again 
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cancelled when a group of Thevar men reduced several polling booths to ashes on the 
day prior to voting.85  
  The deteriorating situation in Melavalavu posed a dilemma for Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers who, while still adhering to a policy of electoral boycotts dating 
back to the earlier DPI, observed keenly as the first round of reserved panchayat 
elections unfolded in Melavalavu and across Madurai District. Thirumaavalavan 
recalls multiple occasions when K. Murugesan, who factored among the initial 
candidates in Melavalavu, visited him in Madurai prior to polling. He recounts, 
“Murugesan and others visited me in my room at Thallakulam to request my 
organization’s support. I told him, ‘No, we are not participating in elections; we will 
maintain our distance. You can proceed on your own behalf and decide as you see 
fit.’”86 But, Thirumaavalavan recalls that Murugesan again returned to reiterate his 
intent to contest the polls and insist that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal endorse his 
candidacy.87  
  As the political situation grew more volatile, Thirumaavalavan faced mounting 
pressure from within the movement ranks to support Murugesan. He recalls that 
grassroots organizers including M. Yallalan, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Madurai District 
Secretary who monitored rural affairs, advised unequivocally that the movement 
discontinue its electoral boycott immediately and exerted strong pressure to back 
Murugesan in the face of upper caste hostility. Yallalan argued, “If a Dalit cannot even 
come to power in a reserved constituency, what is the point of boycotting elections? 
Should we not instead utilize our organization’s strength to help Dalits seize political 
power?”88 As similar critiques surfaced, Thirumaavalavan relented and advised his 
cadre to back Murugesan in Melavalavu.89 Recollecting this decision, 
Thirumaavalavan recounts, “Although we decided not to contest the election, we 
advised our people how to vote in the election,” adding, “This was our first step toward 
electoral politics.”90  
  Following direct state intervention, polling took place in Melavalavu on 
December 30, 1996, under the gaze of a 250 strong police presence.91 Because local 
Thevars boycotted the election, Murugesan, the only candidate to file nomination 
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papers, was declared the village’s first Dalit panchayat president. Yet, over the initial 
five months of his tenure, Murugesan was unable to fulfill his duties as Thevar men 
gherroed (encircled) his office to impede his entry and he received repeated, anonymous 
threats. Despite a deteriorating law and order situation, the ruling Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (DMK) government, the party that Murugesan supported, disregarded his 
appeals for police protection. In fact, it was only after Murugesan reportedly sought 
physical security from the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal that the state government provided a 
single armed guard.92 On June 29, 1997, when Murugesan and his associates were 
travelling on a bus to Dindigul, a group of Thevar men from Melavalavu village 
intercepted the bus at an intermediate stop, forced Murugesan and his associates off 
the bus and, in broad daylight, hacked them to death with agricultural shears in the 
public street.93  
 
The Anatomy of a Protest 
M. Ravikumar, an advocate at Madurai High Court and former Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
District Secretary (city), recalls, “The Melavalavu joint murder was the single most 
important event for the growth of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. This was the event that 
really brought the people together.”94 Although initial reports referred to the atrocity 
simply as a “murder of bus passengers,” altogether eliding mention of caste or 
elaborating the broader political context, subsequent Viduthalai Chiruthaigal protests 
secured statewide attention on the issue.95 While Murugesan’s murder precipitated 
popular unrest and protests across the state, what was particularly notable, as multiple 
sources observed, is that the Melavalavu atrocity was “the first time that caste-related 
violence in the southern districts [had] repercussions in a northern district.”96 In the 
absence of a rigorous investigation in the days following Murugesan’s murder, Dalit 
communities across Tamil Nadu, including Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre, took to the 
streets in protests that included sporadic incidents of damage to public property.  
  According to Dinamalar, movement activists reportedly set fire to a public bus 
in Neyveli. The newspaper carried a photo of an incinerated bus still immersed in 
flames above a caption reading: “Viduthalai Chiruthaigal members hurl a petrol bomb in 
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Neyveli and set ablaze a Thiruvalluvar bus. In the photo you can observe the bus 
burning.”97 The paper reports that “a violent gang” consisting of twenty young men 
supporting the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal set the bus ablaze in the early morning hours of 
July 1, 1997.98 Without referencing the Melavalavu murders, the paper quotes the 
District Superintendent of Police: “The bus was burned in Neyveli to condemn a few 
incidents that occurred in Madurai,” who assured the public that police authorities 
would immediately conduct “a rigorous investigation in order to apprehend the 
individuals who burned the bus.”99 Further, the article continues, “Police found a 
notice at the scene of the incident attributed to supporters of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
with the following message: ‘In condemning atrocities committed against the Dalit 
people in Madurai, we will instill panic across the Tamil Nadu’.”100 To conclude, it 
references recent instances of damage to public property, noting that three bus 
windshields were shattered in nearby Thittakudi to denounce what the report glossed 
as a “Madurai riot.”101 
  In response to the Melavalavu murders, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal first 
organized a protest march across Chennai to condemn the state government’s inaction 
and draw attention to four additional reserved panchayats where elections had been 
indefinitely postponed as no Dalits re-filed nomination papers due to coercive 
measures by locally dominant castes.102 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers across 
northern districts of Tamil Nadu pasted wall posters in Dalit colonies alerting the 
residents to the upcoming rally in Chennai, which the movement referred to not as 
perani, or a protest march, but as anivahuppu, a military parade. Colorful posters 
(Appendix) flooded Dalit colonies across the state publicizing, “The Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal’s grand military parade to condemn the Melavalavu assassination.”103 The 
posters instructed Viduthalai Chiruthaigal supporters to assemble at Thevu Thital near 
the Chennai Central Railway Station by two o’clock on the afternoon of July 23, 1997, 
informing them that the marching procession would proceed through Chennai’s 
bustling city center as far as Kannigapuram, nearby to Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar, 
or simply K.K. Nagar, a commercial and residential neighborhood in southern Chennai 
well serviced by public transportation.104 
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  Prior to conducting the marching procession across central Chennai, movement 
organizers first distributed small pamphlets to Dalit communities across Tamil Nadu. 
A close reading of this material provides insight into how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers deployed a new style of impassioned rhetoric shot through with militant 
allusions to strike at the sentiments of Dalit communities while conveying political and 
rights-based awareness. The movement’s language operates on multiple levels, at once 
comedic and acerbic in deriding the perpetrators of the Melavalavu joint murder as “a 
cowardly gang with murderous rage” and “barbarians from the Stone Age.”105 
Although these references may attract the reader’s immediate attention, the pamphlet 
proceeds to outline precisely what transpired in Melavalavu and then discuss these 
events within a legal, constitutional framework. Taken collectively, this language 
navigates a fine balance between militant revolt and democratic assertion that came to 
define Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics in the 1990s. 
  The pamphlet commences with an account of the murder that does not spare 
graphic details of Murugesan’s death. It reads, “Recently on June 30, 1997, six 
persons including Madurai-Melavalavu panchayat leader Comrade Murugesan were 
traveling in a bus when they were intercepted by a rowdy gang that, rapt by casteist 
fury, slit their throats in an act of murderous rage.”106 Having elaborated upon the 
circumstances surrounding the murder, the material juxtaposes this atrocity with 
national preparations that were currently underway to commemorate the golden 
jubilee of Indian independence, accentuating the irony that the Melavalavu atrocity 
occurred at a time when prominent national politicians were clamoring that “they will 
appoint a Dalit as President of the Republic!”107 To conclude the introductory section, 
the pamphlet reads, “Caste fanatics, refusing to accept a Paraiyar who was elected as 
panchayat president by the people as per the laws of the political system, conspired 
and murdered him in broad daylight.”108 Emphasizing, “Having observed the 
murderous rage of this cowardly gang, true democrats and any compassionate human 
being would be disgusted, they would scorn these actions.”109 Yet, as the material 
acknowledges, the murder elicited nothing more than an uncomfortable silence from 
the state government. 
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  Next, the pamphlet stresses the democratic aspirations of Murugesan, who 
“contested the election and had the guts to enforce the right (urimai) of reservations as 
sanctioned by law without fearing death threats from fools who insisted that, despite it 
being a reserved constituency, Dalits should not file nomination papers. Having 
become the panchayat leader, Melavalavu Murugesan is a martyr who raised his head 
and became a great hero.”110 Juxtaposing the democratic aspirations of Murugesan 
alongside the retrogressive demeanor of locally dominant castes, the material 
demonstrates that the atrocity cannot be viewed in isolation, stating, “Not only in 
Melavalavu but across Madurai District, caste fanatics intimidated and obstructed the 
Dalit people from filing nomination papers in panchayat constituencies including 
Pappapatti, Kirippatti, Kallippatti and Nattamangalam.”111 Further, “Persisting unto 
the present day, it is disgraceful that in Tamil Nadu nomination papers have still not 
been filed in these constituencies despite having announced elections for the third 
consecutive time.”112 But, without holding dominant castes solely responsible for the 
failure of democratic procedures, the narrative heaps its condemnation on the state 
government. 
  The pamphlet places direct responsibility for the Melavalavu murders on the 
state government, alleging that the government “lacks a backbone” and “hesitates even 
to take action against caste fanatics such as those [in Melavalavu].”113 Upon 
enumerating specific instances of prior anti-Dalit violence, the narrative alleges, “In a 
context in which so many murders have occurred, the police department and revenue 
authorities maintain their apathy and continue to sluggishly mishandle the problem in 
Melavalavu.”114 Next, the pamphlet underscores that even though the “problem was 
brought to the attention of higher authorities and the chief minister himself… this 
political structure has been built by dominant caste fanatics, so what interest would it 
have to act against them?”115 Further, it queries, “Without shaking up the political 
structure, how else can we defeat dominant caste fanaticism?”116 Prior to articulating a 
set of demands to state authorities, the pamphlet issues a final appeal to Dalits to 
participate in the Chennai rally. It reads: “Those caste fanatic thugs may have killed 
our revolutionaries, but they did not conquer them! Murugesan, the revolutionary, 
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stood firm like a mountain alongside his comrades! He conquered in principle!”117 
Finally, in bolded letters, the text exhorts Dalits, “We will keep tally of our martyrs – 
but now, we must maintain focus on our democratic responsibility! Set off for Chennai 
like a war battalion!”118 
  While Viduthalai Chiruthaigal couched its rhetoric in a militant idiom, the 
pamphlet advanced a democratic program, culminating in six korikkaikal, or demands, 
presented to government authorities.119 Among the demands, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
insisted that the prime accused be apprehended immediately and charged under the 
Goondas Act as well as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act (1989). Additionally, it called for a CBI investigation into the matter, 
an endeavor to supersede state-level officials and appeal to federal authority.120 
Moreover, the movement insisted that the government designate Melur as an “atrocity 
prone area” and ensure the livelihood and security of its Dalit residents “as prescribed 
by law.”121 Further, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal commanded the government to convene 
elections in reserved panchayats in Melavalavu and across Madurai District, where 
recent communal violence had foiled democratic procedures, and instructed pertinent 
authorities to rescind current National Security Act and Goondas Act cases lodged 
against its cadre who had participated in a roko agitation on July 4th, 1997, related to 
the Melavalavu murders.122 Finally, in what appears to have been a taunt targeting the 
very notion of state sovereignty, the text calls on the government to allocate weapons 
to Dalits residing in atrocity-prone areas to provide for their self-defense. 
  On July 23, 1997, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, in coordination with Dalit 
organizations across Tamil Nadu, conducted a protest march that traversed the dense 
arterial roads of central Chennai. Paavalan recounts that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
anticipated the state’s response, recounting, “Thirumaavalavan selected northern 
Madras as a rallying point because Dalits thickly populate the area. At every turn, our 
people were present to welcome Thirumaavalavan and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre.”123 
Moreover, he points out that the rally’s points of origin (Theevu Thidal) and completion 
(Kannigapuram) were proximate to prominent city markets, Vyasarpadi and 
Koyambedu, respectively; areas densely populated by Dalit migrant laborers. A 
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photograph (Appendix) of the procession published in Dinamani the following morning 
displays throngs of Dalits stretching beyond the camera’s frame, many of whom were 
waving colorful Viduthalai Chiruthaigal movement flags. The image rests above the 
caption, “A protest march conducted in Chennai by the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, a Dalit 
organization, to condemn the murder that happened recently in Melavalavu, Madurai 
District.”124 Similarly, The Hindu reported: “All shops along the procession 
route…downed shutters. Most of the youth were armed with sticks and shouted 
slogans…”125 While media coverage represented Viduthalai Chiruthaigal rallyists as 
“miscreants” who “turned violent” and created “unruly scenes,” referencing incidents 
of damage to public property, the rally’s mass attendance coupled with the visible 
anger of its participants prompted media outlets to provide further explanation, 
thereby generating coverage of the Melavalavu murders that did not merely gloss the 
atrocity as “a few incidents” or a “Madurai riot.”126  
  Next, on August 6, 1997, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal banded together with more 
than thirty Dalit organizations across the state to convene a larger marching 
procession across Chennai, traversing a five kilometer route from Valluvar Kottam in 
Nungambakkam to Raj Bhavan, the Governor’s Palace, via Little Mount and 
Saidapet.127 In an account published in Frontline, S. Viswanathan writes, “What was 
perhaps the largest ever mobilization effort by Dalit organizations in Tamil Nadu was 
severely curtailed by state action,” noting that “The procession presented an unusual 
spectacle – the police force far outnumbered the rallyists, and the entire procession 
route looked like a curfew-bound area.”128 Similarly, as reported by The Hindu, “The 
entire route resembled a “bandh” or curfew area with all business and commercial 
establishments and educational institutions remaining closed.”129 As if bracing for 
large-scale violence, police guarded petrol pumps along the route and business 
establishments not only downed metal shutters, but covered glass storefronts and 
windowpanes with “canvas, cloth or polythene sheets.”130  
  Anticipating an attendance of one lakh (100,000), Viswanathan affirms that the 
Tamil Nadu government marshaled the strength of 20,000 police officers to line the 
procession route, even enlisting specialty units such as Rapid Action Forces (RAF) 
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alongside police reinforcements from the neighboring states of Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh.131 Further, his detailed account elaborates upon the strict protocol that 
governed the rally’s execution. Police authorities stipulated:  
 
Pedestrians should be allowed to cut across the procession once in 10 minutes 
at all road junctions; the police should ensure a gap between every 500 persons; 
the participants should not travel in vehicles, but walk in the procession and 
they should not be allowed to enter any shop, hotel, residence or any public 
place en route.132 
 
In the days preceding the rally, police officials scoured the state, arresting in 
preventative detentions 4,000 Dalit organizers and grassroots activists, who they 
labeled as “anti-social elements.”133 Further, officials reportedly threatened the owners 
of transportation companies contracted to ferry participants to the rally, triggering 
many of them to renege existing commitments. On the day of the procession, city 
police erected twenty-nine checkpoints around the city’s perimeter at which they 
detained an estimated 600 vehicles, effectively barring the participation of their 
occupants. Moreover, allegations surfaced that 2,000 Dalit activists traveling on the 
Nellai Express were detained in Trichi, while hundreds more on the Kanyakumari 
Express were hindered in Dindigul, resulting in hundreds of arrests.134  
  Although strong countermeasures effectively barred most Dalits from 
participating in the rally, an estimated 7,000 Dalits participated in the procession. As 
planned, rallyists marched to Rav Bhavan and presented a memorandum to M. 
Fathima Beevi, retired Supreme Court Justice and present Governor of Tamil Nadu, 
that enumerated caste atrocities committed against Dalits, listed 22,000 villages across 
Tamil Nadu where practices of untouchability purportedly continued, criticized the 
government’s inaction on recent instances of anti-Dalit violence, and demanded that a 
Supreme Court judge, preferably a Dalit, conduct an official inquiry into the matter 
tasked with recommending “effective structural changes in the police 
administration.”135 For this final request, presiding Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. 
Karunanidhi reportedly responded that he had “no comments to offer.”136 
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  While the Chennai rally was the largest event that the movement coordinated in 
response to Melavalavu, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal continued to spearhead protests 
across Tamil Nadu. On November 24, 1997, the movement convened a protest march 
in Madurai. In its coverage, Dinamani began by acknowledging the rally’s objective, 
stating, “The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal conducted the rally demanding the arrest of the 
prime accused in the case related to the murder of six persons, including Murugesan, 
the former panchayat leader of the Melavalavu panchayat council.”137 Participants 
assembled at Madurai Junction and then marched through Simmakkal, Yaanaikkal, 
Kalbaalam and Goripalaiyam before closing with a rally before the Madurai District 
Collector’s Office. In his speech at the rally, Thirumaavalavan reportedly stated, 
“Because, even up to the present, security has not been provided for our Dalit people 
living in the Melur area, the Dalit people from these villages in Melur taluk have been 
murdered.”138 He reproached state authorities because “no proper investigation [had] 
been conducted in regards to the murderous incidents that occurred in these three 
places.”139 Seeking to supersede obdurate local police officials, he demanded that the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) launch a formal investigation into the murders 
and charge the culprits under the National Security Act. In addition, Thirumaavalavan 
petitioned the state government to provide compensation for the victims’ families and 
those who had lost houses and property during recent anti-Dalit violence in the state’s 
southern districts.140  
  In supplement, Dinamani published two photographs (Appendix) adjacent to 
the article. The first image displays two long queues of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
supporters, mostly women, marching through central Madurai.141 The other image 
conveys the imposing presence of the police battalions assigned as a ‘security detail’ to 
monitor the rally. Against a backdrop of officers standing shoulder-to-shoulder atop 
fortified police buses delimiting the procession route, additional officers patrol the 
ground below. The caption reads, “Police engaging in a protection force on Monday in 
Madurai’s Goripalaiyam area for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s walking procession.”142 
The irony that police protection was not afforded on their behalf, but to surveil their 
protest against anti-Dalit violence that called on authorities to safeguard their security 
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was not lost on those who participated in these early protests. In fact, the photograph 
provides a source of amusement for movement activists today who jest, albeit with a 
shade of truth, that in the 1990s it sometimes seemed as if more police attended 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal rallies than its own movement cadre. 
   
On Visibility and Voice 
In the 1990s, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s emerging visual and physical presence elicited 
a violent blowback from locally dominant communities.143 Academic and media 
accounts that chronicle caste clashes often portray the tumultuous period through a 
paradigm of violence and resistance. For example, M.S.S. Pandian writes, “The 
political biography of Tamil Nadu during the 1990s was marked by increasing caste 
conflicts between the backward castes and the Dalits,” a development that he 
attributes to “the fact that the backward castes [did] not any longer exercise 
ideological hegemony over the Dalits in Tamil Nadu and they [had] to affirm their 
authority through dominance mediated by violence.”144 While Pandian’s claim that 
backward castes had once exerted ideological control over Dalits lacks evidence, he 
aptly observes that they turned increasingly to violence to reassert what some 
perceived as their eroding dominance. Similarly, in contributions to Frontline, S. 
Viswanathan records an unprecedented surge in anti-Dalit violence across Tamil Nadu 
from the mid-1990s, which he attributes to “a growing Dalit resistance to caste 
oppression and caste Hindus’ increasing intolerance of Dalit assertiveness.”145 Taken 
collectively, Viswanathan’s articles locate a recurring catalyst of anti-Dalit violence in 
Dalit attempts to enter the public sphere and encroach upon backward castes’ control 
over local political and economic affairs.146 
  Pandian and Viswanathan’s accounts resonate with those proffered by early 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, who similarly acknowledge that caste violence 
intensified as Dalits asserted themselves within local politics and staked a claim for 
equitable economic access. For example, Thayappan elucidates a common perspective 
among my interlocutors when he suggests, “Each and every moment of Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal expansion coincided with an atrocity. Every major turning point coincided 
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with a massacre or murder.”147 Similarly, D. Ravikumar, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
General Secretary, points out that caste-based atrocities increased in tandem with 
mounting Dalit assertion, citing as evidence the National Human Rights Commission’s 
Report on Prevention of Atrocities Against Scheduled Castes (2004).148 While organizers and 
supporters alike may contextualize the movement’s emergence through reference to 
landmark instances of anti-Dalit violence, violence itself does not serve as the primary 
idiom through which they recollect early movement politics. Rather, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers discussed their politics in terms of voice, not as individual 
utterances but as collective acts that amplified and carried their demands to pertinent 
authorities. 
  This idiom of voice was particularly pronounced during a conversation with 
Gowtham Sannah in his office at Madras High Court. When Sannah, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Propaganda Secretary, reminisces about the political climate during the 
movement’s formation, he recalls: 
 
At the time, there was a vacuum for Dalit politics [in Tamil Nadu]. Although 
there were many small leaders, they lacked the courage to raise a resolute 
voice to press our demands before the government. The Dravidian parties 
considered these [earlier Dalit] movements as subordinate political forces. 
These Dalit voices failed to even register as sound in their ears.149 
 
Whereas Sannah contends that the previous generation of Dalit leaders and 
movements had faltered or were simply ignored, he asserts, “The VCK gave a voice to 
Dalits.”150 Following a punctuated silence, he underscores, “Because our voice was very 
small, we were compelled to make our activities very loud in order to project our voice to centers of 
power.”151 Through a motif of voice, Sannah highlights that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
embraced disruptive forms of political participation to ensure that Dalit communities 
were seen and their voices were heard. For Sannah, voice is not limited to individual 
utterances, but encompasses collective acts capable of amplifying its message and 
projecting political demands to authorities.152  
  When Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers discuss their early protests, often 
detailing tactical disruptions of public space that obstructed roadways and 
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transportation systems alike, two themes recur in our conversations. Firstly, they 
underscore that collective acts of disruption proved more effective than formal 
institutional channels in conveying their voice to pertinent authorities. To evince this 
claim, they emphasize that disruptive forms of political activity enabled them to 
command media attention, albeit not on their own terms, and broadcast their presence 
and message across the state. Moreover, they allege that disrupting law and order 
compelled government authorities to intervene and listen to their demands. Secondly, 
they highlight that the physical act of protest itself generated new understandings of 
rights and citizenship among Dalit communities. While acknowledging that a Dalit 
occupation of the public sphere was not entirely novel, they accentuate that the style 
and demeanor with which these individuals now inhabited public space had undergone 
a marked transformation. Further, they emphasize that this new style of Dalit political 
participation not only conveyed demands to state authorities, but the physical form of 
its expression, the collective act of protest, refashioned Dalit subjectivity and re-
presented Dalits as rights-bearing citizens who demanded recognition as such. 
  In response to anti-Dalit violence in the 1990s, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers implemented an escalating model of protest that intensified until relevant 
authorities took cognizance of their demands. In our conversations, organizers recall 
that their intervention began with the submission of a written petition to local 
authorities. M. Arivudainambi, an early organizer of Cuddalore District, recounts that 
if the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal failed to remedy an issue locally through institutional 
channels, organizers adopted an increasingly confrontational approach that ratcheted 
up pressure on authorities to redress, or at least acknowledge, their demands. He 
recalls, “We staged protests before the Collector’s Office, the police station, the taluk 
office. If an amenable solution still was not reached, we conducted rokos.”153 Further, 
Sinthanai Selvan underscores that local community participation was integral 
throughout this process, recounting, “Whenever an atrocity took place, we first 
organized the people by conducting a people’s forum and then, with the people’s 
strength, we spearheaded rokos and protest marches.”154 As the decade progressed, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers turned increasingly to rokos (transit blockages), 
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peranikal (protest marches), and related activities that clogged dense arterial roads and 
disrupted transportation networks as a strategy to either intensify pressure on local 
officials or supersede these officials altogether and appeal directly to higher authority. 
  Drawing upon his experience, Tada Periyasami alleges that early protests were 
not simply manifestations of Dalit discontent, but also served as available fora where 
Dalit communities articulated demands for an equitable administration of law 
alongside the delivery of rights. He recalls, “The people were demanding that their 
government abide by its own rules and enforce its own laws... When an atrocity 
occurred, we staged bandhs, rokos, and perani. We pressed our demands through these 
protests.”155 These tactical disruptions of the public sphere captured media attention, 
which organizers claim provided a visible means of political participation that 
amplified their voice. This is among the reasons why Thirumaavalavan once 
emphasized, “Without first showcasing our strength, we cannot lobby [those in 
power].”156 Likewise, K. Krishnasamy, another prominent Dalit organizer in the state, 
reached a similar conclusion when he underscored, “For each and every incident we 
had to come to the streets to highlight the issues; it was because of such protests that 
the media would follow and only then were we able to settle some issues.”157 
  This contention that disruptive politics were not simply more effective, but, 
moreover, necessary to redress problems resonates with a personal account provided 
by Kani Amudhan, an early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Deputy General Secretary in 
Madurai. Referring to the 1990s, Amudhan recalls that local police were resistant to 
even file a First Information Report (FIR), a mandatory first step in criminal 
proceedings, at the behest of Dalits. Confronted by obdurate local officials, he 
recounts that Viduthalai Chiruthaigal activists perceived a need to supersede these 
officials and appeal to higher echelons of authority if they were to secure an amenable 
solution.158 Amudhan recalls, “We realized that creating a law and order problem 
forced higher levels of police and state authority to intervene. If a law and order 
problem was not created, there was a general belief that the state would not solve, or 
even address, our problems.”159 He adds further, “Disrupting law and order compelled 
police and government officials to convene peace talks and at least hear our 
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grievances.”160 Corroborating Amudhan’s account, Sinthanai Selvan affirms that early 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal protests “compelled police and state authorities not only to deal 
with a law and order problem, but also with our demands.”161 He stresses, “We had no 
alternative but to exert strong pressure in order to force them to take decisive 
action.”162  
  In our conversations, my interlocutors not only allege that tactical disruptions 
compelled state authorities to respond to Dalit grievances, but, in different registers, 
they employ a motif of ‘voice’, emphasizing that the tactical disruptions of public space 
provided a means of political participation that ensured that their voices were, at the 
very least, heard. For example, Arul Joseph and M. Ravikumar, both advocates in 
Madurai High Court, stress, “Road rokos forced government and police authorities to 
intervene and, moreover, these activities compelled them to listen to our demands.”163 
The advocates acknowledge that Dalits generally lacked professional and kinship ties 
to individuals in local government and law enforcement, which effectively limited their 
points of access to formal institutions and representatives of the state. This, they 
suggest, compelled the movement to deploy a brand of “intensive politics,” referring to 
road rokos and similar disruptive tactics, to communicate with authorities and ensure 
that their grievances were heard.164 Moreover, Arulraj, the movement’s first district 
secretary, recalls that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s strategy at times even gained the 
begrudging “respect” of local authorities. He smiles when he affirms that once the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal had demonstrated its willingness to stage provocative 
demonstrations and court arrest, local authorities became more responsive to its 
demands, knowing that its cadre would swarm the streets if action were not taken.165 
  When Vanni Arasu, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Spokesperson, reminisces about 
these early protests, he emphasizes that such collective acts not only made claims on 
state authorities, but also reinforced popular notions of rights and democratic 
citizenship. When Arasu recounts the movement’s expansion during the 1990s, he 
recalls, “When our youth inaugurated Viduthalai Chiruthaigal branches in their native 
villages, they projected an assertive, powerful image of our movement. And, as a 
consequence, they became more visible.”166 Further, Arasu stresses the capacity in 
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which they “became visible,” emphasizing that Dalits presented themselves as rights-
bearing citizens through the collective act of protest, itself a powerful symbol of Dalit 
assertion. He recalls, “There were so many different struggles, we can point to the 
Melavalavu massacre and the many murders that followed Dalit attempts to secure 
tenders on public lands. We spearheaded vigorous protests in response to each atrocity 
and our movement spread through these activities.”167 Acknowledging that political 
activism and rights-based awareness generated a resounding impact among Dalit 
communities, Arasu opines further, “In fact, the protests themselves inspired the 
people.”168 
  When they recount their early politics, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
emphasize that the physical act of protest cannot be reduced to a public assembly 
where Dalits congregated en masse to recite grievances and make political claims on 
state authority but, moreover, served to solidify emergent notions of citizenship among 
their community. When Tada Periyasami recounts these early protests, he 
acknowledges how these collective, physical acts engendered a notable effect among 
Dalit communities, recalling, “At first our people were not familiar with or even aware 
of their rights. We informed them that we are human beings and therefore we also 
have rights. We exhorted them to understand their rights and, moreover, to demand 
their delivery.”169 These public assemblies, he recalls, presented Dalits as democratic 
citizens and provided a public forum in which they learned about their rights and came 
to demand their implementation.170 Elaborating further, VCK chairman Thol. 
Thirumaavalavan underscores, “we consolidated our people and staged these protests 
to claim our rights,” and, in doing so, he suggests that early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
protests were not simply premised upon being heard, but also being seen and, 
moreover, being recognized as democratic citizens.171 
 
Conclusion 
In a recent essay, Dipesh Chakrabarty writes, “Disorder in public and everyday life—
a culture of disrespect for the law, in other words—has come to be a major ingredient 
of Indian democracy.”172 Elaborating further, Chakrabarty acknowledges that the 
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sources of disorder, acts that are by nature disruptive and sometimes grate 
uncomfortably with normative tenets of liberal democratic theory, have become 
entrenched aspects of democratic life in modern India. But, could we press this 
observation a step further and query whether disorder, or presented differently, 
disruption, might not simply be integral to democracy but, furthermore, a vehicle for 
its expression? This chapter has provided an account of the early Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal conveying how movement organizers perceived tactics of spatial 
disruption not as antithetical to democratic order, but rather as a means of 
participation afforded their community, which otherwise lacked meaningful access to 
state institutions.  
  An analysis of early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics exhibits how movement 
organizers used a spatially disruptive method of corporeal politics to represent Dalit 
concerns and advance a program that augmented minority franchise and strengthened 
democratic participation in 1990s Tamil Nadu. When movement organizers reminisce 
about this seminal period and recount the turbulent decade in their own words, they 
describe their early politics in a manner reminiscent of what Chantal Mouffe earlier 
termed “radical democracy,” namely as a political project seeking to realize the promise 
of equal rights and citizenship that lies at the heart of liberal democratic theory.173 
Recollecting this phase of movement activity, my interlocutors discuss their politics 
foremost in terms of a struggle to project their voice to centers of state power with the 
explicit aim to force their hand and secure amenable solutions. Without disavowing the 
legitimacy of the state, they orchestrated provocative, public protests and engineered 
tactical disruptions in the public sphere in order to demand that the rights and security 
of Dalit citizens, assurances they perceived as essential to democratic governance, be 
safeguarded.  
  In retrospect, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers assert that their movement’s 
self-fashioned militancy in addition to its hardline response to caste violence instilled a 
heightened degree of political awareness among Dalit communities and contributed to 
a more robust understanding of rights and democratic citizenship. Yet, in 1997, the 
joint murder in Melavalavu exposed not only a blatant failure of democratic procedure, 
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but a fault line of early Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics. While the atrocity served as a 
clarion call that drew Dalits en masse to the movement, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
mass demonstrations, although amplifying its voice and conveying its demands to 
upper echelons of state authority, ultimately fell short of securing an amenable 
response.174 In fact, the denouement in Melavalavu village prompted Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers to reevaluate their position vis-à-vis the state and placed under 
scrutiny their efficacy in lobbying state authorities from outside of formal institutions. 
The challenges confronted by the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal across the 1990s, and 
particularly at Melavalavu, provoked spirited debate on the relative merits of direct 
electoral participation. A brief two years later, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
charted their movement’s turbulent transition into electoral democracy, which 
provides subject matter for Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
From Boycotts to Ballots: 
Reevaluating the ‘State’ of Politics, 1997-1999 
 
Introduction 
On November 4, 2013, I met with Thol. Thirumaavalavan to conduct the first of 
multiple interviews covering the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition to electoral 
democracy. In the mid-morning, a puttering auto-rickshaw ferries me to the party 
headquarters situated in a former elementary school building in the quiet Velachery 
neighborhood of southern Chennai.1 Upon my arrival, a handful of movement cadre 
accustomed to my recurring presence greet me with a cup of milk tea. We retrieve 
several red and blue plastic chairs from an adjacent classroom and speak informally as 
I await my opportunity to interview Thirumaavalavan, who they refer to simply as 
“talaivar,” or the leader. Community members congregate beside us in an open-air 
waiting area in anticipation of securing a brief meeting with the VCK Chairman, who 
at the time served as a Member of Parliament (MP) from Chidambaram, a reserved 
constituency in northern Tamil Nadu, but was widely perceived as a surrogate 
representative for all Dalits.2 Some constituents came to appeal for his direct 
intervention into personal matters, others to request an official document on his 
parliamentary letterhead bearing his signature alongside instructions directing state 
officials to redress a dispute, while still others arrived laden with ornate marriage 
invitations, angling to confirm his attendance and then schedule the ceremony around 
his availability.3 No formal appointment is necessary, only patience. 
  After attending to a handful of requests, Thirumaavalavan emerges from his 
office-cum-residence and gestures for me to accompany his entourage as they depart 
for political business in central Chennai. Taking his cue, I squeeze into an overflowing 
SUV marked clearly with the party’s signature red and blue flag bearing a white star at 
its center. Thirumaavalavan sits in the front passenger seat, while his secretaries 
situate themselves to my sides and additional cadre pile into the back. During the trip, 
these personal assistants vet incoming calls, carefully noting the caller and nature of 
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inquiry before deciding whether to pass the phone to talaivar. Admiring their 
efficiency, I firmly clench my notebook and audio-recorder as the vehicle deftly 
maneuvers Chennai’s congested roadways at a remarkable speed. Amidst a flurry of 
telephone calls, Thirumaavalavan falls asleep and, almost in unison, cell phones are 
placed on vibrate and business continues in hushed whispers, that is, until we 
approach our destination. We pull up to the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) office nestled 
within the Periyar Thidal campus at Egmore. Following his meeting with DK Chairman 
Veeramani, Thirumaavalavan instructs his driver to navigate the SUV down a quiet 
residential street. As his assistants alight from the vehicle and enjoy an afternoon rice 
meal at a nearby restaurant, Thirumaavalavan turns to me, inquiring, “So, what did 
you want to ask me?” 
  Over the following ninety minutes, we discuss the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
transition into electoral democracy. Providing an account of his movement’s electoral 
turn, Thirumaavalavan recalls that the late-1990s was especially critical for his 
organization, a turbulent period that he characterizes in terms of repressive state 
measures that, he alleges, were intended to “de-mobilize” his movement. To provide 
context, he discusses at length the challenge posed by the political consolidation of 
Vanniyars, a Most Backwards Class (MBC) and locally dominant caste in northern 
Tamil Nadu, by the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), or Toiling People’s Party.4 
Recollecting the period, Thirumaavalavan avers, “Just as there may be two blades on a 
knife, our movement was confronted at once by state terrorism (arasu bayangaravatam) 
on the one side and caste terrorism (jati bayangaravatam) on the other.”5 Yet, he 
contends that the growing bonhomie between the Vanniyar-led PMK and ruling-
DMK parties exacerbated the crisis besetting his movement. Dating this process back 
to 1996, Thirumaavalavan pinpoints its climax in 1998 following the PMK’s 
integration into Dravidian coalitions, which, from his perspective, imbued the 
traditional caste dominance of the Vanniyars with political authority. Referring to 
PMK’s assimilation into the ruling DMK government, he declares, “At that time, state 
terrorism became a more developed, better equipped form of caste terrorism.”6 
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The State of Electoral Politics 
From the origins of social anthropology, the state has proven to be an elusive concept 
for the discipline. As a testament to the difficulty posed by its conceptualization, early 
scholars including A. R. Radcliffe-Brown once suggested discarding ‘the state’ as an 
analytic in lieu of organizing concepts such as “politics” and “government.”7 More 
often than not, the state in early anthropology remained conspicuous by its absence 
and, as Veena Das and Deborah Poole have acknowledged, “primitive or ‘non-state’ 
societies” provided the primary units of ethnographic inquiry.8 When anthropologists 
did scrutinize political structures as objects of analysis, their accounts tended to 
examine ostensibly ‘traditional’ political organizations such as the ‘tribe’ or ‘kingly’ 
political structures.9 Perhaps taking cues from Radcliffe-Brown, over ensuing decades 
the state appears to have remained largely absent from anthropological inquiry until, 
as Jonathan Spencer observes, it resurfaced in the late 1980s.10 
  From the late 1980s, Philip Abrams (1988) and Timothy Mitchell (1991), 
inspired by the turn to post-structuralism, called into question the ontological 
coherence of ‘the state’ as an analytic category. Rather than interpreting the state as a 
concrete social fact as ‘state-centered theorists’ had done, Abrams takes seriously the 
role of the state as an ideological projection, theorizing the state in terms of two 
distinct components: a state-system, or a “nexus of practice and institutional structure 
centred in the government,” and a state-idea, which is “projected, purveyed and 
variously believed in in different societies at different times.”11 In effect, Abrams 
presents the demystification of the state as an objective of academic inquiry, 
encouraging us to “recognize the cogency of the idea of the state as an ideological 
power and treat that as a compelling object of analysis.”12 Extending Abrams’ 
intervention, Mitchell examines everyday processes through which the state is reified 
as a coherent entity.13 Rather than bifurcating the modern state into a related yet 
distinct material system and ideological construct, Mitchell interrogates how mundane 
practices generate popular perceptions of the state as distinct from a supposed ‘other’ 
(i.e., society, economy). Calling into question the ontological coherence of the state, 
Mitchell scrutinizes quotidian, iterative practices that reify its apparent boundaries. 
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  Taking cues from these landmark studies, subsequent literature examines 
ethnographically the “everyday state,” re-orienting our focus from ‘the state in theory’ 
to ‘the state in practice’. Drawing upon fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh, Akhil Gupta 
(2012, 1995) examines how modern states are produced discursively through 
quotidian interactions with government bureaucracy, discourses of corruption, and 
media representations.14 His account provides a “disaggregated view” of the local state 
that accentuates contradictions across its multiple actors, layers, and institutions. 
Rather than interrogating the complex nature of modern states, Gupta focuses instead 
on how congeries of actors, practices, and institutions come to be imagined as a 
coherent structure, discursively produced in popular imagination and circulated in 
mass media. Gupta captures a “dialectic between practices and representations” that 
conveys how modern states come to be understood in popular imagination.15 But, 
without attributing an apocryphal unity to popular conceptions of the state, 
subsequent studies investigated how the Indian state is experienced in markedly 
different ways by differentiated groups of citizens, highlighting how caste, class, 
gender, and religion mediate these encounters. 
  Accounting for these discrepancies, Rupa Viswanath recently emphasized, 
“what Timothy Mitchell has called the “state effect”—the manner in which the state, 
although disjointed and heterogeneous, nevertheless takes on the appearance of 
unity—varies according to the social location of those subjected to its power.”16 
Viswanath’s account demonstrates that, from the experience of Dalits in late Madras 
Presidency, local caste dominance appeared “continuous with that of the state in the 
governance of laboring populations,” a “pragmatic unity” that she refers to as “the 
caste-state nexus.”17 Similarly, Barbara Harriss-White’s (2002) account of the local 
“actually existing State” in northern Tamil Nadu yields similar findings.18 Providing a 
snapshot from the 1980s to mid-1990s, Harriss-White’s study explores the dynamics 
through which the local state “shapes the accumulation possibilities as well as the 
exploitation and oppression of the lowest castes.”19 Her account evinces how local 
elites leverage their access to and control over local state institutions to facilitate 
capital accumulation and reproduce class differentials. In effect, her synthesis of 
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quantitative and ethnographic methods illustrates how access to the state is mediated 
by caste, gender, and religion and, further, “shaped by everyday forms of 
communalism.”20 In sum, her account reveals how state resource allocations come to 
reflect and sustain concurrent “patterns of class power relations.”21 
  In a study of Uttar Pradesh, Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerche (2001) corroborate 
Harriss-White’s attention to the role of politics in shaping processes of capital 
accumulation and class reproduction.22 In early post-Independence India, the authors 
demonstrate how wealthy Jat landowners capitalized on their preferential access to 
and control over local state resources to reproduce their class position and facilitate 
capital accumulation. But, as the authors argue, the role of the local state in these 
processes underwent substantial revision in the mid-1990s following the precipitous 
growth of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a predominantly Dalit party, in state politics. 
The authors chronicle shifting patterns of class formation upon the integration of new 
political actors including Dalits within local state institutions, conveying how direct 
participation in electoral politics opened new avenues for historically marginalized 
groups to contest prevailing power structures in rural Uttar Pradesh. Jeffrey and 
Lerche contribute to our understanding of how caste-based mobilization not only 
altered the composition of state institutions, but expanded the physical space of caste 
contestation by ushering these struggles into the ensemble of state institutions. 
  In his analysis of Bihar, Jeffrey Witsoe (2011; 2013) considered how electoral 
democracy “changed the means by which dominant groups were forced to reproduce 
their dominance,” and, in the process, brought about “a very public spectacle of the 
precariousness of their position in a democracy with universal franchise.”23 Querying 
how a politics of caste affects the nature of India’s democracy, Witsoe argues that 
social, economic, and political networks organized on a basis of caste “connect state 
institutions with local relations of dominance and subordination,” thereby “producing a 
state unable to impartially deliver services or enforce individual rights.”24 Conveying 
how dominant castes consolidate themselves through electoral mobilization, his 
account depicts its uneven effects and sometimes “markedly undemocratic” outcomes, 
indicating that “‘democratization’ of power did not result in an equal empowerment for 
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all, or even most, subaltern groups.”25 Witsoe’s findings resonate with the 
anthropological literature on caste politics and the state in modern India, portraying 
how caste networks graft atop political institutions in a way that generates uneven 
patterns of development and capital accumulation which, by design, favor specific 
caste constituencies, particularly larger groups among those collectively referred to as 
“the backwards castes.”26  
  Through rich empirical accounts, recent studies provide valuable insight into 
how modern state institutions come to be reimagined by emergent groups not merely 
as sites of power, but as the primary loci of political struggle. This chapter contributes 
an ethnographic perspective to the literature, charting the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
transition into electoral democracy. Under Malaichamy, early DPI organizers first 
regarded the state as a recipient of petition, tapping formal institutional channels to 
lobby state authorities to fulfill their professional mandate to Dalit citizens. Admitting 
the limitations of this early program, subsequent leaders upheld their predecessors’ 
commitment to legal advocacy, but expanded their repertoire to encompass 
contentious street politics as a complementary strategy to amplify their voice and 
register their demands. But, as this chapter demonstrates, the late-1990s presented an 
altered political reality. At a time when authorities routinely denied their permits for 
public rallies and utilized stringent legal maneuvers to curtail their activities, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers reappraised their adherence to electoral boycotts and opened a 
conversation on the merits of formal electoral participation. In 1999, with cautious 
optimism and a wary eye on the success of rival backward caste politics, movement 
leaders steered their movement towards electoral politics, which they regarded as a 
new battlefield to challenge caste oppression. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter chronicles the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition from boycotts to ballots, 
attending to the internal debates and external dynamics that spurred the organization 
toward electoral democracy at the turn of the millennium. In charting its electoral turn, 
I draw primarily upon personal interviews with movement organizers over recent 
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years (2008-2016). In supplement to the ethnography, the chapter integrates a wide 
breadth of primary and secondary materials including early political pamphlets, 
handbills, wall posters, and personal letters. Additionally, it integrates newspaper 
coverage from the Tamil- and English-language press alongside early interviews with 
movement organizers published in limited-circulation vernacular journals. 
Synthesizing ethnography with primary and secondary source materials, the chapter 
provides a diachronic perspective on the democratic transition of the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, conveying why movement organizers reappraised their adherence to 
electoral boycotts and came to regard the state less as a recipient of petition (i.e., 
Chapter One) or an object of protest (i.e., Chapter Two), but rather as an ensemble of 
institutions that demarcated a new locus of political struggle. 
  The chapter begins in the 1980s with a synopsis of the socio-political climate 
preceding the movement’s expansion to the state’s northern districts, charting the 
electoral consolidation of the regionally influential Vanniyar community by the Pattali 
Makkal Katchi (PMK), or Toiling People’s Party. Although the three largest Dalit 
castes are concentrated in different regions with Pallars to the south, Paraiyars to the 
north, and Arundhathiyars to the west, their presence is most often counterbalanced 
by locally dominant intermediate castes: Thevars, Vanniyars, and Goundars, which 
often exceed the population size of Dalits.27 Keeping a wary eye on Vanniyar 
consolidation in the north, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers observed how the 
transformation of backwards caste organizations into autonomous political parties 
mitigated their efficacy to lobby political authorities from outside of state institutions. 
Further, movement organizers contend that electoral competition provided parties 
such as the PMK with enhanced leverage in its negotiations with Dravidian parties 
and greater latitude to influence political processes, shape policy directives, and secure 
preferential access to state resources. At a time when stringent legal maneuvers 
constricted their capacity for collective mobilization, movement organizers began to 
consider electoral participation as a strategy to countervail the PMK and augment 
their bargaining power with state authorities who, having shunted the movement’s 
earlier demands, remained keenly attentive to electoral calculations. 
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  Next, the chapter examines key points of contention that surfaced during intra-
movement discussions on direct electoral participation. From 1998, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers deliberated whether their movement should enter electoral 
democracy and, if so, in what capacity. Reiterating their stated commitment to robust 
Dalit advocacy, organizers disputed the most efficacious means to represent Dalit 
concerns, influence political processes, and generate ameliorative outcomes. Whereas a 
handful of activists pressed for an underground movement, a clear majority of its 
members conceded that the electoral platform could not be avoided, although they 
struggled to reach a consensus on the nature of their participation. Should they 
directly contest elections or retain their distance and instead leverage their base to 
affect electoral outcomes? Upon reviewing intra-movement debates, the chapter 
introduces external arguments posed to Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers by leading 
figures of the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), or Tamil State Congress, who persuaded 
them to join their electoral coalition ahead of the 1999 General Election. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with an in-depth account of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s inaugural 
electoral bid, focusing on Thirumaavalavan’s campaign in Chidambaram, a reserved 
constituency in Tamil Nadu’s northern districts.  
  Exploring the early debates and circumstances surrounding their integration 
into electoral democracy, this chapter lends an ethnographic view on how Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers recount their turbulent transition from boycotts to ballots. 
Chronicling this seminal period, the chapter conveys how caste came to be re-
articulated through electoral politics and why this prompted Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers to reconsider their early perspectives on electoral participation and 
reimagine state institutions as the primary loci of political struggle. While political 
commentators often trumpet the participation of marginalized groups within electoral 
procedures as testament to democratization, the firsthand experience of Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers complicates this often-buoyant narrative.28 In fact, it was not so 
much the promise of democracy, as much as the looming threat of state repression 
paired with the consolidation of rival backwards castes that spurred the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal’s democratic transformation. Moreover, this shift in the form of political 
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practice, a move from boycotts to ballots, does not necessarily signal a radical 
aberration from earlier movement politics. Previously, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal leaders 
had relied on the occupation of the public sphere to amplify their voice, press their 
demands, and effect an audience, but, with that form of engagement increasingly 
foreclosed in the late-1990s, they turned to electoral democracy as an alternate means 
through which to represent Dalit concerns. The following chapter provides an 
ethnographic account of democratic integration, detailing its underlying circumstances, 
debates, and contradictions. 
 
Vanniyar Consolidation29 
On Wednesday, September 16, 1987, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
inaugurated its new headquarters building, Anna Arivalayam, in the affluent Teynampet 
neighborhood of central Chennai.30 Constructed at a cost of ₹1.5 crore on a spacious 
five-acre plot, the ornate structure featured architectural overtones harkening back to 
the bygone era of ancient Chola kings, a grandiose design to which DMK Chairman 
M. Karunanidhi himself contributed.31 In the late afternoon, thousands of DMK office 
bearers converged on the grounds from districts across the state to attend a ribbon-
cutting ceremony at the sprawling three-story complex.32 The inauguration ceremony 
commenced with a ninety-minute perani, or marching procession, through the capital’s 
main thoroughfares, producing a chaotic scene in which slogan-chanting DMK 
supporters eked a path through the city’s notoriously congested roadways at the peak 
hour of evening traffic.33 Upon completing the 4-kilometer procession from Marina 
Beach to Anna Arivalayam, located on Anna Salai, they participated in a formal 
ceremony dedicating the building to late DMK founder C. N. Annadurai.34 As 
midnight approached, party members trickled out of the complex and began what 
turned out to be a lengthy commute to their home districts, ill-prepared for what they 
encountered next.35 
  By the early morning hours of September 17, 1987, DMK party members had 
departed in an assortment of personal vehicles, private buses, and hired lorries that 
barreled down the national highway and major thoroughfares leading out of Chennai. 
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As they approached Villupuram, the primary transit junction of Tamil Nadu’s northern 
districts, their progress was immediately stalled by a massive road roko, or blockage, 
conducted by the Vanniyar Sangam, a caste association purporting to represent 
Vanniyars, the largest caste cluster in Tamil Nadu comprising nearly 12 percent of the 
state population.36 The Vanniyar Sangam, a conglomerate of twenty-seven Vanniyar 
caste organizations consolidated in 1980 by Dr. S. Ramadoss, organized an 
unprecedented, weeklong road roko to press its demand for a separate 20 percent 
reservation quota for Vanniyars in state government employment and educational 
institutions and a 2 percent quota in the central government.37 To command media 
coverage, Vanniyar Sangam organizers orchestrated the roko agitation to coincide with 
the DMK’s much-publicized inauguration ceremony at Anna Arivalayam. 
  Vanniyar Sangam activists obstructed major roadways by reportedly felling 
“lakhs of trees” along with telephone poles and lampposts.38 They scattered shards of 
glass and rolled large boulders across roadways, even digging trenches through major 
thoroughfares. Further, the agitators used crude homemade explosives to blast 
culverts, causing extensive damage that authorities estimated would require at least a 
month of dedicated maintenance.39 As planned, DMK office bearers were among the 
first persons encumbered by the protest. In Valavanur, lorries transporting DMK 
supporters were halted, doused with petrol, and set ablaze, leaving thousands of 
travelers stranded along the roadside without access to adequate food or water.40 In 
Koliyanur, near Villupuram, 250 vehicles, mostly carrying DMK party members, stood 
bumper to bumper, a stationary fleet that swelled to over 1,000 by the following 
afternoon.41 In adjacent areas, Vanniyar Sangam activists assaulted individuals who 
police had instructed to clear roadways, culminating in a police firing that left 11 
Vanniyars dead on the first day of the agitation.42 Recognizing the severity of the 
situation, the state government dispatched armed police escorts to guide convoys of 
stranded travelers out of affected districts via alternative routes.43 
  The Vanniyar Sangam’s road roko agitation, which persisted uninterrupted for 
seven days, crippled transportation to and from the state capital.44 In response, 
transportation authorities cancelled most mofussil buses running rural, interior routes 
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and imposed a curfew that limited public transportation in the state capital from 6am 
until 9pm.45 State authorities issued “shoot on sight” orders that authorized police to 
open fire on individuals caught damaging public property or abetting the roko. Even as 
roadways gradually became accessible, armed police convoys escorted fleets of public 
buses to their destinations.46 Shortly thereafter, enhanced security measures were 
extended to the transport of food grains and essential commodities following the late 
night arson of a milk tanker within the Ambattur area of Chennai.47 Over the course of 
the agitation, limited road transportation coupled with heightened security risks 
generated severe shortages of basic commodities such as milk, vegetables, and 
kerosene within Chennai, which sourced many essential goods from the state’s 
northern districts.48 
  As the roko progressed, daily newspapers continued to cite fresh instances of 
violence and the destruction of public property, but Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, 
in recollecting the agitation, underscore that Dalit communities bore the brunt of the 
Vanniyars’ aggression.49 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary D. Ravikumar 
recalls that anti-Dalit violence began on the first day itself, when DMK party leaders 
and police entered Dalit colonies adjacent to obstructed roadways and instructed the 
local residents to begin clearing debris. An early newspaper account reported, “police 
with the cooperation of other departments and members of the public cleared the roads 
for traffic.”50 Yet, Ravikumar insists that the individuals instructed by police to clear 
key roads, those glossed by media accounts as “members of the public,” were 
exclusively Dalits.51 Similarly, Sinthanai Selvan recalls how authorities “used our 
people as laborers to clear roadways,” and, in doing so, converted them into targets of 
Vanniyar aggression.52 Having witnessed their cooperation with authorities, Vanniyar 
Sangam activists reportedly warned Dalit residents not to impede the roko agitation. 
When some Dalits refused to oblige this request, their residential colonies were 
targeted amidst the turmoil of the roko agitation, beginning with the arson of 100 Dalit 
huts in Sundaripalayam.53  
  During the following days, Vanniyar agitators torched Dalit hamlets across the 
northern districts, including roughly eighty huts in Chitharasoor and in 
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Mazhavaranoor, more than 75 in Nellikuppam, and an unreported number in 
Kandarakottai.54 Although police pledged to distribute rations of rice, kerosene, 
clothes, and cash to affected communities, their residents remonstrated that the 
promised aid never arrived and, further, that the District Collector “did not even have 
the courtesy to get down from his car” when he visited affected colonies.55 Then, on 
September 21, 1987, anti-Dalit violence reached a crescendo when nearly 1,000 
Vanniyar Sangam supporters set fire to Endathur village near Uttiramenur.56 Two days 
later, on September 23, 1987, Vanniyar Sangam agitators descended upon four villages 
in Alampakkam, near Cuddalore, and reduced nearly 1,200 Dalit huts to ashes, 
displacing an estimated 5,000 Dalit residents.57 In each instance, targeted Dalit 
communities had earlier impeded the roko agitation.58 In Endathur, Dalit residents 
confronted 400 Vanniyar Sangam agitators armed with what newspaper reports 
described as “lethal weapons,” presumably agricultural tools, and beseeched them to 
spare four culverts adjacent to the colony, whereas in Alampakkam Dalit residents 
gathered en masse and collectively prevented Vanniyar Sangam agitators from 
blockading nearby roads.59 
  Over the course of the roko agitation, police remanded 20,461 persons in 
custody, a figure that includes roughly 2,500 preventive detentions.60 Further, police 
gunfire killed an estimated 23 Vanniyars over the course of the weeklong campaign.61 
Recollecting the incident, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary Sinthanai Selvan 
recalls that the Vanniyar Sangam promptly venerated individuals killed by police 
gunfire as “social justice heroes,” constructing elaborate memorials that etched their 
memory in the local landscape.62 In his account, Selvan draws our attention not only to 
the irony of this epitaph, but also to the political afterlife of this early protest, which, 
he alleges, renders visible how caste contestations had come to be rearticulated 
through electoral politics. Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, like Selvan, describe the 
agitation as a “breaking point,” which they discuss not as a temporally bound 
chronology of events, but rather as an evolving process that provides a vantage point to 
consider how electoral politics altered the equation between caste and state.63 Citing 
the 1987 roko agitation as a paradigmatic example of how caste organizations first 
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demonstrate their strength prior to entering electoral democracy, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers recall this incident to accentuate the afterlife of the Vanniyar 
Sangam’s agitation and, further, what it reveals about the character of democracy.  
 
The Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) 
Fifteen months after the Vanniyar Sangam’s landmark roko, the DMK coalition emerged 
victorious from the 1989 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Election, a result that 
analysts attribute to a split in the rival AIADMK party between J. Jayalalitha, the 
party’s future heir, and Janaki Ramachandran, wife of late-AIADMK founder M. G. 
Ramachandran.64 While the warring AIADMK camps fractured their otherwise 
formidable vote-bank, the DMK bagged a remarkable 169 out of 234 seats.65 Shortly 
thereafter, the DMK announced a 20 percent compartmentalized reservation quota 
within the 49 percent quota already allocated for the Backwards Classes (BCs), 
earmarking these posts for 107 communities classified as the Most Backwards Classes 
(MBC).66 Vanniyars, who account for 53 percent of Tamil Nadu’s MBC population, 
were primed to reap its benefits.67 This gesture toward appeasement bespeaks the 
DMK’s resolve to arrest the Vanniyar Sangam’s burgeoning popularity among 
Vanniyars, who had previously been considered a bastion of DMK support and who 
account for 25-30% of the population across northern Tamil Nadu often referred to as 
“the Vanniyar belt.”68 Wary to cede ground, the Vanniyar Sangam struck a hard bargain 
and remonstrated against the DMK’s overture, outwardly miffed at the prospect of 
sharing the quota with 106 other communities.  
  On July 16, 1989, the Vanniyar Sangam launched the Pattali Makkal Katchi 
(PMK) ahead of the November 1989 General Election. The party entered its inaugural 
bid independently, contesting 32 of 39 parliamentary seats and securing a reputable 
5.82% of the statewide vote.69 Though coming out empty-handed, the PMK played 
spoiler to the DMK in six constituencies and, in effect, helped hold the Dravidian 
juggernaut to a solitary parliamentary seat. In six constituencies, the PMK polled a 
greater percentage of the vote than the margin of AIADMK victory over the DMK. 
Further, the PMK averaged roughly 7% of votes in seats where it contested and 
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enjoyed particularly strong performances in Vandavasi (19.33%), Arakkonam 
(21.11%), Tindivanam (22.07%), Chidambaram (23.87%) and, finally, Dharmapuri 
(29.88%), where the PMK polled considerably higher than the DMK (22.71%).70 The 
1989 Lok Sabha Election marked the beginning of a seven-year drought in DMK 
politics. During the next round of state assembly and parliamentary elections, both in 
1991, the PMK again contested independently to demonstrate the magnitude of its 
support.71 Although winning only a single seat in the assembly and drawing a blank in 
parliamentary, the PMK again cordoned off an impressive 7% of the vote share in 
seats it contested.72 Further, the PMK secured more than 10% of the vote share in 56 
state assembly constituencies.73 But, perhaps more importantly, the PMK again played 
spoiler for DMK, which bagged a measly 2 out of 234 assembly seats and lost all 39 
parliamentary contests.74  
  Five years later, in 1996, the DMK’s fortunes improved when its coalition 
prevailed in 221 assembly seats and all 39 parliamentary contests, an electoral landslide 
that analysts attributed to the backing of cinema star Rajinikanth, including his 
estimated 20,000 fan clubs, as well as a flurry of corruption and disproportionate asset 
cases lodged against AIADMK Chairperson Jayalalitha.75 When DMK returned to 
power, it again sought to appease Vanniyars across the northern districts. The party 
withdrew nearly 40,000 cases registered against members of the community dating 
back to the 1987 roko agitation and granted ₹3,000 in monthly assistance to the families 
of individuals who died amidst the protest in addition to a one-time solatium of ₹3 lakh 
to their families.76 Raising the ante, the PMK allied with the AIADMK during the 
1998 General Election and again played spoiler to DMK, helping the AIADMK 
coalition to bag 30 of 39 seats and edge the DMK out of its traditional bastion of 
support in northern Tamil Nadu.77 To the consternation of DMK organizers, the party 
once again drew a blank across the northern districts, its victories limited to other 
regions of Tamil Nadu.78  
  In its initial decade of electoral politics, the PMK established itself as an 
electoral force to be reckoned with in northern Tamil Nadu. In the following years, the 
party’s shrewd tactical maneuvers paid lofty dividends, including its willingness to 
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successively alternate Dravidian coalitions and thereby pit Dravidian parties against 
each other to secure its support. As Andrew Wyatt observes, “the PMK was on the 
winning side in each of the five elections held in Tamil Nadu between 1998 and 2006,” 
and, further, “participated in all three national coalition governments between 1998 
and 2009, giving the party a string of ministerial posts.”79 The PMK complicated the 
existing electoral arithmetic and augmented its bargaining power with Dravidian 
parties. Although Vanniyars factored as a locally dominant community across the 
state’s northern districts, already well represented within local politics and 
bureaucracy, their electoral consolidation by the PMK heightened the concerns of 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, who observed how caste calculations influenced not 
only electoral outcomes, but political procedures. When they reminisce about the 
Vanniyar Sangam’s 1987 roko agitation nearly three decades in hindsight, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers contend that the PMK’s electoral consolidation of the Vanniyar 
electorate intensified the salience of caste in political calculations and posed an obstacle 
to Dalit mobilization. 
  When Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers discuss the late 1990s, they allege that 
the PMK’s consolidation of Vanniyars and subsequent integration into Dravidian 
coalitions exacerbated the crisis besetting their movement. While their responses 
reveal an erosion of confidence in state neutrality, their accounts further suggest that 
they came to view the state not merely as complicit in anti-Dalit violence, but 
implicated within its production. Although the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal had earlier 
beckoned Dalits to “hit back” in the face of violence and intimidation, this motto was 
developed to counteract specific incidents of caste violence, thereby positing a degree 
of separation between caste violence and state officials. Echoing Thirumaavalavan’s 
evocative language, many organizers describe the integration of rival caste associations 
within the electoral arena in terms of a merger of “caste terrorism” and “state 
terrorism.”80 Stated as such, their word choice is not merely evocative, but reveals an 
evolving perception among Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers in the late 1990s that an 
earlier distinction between caste violence and state-sponsored violence had grown 
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opaque. What was previously understood as indifference on behalf of the state, was, by 
1998, re-interpreted as collusion.81 
 
“Tamil Nadu’s Emergency” 
On January 9, 2014, I conversed with Kani Amudhan and Selva Arasu, both 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal administrators in Madurai, as they awaited a meeting with the 
District Collector. Sipping milk tea at an outdoor stall adjacent to the Collector’s 
Office, we first discussed the circumstances surrounding the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
formation before our conversation gravitated toward the movement’s electoral 
transition. I inquired why, in 1999, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal abandoned electoral 
boycotts to formally enter electoral democracy. “From my perspective,” Arasu 
reminisced, “Electoral politics was not entirely of our own choosing. The formation of 
the PMK compelled our organization to re-evaluate its earlier platform and ultimately 
pressed us toward the electoral path.”82 Then, Amudhan interjected, “At that time, the 
PMK had become an influential party and joined hands with the ruling DMK. The 
PMK leveraged its position within the DMK-led state government to cripple the 
growth of our organization. From 1997 until 1999, more than one hundred of our key 
organizers were detained under the Goondas Act and National Security Act.”83 “In 
those days, state repression was particularly severe,” Arasu confirmed, adding, “It was 
Tamil Nadu’s Emergency.”84 
  When Arasu and Amudhan discussed the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition 
from boycotts to ballots, their accounts construct a parallel between the political 
climate of late-1990s Tamil Nadu and stringent measures undertaken by Indira 
Gandhi’s Congress Party in the 1970s to suspend democratic procedures and stifle 
political opposition during the Emergency (1975-1977), a twenty-one month blight on 
India’s democratic record.85 Arasu references this period not only to make an evocative 
allusion, but a poignant comparison, albeit on a different scale. During the Emergency, 
state authorities utilized the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) to detain 
nearly 100,000 members, supporters, and sympathizers of opposition political parties, a 
figure that includes the detention of journalists, scholars, and activists.86 The Janata 
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Party-led government repealed MISA following its resounding defeat of Congress in 
the 1977 General Election, which effectively terminated Emergency rule.87 Upon 
revoking MISA, India enjoyed the only time in its history as a sovereign state without 
laws permitting preventive detention until a resurgent Indira Gandhi emerged from 
the 1980 General Election victorious and her Congress party promulgated the 
National Security Act (1980).88  
  Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers including Arasu and Amudhan recall that the 
movement reached an impasse in the late 1990s. They recount how state authorities 
routinely refused permits for their public rallies, thereby crippling the primary vehicle 
of movement politics and, further, exercised stringent legal maneuvers that, in their 
own words, threatened to “de-mobilize” their organization.89 Instead of arresting 
activists under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), bailable offences that they were prepared 
to fight in the courts, authorities utilized the National Security Act (NSA) and what is 
colloquially known as the Goondas Act to arrest key organizers under non-bailable 
offences for up to twelve-months.90 Selectively applied, these laws vested District 
Collectors and Police Commissioners with extensive latitude to preemptively detain 
any individual for a presumed intent to engage in activity that may disrupt “the 
maintenance of public order.”91 NSA and the Goondas Act granted authorities what 
critics have termed “blanket immunity” under which they exercise “unbridled 
discretion.”92 In contrast to punitive detention, or detention on the basis of acts 
committed, “suspicion and reasonable probability” provided sufficient grounds for a 
preventive detention without mandating trial or conviction by a court of law.93 
Further, as Arvind Verma observes, NSA sanctions a detention order if the detaining 
authority, a District Collector or Police Commissioner, “is satisfied with respect to any 
person that such an order is necessary.”94 
  In our conversation, Thirumaavalavan recounts how the selective application of 
these laws impeded Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics. He relates how, beginning in 1996,  
“police, who draw disproportionately from the Vanniyar caste, began targeting our 
cadre when we entered the northern districts, particularly in Cuddalore and 
Villupuram.”95 Further, he contends that the situation intensified when the PMK 
 
 
144 
integrated into Dravidian coalitions, which facilitated its access to upper echelons of 
state bureaucracy and augmented its bargaining power with political authorities. By 
1998, Thirumaavalavan concedes, “We understood that political leaders and police 
authorities were against us and felt a need to redesign our strategy in order to 
safeguard our movement.”96 Thirumaavalavan recalls that, as the movement expanded 
across the state’s northern districts where Vanniyars are preponderant, “[PMK 
Chairman] Ramadoss began filing so many complaints against us and, upon aligning 
with the DMK, he exerted his influence within the ruling government to detain so 
many of our frontline leaders under non-bailable offenses, particularly NSA and 
Goondas Act.”97 “This,” Thirumaavalavan alleges, “shook up our movement,” 
conceding, “we came to realize that the struggle alone will not yield fruitful results. It 
pressed us to begin a conversation on electoral politics.”98 
  Similarly, Tada Periyasami, who is widely said to have shared movement 
responsibilities with Thirumaavalavan from 1992 until his departure from the 
movement in 2002, stresses that although “state repression” was not necessarily a novel 
phenomenon, the “soldering of caste and state power” provided their adversaries with 
mediated access to a new legal arsenal.99 Periyasami, who was arrested twice under 
laws purporting to defend national security, recalls, “More than 150 of our organizers 
were booked under the Goondas Act and National Security Act. Rather than charging 
us under the Indian Penal Code, cases that we were prepared to fight in the courts, 
they utilized harsh laws generally reserved for terrorists and habitual criminal 
offenders.”100 He recollects, “The repressive measures used by the state government 
elicited a palpable fear that they would brand us as terrorists and dismantle our 
organization. We checked the pulse of the state and realized that this is how things 
would continue to progress. This pushed us toward the electoral path.”101 
  Beyond preventive arrest and non-bailable detentions, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers allege that the quotidian practices of local state authorities impeded their 
mobilization strategy, enumerating instances when police refused to grant permits for 
their rallies despite sanctioning political activities conducted by rival caste 
organizations and political parties.102 Providing a paradigmatic example, Viduthalai 
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Chiruthaigal organizers point to circumstances surrounding a proposed September 
1998 bandh in Cuddalore District. Initially scheduled for September 29, 1998, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers marshaled the support of seventeen Dalit 
organizations and announced a perani, or marching procession, in Cuddalore to 
advance a five-point agenda: the provision of reservations in local tender auctions, an 
immediate ban on corpse burying and burning professions, proper implementation of 
the hitherto underutilized Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of 
Atrocities Act (1989), allocation of a reservation quota in the private sector, and a 
white paper detailing the non-implementation of existing reservation quotas.103 When 
Cuddalore District Collector Sandeep Saxena denied their initial request for a permit, 
organizers postponed the procession until October 26 and, in the meantime, petitioned 
upper echelons of police authority based in Chennai to override the Collector’s 
decision. With formal approval still pending, they again postponed the procession to 
November 16. Then, on November 4, Thirumaavalavan met personally with the 
Director General of Police and next, on November 12, consulted with the Inspector 
General of Police, who, he alleged, provided his verbal assurance that a permit would 
be granted shortly.104  
  Then, on November 13, while still awaiting police permission, 
Thirumaavalavan informed the press that instead of postponing the rally yet again his 
movement would proceed with its current proposal and conduct the procession 
without formal authorization. Immediately, local police issued a public notice “warning 
van and car proprietors that they should not allow their vehicles to be hired to 
facilitate the procession.”105 Ratcheting up pressure, District Collector Sandeep Saxena 
reportedly stated, “A ban has been issued for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal procession. If 
they violate it, they will be arrested. Also, those who lease vehicles such as lorries, 
vans, and cars will be arrested and their vehicle licenses will be cancelled.”106 Citing 
similar rallies conducted in recent weeks by the Pattali Makkal Katchi, 
Thirumaavalavan struck a defiant tone, “Regardless of how many bans are imposed 
against our movement, we will defy these bans and conduct this rally.”107 On the 
following day, police officials combed Cuddalore District and rounded up 150 
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Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers including its district secretaries. Further, district 
police heightened security measures and dispatched nineteen flying squads to intercept 
participants en route to assigned meeting points.108 The rally was again postponed.109 
  When Thirumaavalavan discussed circumstances surrounding the banned rally 
in an early interview with the vernacular press, he charged that police officials 
withheld an explanation for prohibiting the procession, merely offering the pretense, 
“We banned your procession because the Vanniyars would attack you.”110 Frustrated, 
Thirumaavalavan stressed the irony of police officials citing their own impotence as 
justification for a dereliction of duty and, further, castigated state partiality, noting that 
the same authorities sanctioned a PMK rally the following week.111 Moreover, he 
publically surmised that PMK Chairman Dr. S. Ramadoss had leveraged his influence 
during an October all-party meeting in Chennai where, with the backing of presiding 
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister and DMK Chairman M. Karunanidhi, the state 
government promulgated an order prohibiting the public assembly of caste 
organizations under the pretense that their activities “provoke religious and caste 
sentiment.112Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers understood the implication of the 
government order, which posited a clear-cut distinction between political parties and 
caste organizations. Whereas the order prohibited the public assembly of caste 
organizations under the pretense that their activities stoked communal animosity, 
provoked violence, and threatened public order, it exempted political parties 
established explicitly on the basis of caste. In effect, while political parties such as the 
PMK remained free to mobilize their ‘constituents’, the government order barred Dalit 
movements such as Viduthalai Chiruthaigal from organizing their supporters.113 Whereas 
state officials cited the maintenance of law and public order as its key imperative, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers suspected political meddling.114 
  The charged political landscape of late-1990s Tamil Nadu prompted Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers to reevaluate their position vis-à-vis the state. In particular, they 
reappraised their adherence to electoral boycotts in response to the electoral 
consolidation of the rival PMK. In a 1998 interview, Thirumaavalavan justified his 
movement’s boycotts by arguing that the state only buttressed the hegemony of locally 
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dominant communities and, therefore, for Dalits to participate in elections was 
tantamount to “handing over authority and placing it directly into the hands of our 
adversaries.”115 Regarding the government as “an institution of the upper caste people,” 
he argued that electoral politics served “to protect caste authority.”116 To cast a ballot, 
he alleged, endorsed the legitimacy of an electoral system that he alleged had, hitherto, 
shunted Dalit concerns. At that time, Thirumaavalavan opined, “This government acts 
as a representative of the [present] social structure. No matter how many times we 
vote and form new governments, the character of the government will persist as a 
structure that protects the welfare of the privileged class… We will not participate in 
elections that only serve to renew the caste structure every five years.”117  
  As conveyed by early interviews, Thirumaavalavan expressed skepticism 
regarding the capacity of electoral politics to redress Dalit concerns.118 The Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal did not oppose electoral franchise purely on an ideological basis, but 
conceded the futility for Dalits, a permanent electoral minority, to generate 
ameliorative outcomes in a political system that they perceived as inherently 
majoritarian. Hence, the movement’s early position was not strictly in principle, 
refuting the legitimacy of the electoral system, but also practical, acknowledging their 
inability to meaningfully alter electoral results. But, as the 1990s progressed, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers reckoned that the transformation of backwards caste 
organizations into autonomous political parties had raised the stakes of remaining 
outside the electoral platform. By 1998, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers began to 
reappraise their outlook on electoral participation, in part prompted by stringent laws 
(e.g., NSA, Goondas Act) that undermined its organizational structure and crippled its 
capacity for collective mobilization, which served as the primary vehicle of movement 
politics. All the while, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers maintain that the PMK had 
leveraged its electoral clout to influence political processes and stymie their growth in 
Tamil Nadu’s northern districts.119 Further, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
understood that while state authorities may have earlier shunted their legal petitions, 
they remained keenly attuned to electoral arithmetic and understood the value of 
organizations with a demonstrated capacity to deliver, or deny, votes. 
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From Boycotts to Ballots 
Against the monochromatic landscape of vintage silent film, Charlie Chaplin endeavors 
to sedate a wild horse in The Circus (1928). While the horse appears deep in slumber, 
Charlie stealthily approaches, packs opium into a pipe, and inserts one end of the 
instrument into the drowsing animal’s nostril.120 But, alas, before Charlie can puff the 
opium through the animal’s nose, the horse exhales deeply and in one strong gust 
spews a cloud of opium into Charlie’s face, rendering him senseless as he reels 
backwards and, following some signature antics, he eventually collapses. On 
September 4, 1998, nearly seventy years after its initial release, this classic scene 
provided a pertinent metaphor when the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal congregated in 
Villupuram, Tamil Nadu, and convened an executive committee meeting to reappraise 
their current program and deliberate over their potential integration into electoral 
democracy.121  
  When movement organizers mulled the prospect of discarding electoral 
boycotts and converting their organization into a political party, Sinthanai Selvan, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary, cautioned against any complete integration 
within electoral democracy.122 Addressing those in attendance, he recalls alluding to 
Charlie Chaplin’s experience with the wild horse, recounting, “I informed my 
comrades that if we attempt to harness the electoral platform, elections will swallow 
this movement and render us lifeless just like Charlie when he struggled to sedate the 
horse.”123 Selvan referenced this classic scene to express concern as to whether or not 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal could maintain robust advocacy for Dalit causes and 
withstand the myriad demands generated by direct electoral participation. Expressing 
his consternation, Selvan warned that elections might backfire, the electoral platform 
may force the movement to compromise its hardline positions and collaborate with 
dominant parties, thereby running the risk of forfeiting support from Dalit 
communities that had come to regard their movement as an attractive alternative to 
mainstream politics. Referring to Chaplin’s comedic struggle with the wild horse, he 
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questioned whether electoral democracy might send the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal reeling 
backwards unto its eventual collapse. 
  Amidst a protracted discussion, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers deliberated 
over three primary proposals: one that pressed for an underground movement, a 
second that advocated, like Selvan, a partial and indirect integration into electoral 
politics, and a third that proposed converting the movement into a formal political 
party. Those advocating underground politics, insisting that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
convert its social organization into a militant extra-parliamentary movement, found an 
unreceptive audience. Moreover, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Chairman Thol. 
Thirumaavalavan refuted their proposal as both untenable and impractical. Referring 
to stringent measures undertaken by government and police authorities to stymie the 
movement’s growth, he advised, “A militant approach entailing bombs and weapons 
was not feasible in the present political climate.”124 In 2009, Thirumaavalavan 
recounted this early proposal during our conversations, emphasizing that the 
movement had to choose between “the underground route undertaken by 
Prabhakaran” and “the path of parliamentary politics followed by Ambedkar,” a 
decision between bullets and ballots.125 Alluding to the demise of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Thirumaavalavan suggested that Ambedkar’s path provided the 
only viable option for his movement at that historical juncture.  
  While a handful of cadre did endorse a call-to-arms, most Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers rejected the prospect of an armed struggle, prompting a protracted debate 
regarding the most effective means to influence political procedures.126 A large 
contingent of organizers including Sinthanai Selvan suggested that the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal engage electoral politics indirectly. Recognizing that the electoral platform 
could not be ignored outright, they advised their colleagues to maintain a separate 
identity as a social movement in order to preserve their political autonomy. Rather 
than contesting elections directly, they recommended developing a symbiotic 
relationship with established Dalit parties such as the Republican Party or Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP).127 Selvan recollects this early position: 
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I felt that we should not enter directly into elections. Of course, let us 
participate in the electoral system, but our party need not contest elections 
straightway. We should support other parties such that we maintain our 
present politics without diluting our platform. Our party’s support should be 
issue-based: no strong commitments, no alliances, only issue-based support and 
opposition.128 
 
From Selvan’s perspective, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal could marshal its support to 
influence the political process without participating directly in the electoral system.129 
A formal electoral turn should only be considered, he advised, “after another ten or 
twenty years” and once the movement had consolidated the Dalit vote bank.130 
  In contrast, a third contingent of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers argued that 
direct electoral participation would provide a tool to expand participation among Dalit 
communities, some of whom remained leery to join the movement fearing that it may 
provoke retaliation from local authorities and dominant castes. Further, movement 
organizers surmised that an electoral turn would alleviate the pressure on their 
movement by legitimizing its protest in the eyes of state authorities, which they feared 
may soon dismantle their organization.131 They underscored the necessity of providing 
an autonomous Dalit voice within the electoral arena, which, up to that point, they 
alleged had disregarded their community’s concerns. Those in attendance at the 
executive committee meeting recall how Thirumaavalavan envisioned the state as a 
primary field of struggle. Sithan Sivabalan, who was among the attendees, recalls a 
specific example by which Thirumaavalavan supported his position: “If a caste Hindu 
attacks you with a knife or an iron rod, you can seize a comparable weapon and fight 
back. But, when that caste Hindu becomes an MLA you cannot oppose him directly. 
There is caste terrorism and there is state terrorism. To challenge the latter, you must 
become a political authority.”132 Recounting this early debate, Sivabalan recalls, 
“Thirumaavalavan’s argument convinced me that political authority was necessary to 
achieve our goals.”133 
  Likewise, other Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers recall Thirumaavalavan’s 
comments in favor of direct electoral participation. Thirumeni, a key organizer from 
Cuddalore District, recounts how Thirumaavalavan lobbied movement cadre: 
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He told us, “If we want to sit equally with Vanniyars in the local council, state 
legislature, and national parliament, we must contest their dominance through 
the electoral system. Everyone is participating in electoral politics: DMK, 
AIADMK, the Communists. This includes caste Hindus and, particularly, the 
PMK. Other [caste] communities are organized as political parties, 
strengthening their authority through elections and reaping its benefits. Why 
should we carry on boycotting elections and further isolate ourselves? We 
should enter the political mainstream to continue our struggle and claim an 
equitable share of resources. We must wage this struggle from within the state 
structure.”134 
 
In effect, many Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers took cues from Thirumaavalavan and 
came to conceptualize the state as a primary locus of struggle. To remain outside the 
state while rival groups integrated within its ensemble of institutions was to forfeit 
leverage in making claims on authorities and, in effect, to entrust rival groups with 
redressing Dalit concerns. 
  When, more than a decade later, Sinthanai Selvan recounts this seminal 
discussion on electoral politics, he concludes his account succinctly, “Caste oppression 
and state oppression were our enemies. We initially boycotted elections, but after ten 
years we came to believe that political power provided the only viable solution for our 
problems.”135 Selvan concedes that the movement’s early boycotts were of limited use, 
noting, “Boycotts generated a positive image of our movement among the people, who 
came to see us as uncorrupted, as warriors, as dedicated activists. But, only our 
reputation was enhanced; we could not secure firm solutions to our problems.”136 This 
conclusion became evident, he alleges, when their protests failed to secure an amenable 
response from state authorities in regards to the violence and malpractice that marred 
panchayats elections in Madurai District. Following the Villupuram conference, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers issued a press release proclaiming their decision to 
convert their organization into a formal political party, soon to be renamed the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (Liberation Panthers Party; VCK). Describing the 
general atmosphere at the executive conference, Selvan estimates that ninety-percent 
of those in attendance, including himself, eventually backed the movement’s proposal 
to enter electoral democracy.137 Thirumeni, who had opposed the move, similarly 
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recalls that most Viduthalai Chiruthaigal cadre welcomed the announcement with 
jubilance.138 
  When they recollect these internal debates, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
acknowledge that multiple, contrasting perspectives circulated within the movement 
prior to its integration into electoral democracy. Most organizers corroborate 
Thirumaavalavan’s contention that pressure exerted by police officials and political 
authorities corralled the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal onto the electoral path. Yet, they also 
recount that many party leaders re-conceptualized the nature of political power. While 
in consensus that the PMK’s entry into Dravidian coalitions jeopardized their ability to 
consolidate Dalits, they also describe how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers came to 
envision electoral politics as a contested field, repressive at present but with the 
potential to generate ameliorative solutions for the social and economic development of 
their community. Balasingam, VCK Headquarters Secretary, recalls a key imperative 
that Thirumaavalavan impressed on his organizers, “While our people view land, gold, 
and similar possessions as assets, Thirumaavalavan encouraged them to also regard 
political power as an asset.”139 Balasingam recounts how movement organizers spread 
this perception among their supporters, emphasizing, “We realized that once our 
people came to regard political power as a necessary asset, they will begin to demand 
their due share.”140 
 
The Electoral Turn 
On March 31, 1996, prominent Tamil Nadu leaders of Indian National Congress 
(INC) splintered from their national organization and launched the Tamil Maanila 
Congress (TMC), or Tamil State Congress. G. K. Moopanar, the charismatic chairman 
of the TMC, attributed the schism to the INC’s decision to align, in 1996, with the 
AIADMK, whose chairwoman Jayalalitha faced a flurry of corruption charges related 
to disproportionate assets. Sensing an unfavorable mood among the electorate, 
Moopanar parted ways with the INC and launched the TMC as an independent party 
to contest the upcoming 1996 State Assembly Election and the parliamentary election 
scheduled for later that year. Moopanar’s prudent decision, which anticipated that 
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both elections would pivot on corruption, paid handsome dividends.141 The TMC allied 
with the DMK and bagged an impressive 39 seats in the state assembly and then, later 
in the same year, won 20 of Tamil Nadu’s 39 parliamentary seats in the 1996 Lok Sabha 
Election.142 Despite its early success, the party’s good fortune began to wane and, in 
1999, the TMC found itself in a quandary when its primary ally, the DMK, joined 
hands with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a rightwing Hindu nationalist party, to 
contest the 1999 Lok Sabha Election. Promising to oppose “corruption,” a slight to the 
INC/AIADMK coalition, and “communalism,” alluding to the DMK/BJP tie up, the 
TMC turned to Dalit and Muslim organizations across Tamil Nadu ahead of the 1999 
General Election.143 
  Assembling an electoral coalition comprised of caste and religious minorities, 
TMC organizers vowed to usher them “into the mainstream” and pledged “to share 
power with minority communities not only in politics but also in governance.”144 Yet, 
the TMC’s decision to associate with Dalit parties elicited a tepid response followed by 
outright hostility, spurring allegations that the TMC was lending credibility to militant 
caste outfits. TMC Chairman Moopanar refuted this contention, assuring media 
personnel that no militants were in his coalition and stressing his party’s intent to 
assimilate Dalit communities within democratic procedures from which they were 
excluded.145 While Moopanar’s public rhetoric underscored the need to integrate caste 
minorities into electoral democracy, his decision to consolidate Dalits was equally 
tactical. Although Dalits had earlier provided a reliable vote bank for the Congress in 
Tamil Nadu, Dalit support progressively gravitated towards Dravidian parties (DMK; 
AIADMK) from the 1970s. But, after three decades of Dravidian rule, there was little 
evidence that Dalit concerns featured on the state policy agenda.146 In effect, 
Moopanar saw an opportunity to return Dalits to the Congress fold, but, as we will 
see, he had very little choice at the time.147 Whereas the TMC quickly solidified ties 
with the Pudhiya Tamizhagam, a predominantly Dalit party with a strong Pallar support 
base across southern Tamil Nadu, the TMC struggled to draw the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal into its electoral coalition; a responsibility that Moopanar delegated to 
TMC General Secretary Peter Alphonse.   
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  In November 2013, Peter Alphonse greeted me at his home office and provided 
a firsthand account of coalition formation ahead of the 1999 General Election. 
Alphonse recalls, “In 1999, we didn’t have many options. As organizers of the Tamil 
Maanila Congress we needed to obtain supplementary vote banks and were under 
strong electoral pressure to secure additional allies. At the time, the DMK joined with 
the BJP and we were unwilling to join their coalition. On the other side, [Indian 
National] Congress allied with the AIADMK, against which we were similarly 
opposed. Our electoral platform was to oppose both communalism and corruption, so 
these realignments in the electoral field left us isolated and seeking new allies. We 
began searching for people who could identify with us and share the electoral dais.”148 
Recounting how the TMC courted Dalit and Muslim organizers, Alphonse points to 
his party’s 1999 campaign slogan, “aḍittaḻa makkaḻukku ātcikum pandu adikāram pandu,” 
which he translates, “We will share power with the lower rungs of society in 
government and in the power structure.”149  
  While the 1999 General Election ultimately marked the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
foray into electoral democracy, Alphonse recounts the challenge of convincing 
Thirumaavalavan to join the TMC coalition. He recalls, “It required great pains to 
convince Mr. Thirumaavalavan to take the plunge in elections. I along with Mr. 
Azhagiri, who at the time served as an MLA from Cuddalore District, took great pains 
to convince Thirumaavalavan to enter electoral politics. Even after four or five rounds 
of discussions on Marina Beach, he still maintained his reticence. Finally, through 
tireless persuasion, we convinced him to join with us.”150 Alphonse recounts the core 
argument he impressed on Thirumaavalavan during these conversations:  
 
I told him, “Unless you are willing to share power, until you are able to share 
power, you will not deliver anything concrete to your people. In fact, this is 
why Ambedkar joined the cabinet, went to parliament, and became a minister. 
Only then was he able to draft a Constitution favorable to Dalits. If you 
consider the social benefits accessible to your people, take reservations for 
example, they all come from the political establishment and are delivered 
through a political mechanism.”151 
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To evince how political integration would enable Thirumaavalavan to deliver benefits 
to his constituents, Alphonse alluded to Jagjivan Ram, a Dalit minister who served in 
the cabinets of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who, he contends, “ensured that 
Dalits received officer postings in the administrative service, the civil service, and the 
revenue service.”152 “I impressed on Mr. Thirumaavalavan,” Alphonse continues, “that 
it was only because Jagjivan Ram was fighting from within the establishment that he 
was able to deliver these benefits. Until you enter the political establishment, even if 
you organize and address mass public meetings, even if you break social barriers, 
ultimately the point of delivery is somewhere where you are not connected; you must 
be connected at these points of delivery.”153 Finally, upon protracted negotiations, 
Thirumaavalavan aligned with the TMC coalition to contest the forthcoming 
parliamentary election.  
  Despite a concerted effort to woo Dalit parties into their fold, Alphonse admits 
candidly, “Even from the beginning, we knew it was a losing alliance,” and recollects, 
“Many people, including those in our party, never approved of the coalition. They felt 
uncomfortable with Moopanar standing alongside these people, with his hands on their 
shoulders. They felt it was unsuitable for a man of his political stature, a respected 
politician who brokers power in New Delhi, to share the dais with Thirumaavalavan 
and Krishnasamy.”154 “Some people,” Alphonse recalls, “reluctantly accepted the 
coalition by reasoning, ‘Let it go, Moopanar had no other option; he is already at his 
begging bowl!’”155 “Others,” he recalls, “complained that Moopanar was bestowing 
legitimacy on these Dalit parties and, thereby, elevating what were nothing other than 
communal outfits. They complained, ‘He is giving them political stature. 
Thirumaavalavan used to address only colonies in the night, but now he is taken to 
very big stages alongside former ministers and with full media coverage.’”156 Alphonse 
underscores, “We faced strong resistance both from within and outside of our party.”157 
  On August 11, 1999, the Tamil Maanila Congress formally announced its 
coalition partners, a list including two Dalit parties, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and Pudhiya 
Tamizhagam, Janata Dal (JD), and Indian Union Muslim League (IUML).158 Promising a 
platform against corruption and communalism, the TMC reiterated its conviction to 
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“bring Dalits into the mainstream.”159 Moopanar’s announcement not only raised 
eyebrows, but spurred political analysts to conjecture whether the inclusion of Dalit 
parties would “prove an asset or a liability” for the coalition’s prospects.160 In response, 
Moopanar repudiated allegations that Dalit parties would serve as an electoral liability 
and opined that the consolidation of religious and caste minorities would “usher in a 
new chapter” to Tamil politics.161 While Moopanar publically defended his coalition 
partners and refuted allegations of intra-party turmoil, he acknowledged in private the 
challenges of persuading his cadre to canvas votes for Dalit parties. In a personal 
conversation with G. Palanithurai, Moopanar recognized that electoral competition 
sometimes served to undermine Dalit empowerment, reportedly stating, “In a 
representative democracy, addressing these vital issues is difficult as the system 
depends on votes.”162 While conceding that the very presence of Dalit parties may 
forfeit votes from upper caste communities and his own party members, Moopanar 
saw an opportunity to recover the Dalit support that once formed a staple of the 
Congress vote-bank. 
 
1999 General Election163 
Sinthanai Selvan, who joined Thirumaavalavan in negotiations with TMC organizers, 
recalls, “At first the TMC offered us five parliamentary constituencies, but we rejected 
some of them because we didn’t have enough money to contest so many seats. How 
could we contest elections in five constituencies without adequate financial means? In 
the end, we accepted two constituencies: Chidambaram and Perambalur,” where 
Thirumaavalavan and Periyasami contested, respectively.164 The campaign period 
produced palpable excitement among Dalit communities, as reflected by newspaper 
accounts that cast in relief the present ebullience of the Dalit electorate against its 
previous “indifference.”165 News reports described the “rousing reception” received by 
Thirumaavalavan and TMC leaders as they traversed Chidambaram, providing 
evocative accounts of buoyant Dalit crowds that, on one occasion, waited four hours in 
a steady drizzle to observe Thirumaavalavan deliver his stump speech.166 Similarly, 
Peter Alphonse recalls, “The Dalit crowds were very enthusiastic and cheerful; And, 
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you always knew when it was a Dalit crowd. When the people were sullen and morose 
and standing off from the leader, we knew it was a pocket of backwards castes, whose 
visible indifference was plainly evident.”167 
  The intra-party tensions, which Moopanar downplayed prior to the campaign, 
came to the fore during vote canvassing. “At the time of the election campaign,” Selvan 
recounts, “TMC organizers took Thirumaavalavan inside upper caste villages. If it was 
a Dalit settlement, our party people accompanied them, but in caste Hindu villages our 
party vehicles would stall outside the village as Thirumaavalavan entered alongside 
local TMC organizers.”168 A similar occlusion of their party surfaced in disputes over 
the location of propaganda. Selvan recalls:  
 
We could not paste our posters in the caste Hindu area. Even TMC people who 
lived in those areas advised us, ‘There is no need to disturb the peace. Don’t 
worry, we will cast our vote for Thirumaavalavan, but don’t place your 
propaganda here, don’t paste his photo here; it will only further antagonize our 
relations. We will cast our votes as Moopanar instructs; there is no need for you 
to enter our area for the campaign.’169 
 
As Election Day approached, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers recall their frustration 
that TMC campaign workers arrived every morning to collect their daily batta, or 
election money, but rarely partook in canvassing activities. Or, as Selvan emphasizes, 
“They simply came to share in the finances.”170 
  The 1999 General Election in Chidambaram promised to be a historic event. 
Whereas in previous years Dalits had regularly signed their voter identity cards 
outside the polling booth, often exchanging their votes for a ration of biryani or a small 
sum of money, the 1999 election marked the first occasion when many Dalits would 
enter the polling station to cast their ballot for a candidate of their choosing.171 In 
Chidambaram, Thirumaavalavan’s primary competition came from the rival PMK 
candidate, E. Ponnusamy, who was backed by the ruling DMK party. Further 
heightening tensions, Dalits had historically been prohibited from entering many 
upper caste villages in the district and, when permitted entry, frequently did so as 
laborers following strict social mores.172 As polling booths were established in 
government buildings located in upper caste settlements, VCK supporters needed to 
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enter these contested spaces to cast their ballots. Prior to polling, the TMC submitted a 
list of “sensitive areas” to district police and Election Commission officials that 
enumerated “violence prone areas” where the prospect of free and fair polls was 
particularly threatened.173  
  In Chidambaram, the law and order situation deteriorated as the election 
approached and palpable tensions boiled to the surface when, on the eve of polling, 
violence erupted in six hamlets across the constituency.174 Claiming to quell mounting 
tensions, Tamil Nadu police conducted a series of preventative arrests across the 
district and remanded in custody 60 VCK polling monitors including its chief election 
coordinator on the eve of polling, charging that these individuals conspired to provoke 
violence.175 Then, on Election Day (September 5, 1999), Frontline reports: 
 
Since Dalits, who are mostly agricultural workers, could not turn up during the 
morning hours, non-Dalits came in large numbers to vote. The polling agents of 
Thirumavalavan were terrorized, beaten and driven out. Dalit voters standing 
in the queues were intimidated. In the absence of polling agents it became 
easier for miscreants to manipulate the polling.176 
 
Sinthanai Selvan recalls that complaints poured in from across the constituency: Dalit 
names had been omitted from the voter-registry, Vanniyar men had expelled VCK 
polling agents forcefully from polling stations and prevented Dalit voters from entering 
polling booths and the upper caste settlements in which they were located. 
Recollecting his personal experience, Selvan recalls, “When, in the early afternoon, I 
entered the election booth with my colleagues, we found that our votes had already 
been cast. We did not know what to do. Some people rushed outside and improvised a 
road roko, demanding police intervention, saying ‘Look! My vote was already cast! 
See, here is my identity card, but my vote has already been cast!’”177 
  When Selvan ruminates over these electoral proceedings more than a decade in 
retrospect, he concedes that movement organizers such as himself, buoyed by optimism 
surrounding their electoral turn, underestimated the obstacles ahead.178 The 
Chidambaram election, Selvan recalls, was novel in many respects. “Despite fifty years 
of independence,” he recounts, “the residents of Dalit colonies across Chidambaram 
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had never cast a vote for a candidate of their own choosing. They were excluded from 
the electoral system, unable to cast their votes and often prohibited from even entering 
polling booths.”179 Although the 1999 General Election witnessed a mass upwelling of 
Dalit support behind the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, Selvan recalls the irony of its electoral 
rhetoric, “At the time, we were speaking about entering the national parliament in 
New Delhi, but entering the polling booth itself posed such a tremendous struggle!”180 
Selvan recounts that polling stations, whether located in a village panchayat office, 
hospital, school, bank, or cooperative society, “were always housed in government 
buildings located in upper caste settlements.”181 With a wry grin, he demurs, “There 
was no question of booth capturing; the polling stations were already captured by the 
system itself.”182 
 
Post-poll Proceedings 
Following Election Day, early media reports carried accounts of “smooth polling” 
across Tamil Nadu, but noted “a few cases” in Chidambaram of “voters being 
prevented from going to the booths” and “altercations between polling agents at some 
booths.”183 In a preliminary account, The Hindu reported, “Police sources said the 
clashes followed allegations by the Dalits of bogus voting by the other group,” which 
culminated in the arson of “houses of both the communities in a dozen villages” as well 
as a private bus in Sethiathope.184 But, on the same day, District Collector Sandeep 
Saxena celebrated a high voter turn-out in Chidambaram and Cuddalore, emphasizing 
that aside from “a few minor incidents and altercations, polling was peaceful in all 
areas…”185 In nearby Villupuram, where Dalit voters had confronted similar 
circumstances, the District Superintendent of Police Baladandayudhapani boasted 
resolutely, “There have been no instance [sic] of impersonation or malpractice from 
anywhere and everyone was respecting the model code of conduct.”186   
  While government authorities and election monitors attested to the integrity of 
polling procedures, the Tamil Maanila Congress and its coalition partners remained 
adamant in their allegation of widespread malpractice, claiming that the ruling DMK 
party had manipulated “administrative and electoral machinery” to disenfranchise 
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more than 20,000 Dalits and, therefore, demanded an immediate re-poll in 50 booths 
across Chidambaram.187 Further, the TMC claimed that widespread violence had 
“imprisoned Dalits in their hamlets,” thereby impeding their entry into adjacent towns 
where polling stations were situated.188 Downplaying the effects of poll-related 
violence, Tamil Nadu Chief Election Officer Naresh Gupta conceded that violence had 
erupted across Chidambaram, but maintained that this was post-poll violence and 
therefore did not impinge upon the integrity of electoral proceedings.189 Similarly, local 
police authorities and officials from the Election Commission of India (ECI) clarified 
their earlier comments, acknowledging the prevalence of violence in Chidambaram, 
but insisting that violence occurred only after the polls had closed and, therefore, did 
not deter polling procedures. Although Tamil Nadu’s Chief Election Officer confessed 
that he “did not know the exact timings [of the violence],” he remained steadfast in his 
assessment and demurred that “mere allegations could not be a ground for ordering a 
repoll.”190 
  Over the following weeks, independent organizations including civil rights 
groups (e.g., People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Independent Initiative) as 
well as domestic and international NGOs (e.g., Madurai-based People’s Watch; 
Human Rights Watch) launched independent inquiries into allegations of electoral 
malfeasance.191 In its initial press release, the PUCL declared that at least fifty areas 
were affected by “rigging and booth capturing” and recommended that the Election 
Commission of India conduct a formal inquiry into the matter and order repolling in 
affected areas across Chidambaram. Recounting particular incidents in a press release, 
the PUCL team discovered, “By 3pm the Vanniars had captured the booths and 
indulged in bogus voting. The caste groupings cut across party lines and polling agents 
of different parties, including the TMC, who were from the Vanniar community, did 
not protest at the bogus voting.”192 On September 20, 1999, PUCL submitted an 
official memorandum to Chief Election Commissioner Dr. M. S. Gill. Citing instances 
of “booth capturing, bogus polling, physical attack [sic] on Dalit booth agents and 
voters,” PUCL, with the support of former New Delhi High Court Justice Rajinder 
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Sachar, recommended a re-poll in the entire Chidambaram constituency except for the 
Mangalur segment where polling was deemed to have occurred peacefully.193 
  A separate inquiry submitted by Independent Initiative, a public interest 
organization spearheaded by the retired Supreme Court Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer to 
monitor polling procedures, reported that “In most of the villages visited in 
Chidambaram constituency Dalit people had been threatened not to cast their vote on 
polling day… Polling agents belonging to the DPI were attacked and people had been 
physically attacked, their huts burnt and looted by the upper castes led by the 
PMK.”194 As Hugo Gorringe notes, although the Independent Initiative’s report cited 
instances of violence on both sides of the caste divide, “the seizing of polling booths, 
denial of voting rights and the use of violence were mostly confined to villages where 
Dalits were in a minority.”195 Corroborating PUCL recommendations, the Independent 
Initiative reported that “at least fifty polling booths had been in the hands of one party 
and that re-polls should be conducted.”196 
  Over the course of a month between polling and ballot counting, the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal staged a series of protests and dispatched memorandums to government 
authorities, including formal petitions hand-delivered to the Tamil Nadu Governor and 
the President of India. Initially, Thirumaavalavan announced an indefinite hunger fast 
to ratchet up pressure on authorities to order a re-poll, but he retracted this 
proposition on the advice of TMC Chairman Moopanar, who had reportedly cautioned 
him, “the fast might lead to further violence in Chidambaram area,” for which the VCK 
would be blamed.197 Rather, Moopanar advised Thirumaavalavan “to take the issue to 
the highest authority in the country, namely the President.”198 Then, on September 21, 
1999, Thirumaavalavan along with TMC leaders met separately with both K. R. 
Narayan, President of India, and G. V. G Krishnamurthy, Chief Election 
Commissioner, as well as other leading figures including Karthikeyan, Chairman of the 
National Human Rights Commission, and Kameswara Paswan, Vice-Chairman of the 
National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to present their 
case and appeal, albeit futilely, for a re-poll in Chidambaram.199 
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  After tallying ballots, the Election Commission declared Thirumaavalavan as 
runner-up to the winning PMK candidate E. Ponnuswamy, who received a berth in 
the national cabinet as Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, by a sizeable margin of 
nearly 119,563 votes.200 Citing the possibility of Dalit retaliation, Cuddalore District 
Collector Sandeep Saxena promulgated an order under Section 144 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) barring public assemblies as well as entry to Dalit 
organizers representing nearly twenty Dalit organizations from Cuddalore and 
Chidambaram districts for a period of two months, starting from the date of issue and 
persisting through December 15, 1999, citing that their presence may instigate a 
breach of the public peace.201 Following a legal appeal, on December 7, 1999, one week 
prior to the expiry of the Collector’s order, the Chennai High Court dismissed the 
directive with the stipulation that Dalit organizers travel in no more three cars, 
announce their arrival twenty-four hours in advance, and pledge not to disturb the 
peace.202 
  Newsweek summarized Thirumaavalavan’s inaugural election campaign tersely, 
reporting: “His electoral bid’s legacy was destruction. To scare off Dalit voters, upper 
caste mobs burned 21 villages in the Cuddalore District, destroying 1,000 huts. They 
attacked 60 Dalit men, killing one.”203 Yet, the consequences of exercising their 
electoral franchise persisted past the polling deadline as Dalit communities in pockets 
across the northern districts endured a social and economic boycott. In some areas, 
Dalits were barred from entering upper caste villages to access government buildings 
including fair-price shops, which caused severe shortages of food grains and essential 
goods in affected colonies.204 Further, some individuals among backwards castes 
initiated a social boycott, firing Dalit farmhands and preventing Dalit students from 
attending the government schools located in their settlements.205 Presiding Tamil Nadu 
Chief Minister and DMK Chairman M. Karunanidhi, whose coalition bagged 26 of 39 
seats in the election, reprimanded his critics, refuting accusations of anti-Dalit bias and 
emphasizing the progress Dalits have enjoyed under DMK rule. Dismissing 
allegations of anti-Dalit bias, the DMK chairman scoffed at how anyone could even 
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muster such claims during an age in which a Dalit had been appointed President of 
India.206 
 
Conclusion 
In February 2014, I met with Vanni Arasu, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Spokesperson, at 
his residence in the tranquil outskirts of Tambaram, a major transit hub in south 
Chennai. Over milk tea and murukku, a fried savory snack, Arasu does not mince 
words when he recounts the tumultuous denouement of the 1990s. “We cannot simply 
frame those years in terms of an inter-caste conflict,” he says, “It was not simply PMK 
versus VCK.”207 “At the time,” he continues, “the PMK, seeking to reinforce the 
traditional hegemony of Vanniyars, viewed electoral politics as a means through which 
to do so.”208 “Further, and much to the alarm of Dravidian parties,” he adds, “the Dalit 
people joined our movement en masse. They were chanting our slogans and pasting our 
posters in their colonies; they had declared an electoral boycott. The DMK and 
AIADMK saw the danger we posed to their electoral calculations; they understood 
that it would become difficult retain their Dalit votes.”209 While Arasu alleges that the 
PMK instigated violence to polarize the electorate and shore up Vanniyar support, he 
contends that Dravidian parties quickly adapted to the PMK’s emergence, bypassing 
the concerns of Dalits, who, despite their preponderance in the state’s northern 
districts, lacked an autonomous movement with a proven capacity to deliver votes. 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers observed how the Dravidian parties pandered to 
caste communities that had consolidated themselves through the electoral process and 
demonstrated their vote-bank. 
  When Arasu reaches a natural pause, I interject, “But, why did the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal enter electoral politics? Were alternative options not available to the 
movement?” He recalls how, after 1996, the ruling-DMK party responded to the 
PMK’s consolidation of Vanniyars by strengthening its ties with the party and then, in 
1998, welcoming its erstwhile ally into its electoral coalition. Arasu casts a wry grin as 
he ripostes, “As Mao used to say, ‘Our enemy determines our weapon.’”210 “In those 
days,” he elaborates, “It was clear that the political climate was not conducive to 
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guerilla warfare and there was a genuine fear that the DMK would ban our 
organization. So, in 1999, we entered democracy as a strategy.”211 This was not without 
precedent, Arasu contends, noting how one year prior in 1998 Hugo Chavez came to 
power through an electoral mechanism. He recounts, “Chavez declared, ‘Our 
resources are for our own people.’ He nationalized key industries and redistributed the 
nation’s wealth. It was a social revolution that didn’t require weapons.”212 But, much to 
the chagrin of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, their transition into electoral 
democracy occurred briskly and not necessarily according to their own design. By 
1996, the epicenter of movement activity had gravitated to Tamil Nadu’s northern 
districts, where the Paraiyar caste, presumed to be the largest Dalit community in the 
state, is concentrated. A few years later, in 1999, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal sought to 
convert an upwelling of Dalit support into a vote-bank to augment its leverage with 
state authorities and countervail the backwards castes.  
  Taken collectively, accounts proffered by Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
suggest that it was not so much the promise of democracy, as much as the looming 
threat of state repression coupled with the electoral consolidation of backwards castes 
that propelled their organization towards elections. Yet, this shift from boycotts to 
ballots does not necessarily signal a radical aberration from earlier movement politics. 
The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal had earlier relied on the occupation of public space to 
amplify its voice, press its demands, and effect an audience, but, with that mode of 
political engagement foreclosed by the late-1990s, the movement resorted to an 
alternative strategy to represent Dalit concerns: electoral democracy. Whereas political 
pundits often trumpet the integration of social minorities within electoral procedures as 
a feat of democratization, the firsthand experience of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal leaders 
complicates this often-buoyant narrative.213 As the next chapter conveys, electoral 
democracy signals neither a triumph nor a retreat from an earlier program, but an 
astute recognition of how caste came to be rearticulated through electoral politics. At 
the turn of the millennium, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers embraced the promise of 
democratic principles understood in terms of political equality and universal rights, yet 
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remained acutely aware that electoral politics frequently produces outcomes 
antithetical to these very ideals. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“This Electoral System is Opposed to Democracy”1: 
An Ethnography of Electoral Politics in Modern India, 1999-2014 
 
Introduction 
In 2008, I conducted the first what would eventually become hundreds of interviews 
with VCK organizers over the next decade. As an undergraduate student and novice 
ethnographer equipped with a tape-recorder, pencil, and notepad, I met VCK General 
Secretary M. Yallalan, who is tasked with monitoring rural affairs in Madurai District, 
at a public park in Arasaradi, a short jaunt from the city’s bustling Arapalayam Bus 
Stand. Once we had situated ourselves on the open ground, Yallalan began to 
chronicle the political history of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, starting with its early roots 
as a radical social movement in the 1990s. He described contentious early protests, 
rattled off an extensive list of police detentions, and slowly directed his narrative to the 
movement’s electoral turn in 1999. Sensing a pause in the conversation, I interjected 
with what I had assumed to be a simple, straightforward question, “Why did your 
movement enter electoral politics?” Without any hesitation, Yallalan forcefully 
responded, “because we needed to show that that there was no democracy.”2 Then, as if 
detecting my confusion, he paused to clarify the naiveté of the befuddled 
ethnographer, informing me that his movement may have entered the crowded arena 
of electoral politics, but it had not yet experienced democracy. As I logged my field 
notes that evening, I was struck the manner in which Yallalan counterposed 
democracy to electoral politics. His comment imparted a lingering impression due to 
the sheer intensity with which it was spoken and the marked distinction that it drew 
between what I had taken to be opposing sides of the same coin: democracy and 
elections.  
  Six years later, I revisited these pilot interviews after completing my 
dissertation fieldwork. I reviewed these early transcripts to gauge how they resonated 
with the viewpoints that I had just encountered in the field. When I asked Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers why they guided their movement into the electoral arena in 
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1999, they discussed the transition without positing any natural congruence between 
elections and democracy, wary to conflate the two elements. VCK General Secretary 
Sinthanai Selvan noted, “In Marx’s doctrine, a quantitative change leads to a 
qualitative change,” suggesting that the upwelling of popular Dalit support prompted a 
shift in movement strategy. When I posed the question to VCK Spokesperson Vanni 
Arasu, he alluded to the use of stringent national security laws that obstructed 
movement activity in the 1990s, before wryly declaring, “As Mao used to say, ‘Our 
enemy determines our weapon.’”3 Couched in allusions to Marx and Mao, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers offered provocative, if not unexpected, points of reference 
when narrating their transition into electoral democracy, which they vigilantly bisected 
into opposing elements: elections and democracy. When recalling their experience of 
electoral politics, they censured its constitutive compromises and proceeded to 
describe instances where electoral calculations grated against and, at times, even 
undermined robust advocacy. Nonetheless, they continued to discuss democracy, both 
as a normative ideal and political objective, as a harbinger of equality, rights, and 
pluralism. Taken together, these discussions revealed how democracy affords a 
powerful social imaginary and potent political vocabulary for historically marginalized 
groups, but, as this chapter demonstrates, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers have 
grown increasingly skeptical of its alluring promise. 
 
The Anthropology of Democracy 
As Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren drolly observe, “democracy suffers from an 
excess of meaning,” which complicates scholarly attempts to narrow its 
conceptualization and generate  a working definition.4 The indeterminacy of the term 
and the multiplicity of associations tied to its popular use have proven enduring 
obstacles to analyses of modern democracy. In the 1940s, Joseph Schumpeter 
proposed a minimalist definition, presenting democracy as an “institutional 
arrangement” distinguished foremost by a competitive electoral system.5 While 
elections remain a constitutive aspect by most accounts, subsequent scholarship 
expanded our understanding of democracy beyond the initial preoccupation with 
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elections in order to examine its core features. For example, Robert Dahl proposed a 
set of general standards, a sort of baseline criteria or political litmus test intended to 
gauge the relative health of democracy.6 Alternatively, Giovani Sartori proposed a pair 
of questions in his study of democracy that evaluated, first, whether a country is a 
democracy and, secondly, how democratic it is; that is, as Michael Saward writes, 
Sartori examined democracy both in terms of a “threshold” and a “continuum.”7 These 
studies have since been followed by an eruption of indices purporting to measure the 
degree to which democracy has manifest in a given country and its growth (or decline) 
on the world stage.8  
  From the 1990s, anthropologists began to query how the ethnographic method 
can advance our study of democracy. In atypically clunky prose, Clifford Geertz 
writes, “Political theory, which presents itself as addressing universal and abiding 
matters concerning power, obligation, justice, and government in general and 
unconditioned terms, the truth about things as at bottom they always and everywhere 
necessarily are, is in fact, and inevitably, a specific response to immediate 
circumstances.”9 Geertz endorses the unique capacity of ethnography to scrutinize 
these “immediate circumstances” and provide insights that both contribute to and 
further complicate the often broad strokes of political theory.10 Apparently taking cues 
from this observation, anthropologists have questioned what ethnography might 
contribute to the study of democracy. Although their approaches have varied, they 
tend to share a central premise that democracy can neither be defined procedurally nor 
ascribed to a specific set of criteria such as a multiparty system characterized by fair 
elections and an independent judiciary that ensures basic freedoms of the press and 
property.11 Without presupposing the stability of “democracy” as an object of inquiry 
or tendering an alternative definition, anthropologists have preferred to accentuate its 
“multivalence” and examine complex processes whereby particular conceptions of 
democracy come to acquire a normative status.12  
  Cautioning against a priori and categorical definitions of democracy, Julia Paley 
proposes that the ethnographic method is especially well-suited to extend our 
theorization of democracy through an examination of “local meanings, circulating 
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discourse, multiple contestations, and changing forms of power accompanying the 
installation of new political regimes.”13 In her synopsis of the emerging field of study, 
Paley categorizes anthropological scholarship on the subject within two primary 
tracks, one that examines the divergence of local understandings of democracy from a 
normative standard and another that scrutinizes the discursive processes whereby 
normative conceptions of democracy come into being.14 Despite their differences in 
orientation, Paley writes, “What emerges from the synthesis of existing literature is a 
set of critical perspectives revealing contemporary democracies as enacting forms of 
power—perhaps less directly repressive than military dictators, but nonetheless falling 
short of democratic ideals.”15 This unreconciled tension between core principles often 
ascribed to democracy (e.g., equality, freedom, prosperity, development, universal 
citizenship) and its actual manifestation within a given milieu factors as a recurring 
theme in the literature.16 
  In a study of “alternative democracies” in Peru, David Nugent proposes that 
democracy cannot be understood in singularity but rather apprehended as a contested 
field of meaning in order to throw light on “multiple and contradictory versions of 
democracy.”17 Further, Nugent cautions against the commonplace emphasis on 
“political democracy” and its “overwhelmingly national focus,” and instead encourages 
scholars to assess “why groups change their orientation toward democracy through 
time” and how democratic systems graft atop existing structures of power.18 Extending 
Nugent’s contribution, Dilip Gaonkar has examined how variegated understandings of 
democracy generate an extensive range of political practices. Gaonkar writes, 
“Democracy as a mode of governance is partially based on people's self-
understandings, beliefs, and interpretations, and because these are not invariant across 
societies, different societies generate interestingly different clusters of practices of 
democracy.”19 Considered together, Nugent and Gaonkar underscore how a sensitivity 
to local knowledge systems, a core facet of anthropological inquiry, enables us to 
comprehend myriad, contested meanings popularly attached to democracy and 
contextualize its manifold practices. While sharing the authors’ contention that our 
interpretation of democracy cannot be reduced to a proceduralist definition, I caution 
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that we cannot fully extricate our study of democracy from the ensemble of state 
institutions and practices that are experienced in dissimilar ways differentiated groups 
of citizens. 
  Recent scholarship has extended the anthropology of democracy through 
ethnographies of the ‘everyday’ state to consider how individuals experience 
democratically elected regimes and, thereby, these studies conceptualize ways in which 
state institutions are reimagined as primary sites for the contestation and reproduction 
of power. In an account of popular politics in Brazil, James Holston elaborates upon a 
critical “disjuncture” in democracy, unearthing tensions that surface between its actual 
manifestation as an institutionalized political system and its associated political imaginary 
that energizes the politics of São Paulo’s “insurgent citizens.”20 According to Holston, 
“the realization of citizenship is the central and not the collateral issue of democracy” 
and, while recognizing its capacity to disrupt “established formulas of rule and their 
hierarchies of place and privilege,” he acknowledges the “insufficiency of democratic 
politics for realizing democratic citizenship.”21 His account of citizen movements in the 
auto-constructed peripheries of São Paulo displays how institutional bodies of the 
state, including its judiciary, emerge as primary sites of political struggle. In the face of 
“differentiated citizenship,” Holston suggests that democracy, as a political system, 
shifts the equation of power and, thereby, produces new sites for its contestation and a 
fresh vocabulary for popular struggle.22 
  Similarly, in reference to modern India, Jeffrey Witsoe considers how the 
introduction of electoral democracy “changed the means by which dominant groups 
were forced to reproduce their dominance,” which brought to the fore “a very public 
spectacle of the precariousness of their position in a democracy with universal 
franchise.”23 Examining how the politicization of caste has impacted democratic 
politics, Witsoe demonstrates that social, economic, and political networks organized 
around caste affiliation “connect state institutions with local relations of dominance 
and subordination,” thereby “producing a state unable to impartially deliver services or 
enforce individual rights.”24 His account depicts the uneven ramifications and often 
“markedly undemocratic” outcomes of what he curiously calls “lower caste 
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empowerment,” indicating that the “‘democratization’ of power did not result in an 
equal empowerment for all, or even most, subaltern groups.”25 Rather than extolling 
the virtues of what is often heralded as a “deepening of Indian democracy,” Witsoe 
cautions, “the rights at the heart of the “liberalism” of liberal democracy require not 
only a constitutional mandate, but also state institutions capable of enforcing this 
mandate.”26 
  In an early essay, Sudipta Kaviraj investigates a dissonance between the ideals 
ascribed to democracy and its actual manifestation, questioning, “Why do we assume a 
connection between democracy and social equality?”27 Kaviraj emphasizes that 
“quotidian democratic politics… brings into play a relentless search for contextual 
majorities” prone to generate contradictions in elected democratic governments.28 He 
channels Ambedkar when he recognizes that “caste majorities are by nature 
permanent, and obviously any permanent majority would make democracy unbearable 
for other groups.”29 Stressing this strain between the logic of electoral politics and 
forms of majoritarian rule, he cautions that democratically elected governments are 
prone to succumb “easily and quickly to the strong temptation of relentless 
majoritarianism.”30 On a similar note, Anastasia Piliavsky presses us to reconsider “our 
own fragmented picture of democracy; the gulf between what we think democracy 
ought to be and what it necessarily is – indelibly and very fallibly human.”31 She 
writes, “Democracy in ancient Athens, like democracy in the early United States, was 
a mirror of its own society, which reflected the values espoused by its demos and the 
ways in which this demos conceived itself.”32 Rather than accentuating contradictions in 
the study of democracy, the gap between our normative assumptions and material 
practices, the authors instead encourage us to stay attuned to its dynamics and what 
insights this may offer into a given social milieu. 
  This chapter contributes an alternative vantage point to our study of 
democracy, providing an ethnographic lens into how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
recall their direct experience of electoral politics and, further, how this interaction 
informs their understanding of democracy. Without proposing a general thesis of what 
democracy is or should be, the chapter conveys how Dalit organizers interface with its 
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institutions, and why this contact prompts them to interpret an indelible tension 
between democracy and electoral politics. Describing instances in which  electoral 
competition actually undercuts their capacity as well as their incentive for robust Dalit 
advocacy, this chapter examines what my interlocutors often understand to be an 
antagonistic relationship between the two elements. The following chapter offers 
ethnographic insights into how electoral competition, much like democracy, is 
experienced in markedly different ways by differentiated groups of citizens. Rather 
than extracting their conception of democracy from the set of normative values that 
they ascribe to it, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers instead disaggregate democracy 
from what is often envisioned as its defining institution: elections.  
 
Chapter Outline 
In the 1990s, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal developed into a mass movement whose 
spatially disruptive brand of corporeal protest (i.e., road, rail, and airport rokos) 
ushered it beneath the limelight of Tamil Nadu politics. Confronted, at once, by a 
heavy-handed police response to its activities, which selectively utilized national 
security legislation to incarcerate key movement leaders, and the electoral formation of 
rival backwards caste associations, the VCK tentatively waded into electoral 
democracy. In our conversation, VCK organizers acknowledge the futility of lobbying 
state authorities from outside its formal institutions, observing how political parties 
representing the backwards castes converted their constituents into vote-banks and, 
thereby, augmented their leverage in negotiating resource allocations and shaping state 
policy. Further, VCK organizers noted how caste conflicts were re-enacted within state 
bureaucracy, impeding the government’s capacity to impartially allocate resources and 
administer rights. In their own words, my interlocutors accentuate a blurred 
distinction between what they refer to as “caste terrorism,” referring to anti-Dalit 
violence committed by non-state actors, and “state terrorism,” denoting the complicit, 
when not direct, entanglement of state agents in sectarian violence.33 As caste 
associations integrated into electoral democracy and forged alliances with the ruling 
party, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers contend that these leaders capitalized on a 
 
 
183 
newfound legitimacy as elected representatives to reroute benefits to their caste 
constituents in detriment to Dalit development.  
  In the previous chapter, I illustrated how state institutions came to be regarded 
not only as objects of petition, but as primary sites of political struggle. This chapter 
examines how VCK organizers recall their firsthand experience of electoral democracy 
and why they distinguish jananayagam, or democracy, from therthal arasiyal, electoral 
politics. To enter electoral politics was not to enter democracy, they claim, but rather 
to approach the electoral platform as a strategy, albeit not entirely of their choosing, to 
realize what they understood to be core democratic principles, including panmaittuvam 
(pluralism), samattuvam (equality) and urimaikal (rights).34 Today, VCK organizers 
discuss their direct experience of electoral democracy in terms of a deep-seated 
“compromise,” using the English term. They concede that the pressure to “capture 
power” through elections has dampened their prior disposition and tempered their 
capacity for robust Dalit advocacy. But, they do not attribute this to a contradiction in 
democracy itself, but to a friction arising at the interstices of electoral competition and 
democratic principles. As they elaborate upon this tension, party organizers relate how 
“communal majority” features both as the core organizing principle of electoral politics 
and the chief impediment to the realization of democratic society. In our conversations, 
VCK organizers conceptualize the central mandate of democracy as a responsibility to 
foster pluralism and check the ever-present potential for a government of the majority 
to transform into majoritarian rule. 
  This chapter contributes an ethnographic perspective that challenges common 
assumptions in popular understandings of democracy and its relation to electoral 
politics. It incorporates a wide breadth of source material including ethnography, 
personal interviews, vernacular and English-language newspaper reports, electoral 
data compiled by the Election Commission of India (ECI), and political oratory. First, 
the chapter opens with an account of VCK electoral politics, examining the party’s 
electoral performance alongside the challenges it has faced in the electoral arena since 
1999. Next, I draw upon ethnography and translations of recent political speeches to 
consider how VCK organizers recall their direct experience of electoral democracy and 
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attend to what they perceive to be a dissonance between jananayagam (democracy) and 
therthal arasiyal (electoral politics). In varying registers, these individuals develop a 
critique of electoral politics, which posits an antinomy between electoral competition 
and the realization of unmaiyana jananayagam, a genuine democracy. In conclusion, the 
chapter examines how VCK organizers evoke democracy as a component of a broader 
political struggle to advocate for equality, selectively deploying its political vocabulary 
and powerful social imaginary to energize their program and call for the extension of 
core democratic principles from the domain of political theory into the contested arena 
of social life. 
 
Navigating Electoral Politics35 
Table 1. VCK Alliances in state and national elections (Tamil Nadu) 
State Assembly Elections  Parliamentary Elections 
Year Coalition #Seats (won) 
 
Year Coalition #Seats (won) 
2001 DMK+ 8 (1) 1999 TMC+ 2 (0) 
2006 AIADMK+ 9 (2) 2004 JD(U)+ 8 (0) 
2011 DMK+ 10 (0) 2009 DMK+ 2 (1) 
2016 PWF+ 25 (0) 2014 DMK+ 2 (0) 
 
Across more than fifteen years of electoral politics, the VCK has enjoyed marginal 
success, sending its chairman to the national parliament and three representatives to 
the state legislative assembly. During this time, the VCK developed in political stature, 
visibility, and membership, but nevertheless struggled to secure a relative majority of 
votes to win elections despite aligning with more established Dravidian parties for 
their financial support, vote-canvassing experience, and extensive party infrastructure. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, allegations of electoral liability have dogged the 
VCK in the electoral arena and popular press, with prominent leaders of other parties 
and media pundits alike surmising that the presence of what is widely perceived as a 
Dalit party in a political coalition may jeopardize its support among vital backwards 
caste constituencies. In effect, the more developed and better financed PMK party has 
most often factored as the ally of choice in the northern districts where its Vanniyar 
base is preponderant, shuttling the VCK to the opposing coalition as a counterbalance 
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to the PMK. This has, on most occasions, left the VCK on the losing side of electoral 
equation. Before presenting ethnography of electoral politics, an account that details 
how VCK leaders recall their firsthand experience of democratic politics, the chapter 
opens with an overview of the party’s electoral performance since its inaugural 
parliamentary bid in 1999, which was discussed in Chapter Three. 
  Although Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers walked away from the 1999 Lok 
Sabha Election empty-handed, the party’s electoral debut attracted the attention of 
established political parties. In Chidambaram, VCK Chairman Thol. Thirumaavalavan 
secured more than 225,000 votes despite contesting from within a weak third front led 
by the Tamil Maanila Congress, or Tamil State Congress, against better organized and 
financed Dravidian coalitions. Thirumaavalavan, who was presumed to have secured a 
substantial majority of the constituency’s sizeable Dalit electorate, bagged an 
impressive 31.17% of all votes cast in Chidambaram.36 In the neighboring Perambalur 
constituency, Tada Periyasami, the party’s other parliamentary candidate, obtained 
85,209 votes.37 Although Periyasami registered a distant third place finish, his 12.52% 
vote-share exceeded the margin of victory separating A. Raja, the winning DMK 
candidate, from his nearest rival, P. Rajarathinam of the AIADMK.38 Although 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal candidates failed to notch a victory, their performance 
commanded a sufficient vote share to garner the attention of Dravidian parties and 
project their organization as a prospective future alliance partner.39  
  Leading into the 2001 Tamil Nadu Assembly Election, political pundits 
surmised that “the transformation of Dalit movements into political forces has 
compelled established parties to woo them into their fold.”40 At first, this conjecture 
appeared well founded when the ruling DMK party lured the VCK into its coalition 
ahead of the assembly election. But, the DMK’s options were limited. The PMK had 
shifted allegiance to the rival-AIADMK coalition. Then, erstwhile DMK ideologue 
Vaiko and his recently launched Marumaralarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 
(MDMK), or Renaissance Dravidian Progress Federation, followed suit, leaving the 
DMK in the lurch. Weighing their available options, DMK leaders welcomed the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal into their coalition, trusting that its extensive Dalit-Paraiyar 
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base would offset the loss of the PMK’s Vanniyar vote-bank.41 Additionally, the DMK 
roped in Dr. Krishnasamy’s Pudhiya Tamizhagam (PT), a political party with strong 
support among Dalit-Pallars in the state’s southern districts. Of the 234 assembly 
segments in Tamil Nadu, the DMK allocated 8 seats to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and 
10 seats to Pudhiya Tamizhagam.42 
  Just as critics had earlier reproached TMC Chairman G. K. Moopanar for 
aligning with Dalit parties, alleging that such alliances bestowed political legitimacy on 
“what were nothing other than communal outfits,” DMK Chairman M. Karunanidhi 
met similar criticism in 2001.43 Whereas MDMK General Secretary Vaiko reportedly 
harangued the DMK for sacrificing its earlier ideals of social justice and caste 
eradication by supporting such “casteist outfits,” PMK Chairman Ramadoss referred 
to the state’s Dalit parties as “rowdy gangs” when he charged the DMK with “inciting 
casteist outfits merely for the sake of fetching votes.”44 Further, the DMK alliance with 
Dalit parties had apparently unsettled some its own cadre, including an unnamed 
organizer who lamented to the press, “Mr. Karunanidhi has chosen to tread the path of 
mines which blew away Mr. G. K. Moopanar in the last parliament election.”45 
Although political analysts harped on the potential of Dalit voters, who comprise 
nearly 20% of the population, to influence electoral outcomes, concerns of “electoral 
liability” shadowed both Dalit parties.46 
  As the 2001 assembly election loomed nearer, media pundits accentuated the 
novelty of its caste dimension, billing the contest as a showdown between an 
AIADMK-led coalition enlisting the support of Tamil Nadu’s largest backwards caste 
communities, Thevars and Vanniyars, against a DMK alliance featuring the state’s 
Dalit parties.47 Political analysts speculated as to whether the DMK’s “calculated risk” 
of aligning with Dalit parties would pay handsome dividends or, alternatively, render 
“the DMK ‘an untouchable’ among the backward caste vote banks.”48 Whereas a 
handful of pundits surmised that Dalit consolidation would yield “a gain for the 
DMK,” most expressed skepticism, anticipating that an alliance with Dalit parties 
would “alienate” influential backwards castes, including segments which had 
previously supported the DMK. For instance, Suresh Nambath of The Hindu 
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postulated that caste conflicts between Dalit cadre and DMK organizers, who 
typically hail from the backward castes, would undermine inter-party coordination, 
projecting that alliances with Dalit parties “could prevent vote transfer from the major 
parties to smaller caste-based players.”49 After all, coalition politics is not simply a 
matter of aggregating vote-banks, but entails serious questions related to social 
chemistry: will DMK voters support the candidates of alliance partners, and vice versa? 
  Upon tallying votes, Thirumaavalavan emerged victorious from the Mangalore 
assembly segment, which, at that time, was part of the Chidambaram Lok Sabha 
constituency.50 The remaining seven Viduthalai Chiruthaigal candidates came up short, 
defeated by double-digit margins, with one candidate even losing her deposit.51 In fact, 
the 2001 Tamil Nadu Assembly Election registered as a poll debacle for the DMK, 
whose coalition bagged a measly 37 of 234 seats.52 As they reviewed election returns, 
media commentators assessed, “the DMK’s pro-Dalit tilt seems to have alienated its 
own upper caste voters,” claiming that the DMK’s alliance with Dalit parties had come 
at the expense of critical OBC constituencies across the state.53 Whereas DMK 
candidates appear to have been beneficiaries of Dalit votes, they “were not able to 
realise the party’s traditional OBC votes,” which contributed to their defeat.54 Further, 
analyses of electoral results suggested that DMK voters had declined to cast ballots for 
allied candidates in constituencies allocated to Dalit parties, leading a prominent 
journalist to pronounce tersely, “The DMK’s gamble with the Dalit card has failed.”55  
  Whereas DMK fortunes improved amid the 2004 Lok Sabha Election, the 
stigma associated with taking onboard Dalit alliance partners likely induced both 
Dravidian parties to distance themselves from the VCK and PT. Sensing that public 
sentiment had turned against the ruling-AIADMK government, the Indian National 
Congress (INC), PMK, MDMK, and Communist parties (CPI, CPI(M)) returned to 
the DMK’s Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA) ahead of the 2004 Lok Sabha 
Election.56 Flush with allies, DMK Chairman Karunanidhi reportedly informed the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and Pudhiya Tamizhagam that, while he may not have seats to 
allocate in the forthcoming election, he had reserved a place for them in his heart. 
Objecting to the move, Thirumaavalavan resigned his MLA post and severed ties with 
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the DMK, admonishing its chairman with charges of “political untouchability.”57 Next, 
the VCK and PT approached the AIADMK, which welcomed both Dalit parties to 
canvass votes for AIADMK-coalition candidates, but declined to allocate seats.58 Cast 
out of the DMK coalition and without an offer from the AIADMK, the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal and Pudhiya Tamizhagam contested the election under the symbol of the 
Janata Dal (United), or JD(U), which altogether lacked a presence in Tamil Nadu.59 
  In the 2004 Lok Sabha Election, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal fielded candidates in 
eight seats across the northern districts of Tamil Nadu on a JD(U) ticket, with 
Thirumaavalavan again contesting from Chidambaram. As an added plotline, former 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary ‘Tada’ Periyasami, who joined the BJP after 
leaving the VCK in 2002, would contest against his erstwhile ally in Chidambaram as 
the BJP candidate of the AIADMK coalition.60 Thirumaavalavan fared well in 
Chidambaram, where he augmented his earlier vote share in the constituency, 
receiving 255,773 votes (34.41%) as compared to his previous yield of 225,768 
(31.17%).61 Although losing once again to E. Ponnusamy of the PMK, 
Thirumaavalavan pressed his erstwhile collaborator Periyasami of the AIADMK-BJP 
front to a distant third place finish with 113,974 votes (15.33%).62 Aside from his 
noteworthy performance, other VCK candidates foundered and forfeited their deposits 
in each of the remaining seven contests.63 But, despite forfeiting their deposits in most 
constituencies, the two Dalit parties cordoned off a relative majority of Dalit votes, 
drawing 41.8% of the statewide Dalit vote against the 36.6% and 21.6% of the 
AIADMK and DMK, respectively.64 Regardless, the DMK coalition swept the 
election, bagging all 39 parliamentary seats in Tamil Nadu as well as another in the 
adjacent Union Territory of Pondicherry.65 
  The first five years of electoral competition (1999-2004) posed a series of 
challenges and setbacks for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. Although it had demonstrated a 
reputable vote bank in pockets across the state’s northern districts, the party continued 
to be dogged by concerns that its presence in an electoral coalition may “alienate” 
critical backwards caste votes. In regards to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, it was not 
simply a question of the size of its vote-bank, but concerns over vote-transferability 
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and social chemistry served to undercut its leverage as a prospective alliance partner. 
As party leaders acknowledge, contesting from the DMK coalition in 2001 provided a 
well-oiled party infrastructure and access to campaign finance, both of which VCK 
organizers deem necessary to bolster their electoral prospects. But, in 2004, the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal again found itself on the outside of Dravidian coalitions and, 
again, walked away without a solitary seat. In response to its popular perception as a 
“Dalit outfit,” the VCK expanded its platform following the 2004 Lok Sabha Election to 
encompass issues related to Tamil nationalism including demands for a sovereign 
Tamil Eelam (homeland); a maneuver widely interpreted as an attempt to appeal to a 
broader cross-section of the electorate.66  
  In September 2004, Thirumaavalavan and PMK Chairman Ramadoss initiated 
a gradual process of rapprochement by sharing a joint platform on Tamil nationalism 
under the banner of the Tamil Padukappu Iyakkam (TPI), or the Tamil Protection 
Movement.67 Their extra-electoral alliance, which fashioned itself as the custodian of 
‘authentic’ Tamil language and culture, was intended to depress inter-caste conflicts 
between their respective OBCs and Dalits constituents and cultivate inter-party 
bonhomie with an eye towards elections, but it also provided a visible platform for the 
VCK to address matters of ‘general’ interest beyond the otherwise constrictive 
repertoire often attributed to Dalit politics.68 Whereas PMK and VCK party 
organizers shared a program that pandered to pro-LTTE sentiments and peddled what 
was often criticized as an opportunistic embrace of Tamil nationalist politics, this 
attempt at inter-party geniality suffered a decisive blow just prior to the 2006 Tamil 
Nadu Assembly Election when the DMK refused to allocate seats to the VCK. When 
Thirumaavalavan objected to his exclusion from the DMK alliance, DMK Chairman 
Karunanidhi proposed that the PMK allocate seats from its own quota for VCK 
candidates.69 In protest, the VCK joined the rival AIADMK coalition, which, on this 
occasion, accepted the party into its fold. 
  During the 2006 Tamil Nadu Assembly Election, the VCK contested nine seats 
from the AIADMK coalition.70 The DMK maintained its successful coalition from the 
previous election except for Vaiko’s MDMK, which accompanied the VCK in the 
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AIADMK front. Adding further intrigue into the mix, Vijayakanth, a cinema-star-
turned-politician, announced that his Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK), or 
National Progressive Dravidian Federation, which he had floated just the previous 
year, would contest polls independently. With polling agencies reporting a tight 
election and professing uncertainty as to how the entry of the DMDK would alter 
electoral arithmetic, the Dravidian parties entered largesse-driven brinksmanship, 
successively raising the ante by augmenting their election manifestos. When the DMK 
pledged to peg the price of a kilo of rice issued under the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) at two rupees, the AIADMK promised ten kilos of free rice per cardholder 
each month.71 With pollsters anticipating a split result, the DMK next pledged to 
provide color television sets to an estimated 54 lakh houses below the poverty line, to 
which the AIADMK responded by offering a laptop computer to every plus-two 
graduate.72 Ultimately, the DMK coalition bagged 163 of 234 assembly seats while 
notching only a 4.67% higher vote-share over the rival AIADMK coalition.73 The VCK 
walked away with a pair of assembly seats and Vijayakanth left his imprint in the 
electoral arena, securing 8.38% of the statewide vote and a single assembly seat.74 The 
cooperation between the AIADMK and VCK quickly soured when, as 
Thirumaavalavan later charged, the AIADMK fielded candidates during the ensuing 
local body elections in wards that it had previously allocated to the VCK.75  
  The 2009 Lok Sabha Election coincided with the final phase of civil war in 
neighboring Sri Lanka. While the DMK roped Congress (INC) and the VCK into its 
coalition, the AIADMK enlisted the support of the PMK, MDMK, and the 
Communist parties (CPI, CPI(M)). While Dravidian coalitions traded barbs over the 
inadequacy of their rival’s response to the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, they 
continued to ratchet up pressure with promises of electoral ‘freebies’ ranging from 
color television sets to free gas stoves with liquid petroleum gas (LPG) connections.76 
Again, Vijayakanth’s DMDK contested polls independently and demonstrated that his 
party had augmented its earlier vote share. With votes tallied, the DMK coalition had 
secured 42.54% of the statewide vote, 5.23% more than the AIADMK coalition 
(37.31%).77 Again playing spoiler, the DMDK secured 10.1% of the statewide vote 
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share, attracting more votes than the margin of victory in 24 of the 39 parliamentary 
constituencies.78 Victorious, the DMK coalition bagged 28 seats across Tamil Nadu 
and Pondicherry against 12 seats won by the AIADMK alliance.79 On his third 
attempt, Thirumaavalavan won a resounding victory in Chidambaram, defeating E. 
Ponnusamy of the PMK by nearly 100,000 votes and awarding his party its first 
parliamentary berth.80 
  Over its first decade of electoral competition (1999-2009), the VCK contested 
elections from a Dravidian coalition on three occasions (2001, 2006, 2009), notching at 
least one victory in each contest, whereas the party walked away empty-handed when 
contesting from a third front (1999, 2004). In each election, the PMK enjoyed the 
upper hand in alliance negotiations with prospective coalition partners as it had 
demonstrated a substantial hold on the Vanniyar electorate, was presumed to be better 
financed and organized, and was not dogged by popular concerns over vote-
transferability. In effect, the PMK enjoyed greater latitude in negotiating with its 
Dravidian ally, often prompting the VCK to join the rival Dravidian coalition – that is, 
when the opportunity arose. Keenly aware of inter-caste dynamics across the state, 
Dravidian parties demonstrated a proclivity to pit OBC and Dalit parties against each 
other to mobilize votes. But, this electoral logic took a brief hiatus in 2011 when the 
DMK ushered both the VCK and PMK into its alliance, thereby testing the degree of 
inter-party bonhomie forged through nearly seven years of collaboration in the Tamil 
Protection Movement.  
  In 2011, the ruling DMK government, besieged by accusations of corruption 
stemming from its allotment of 2G spectrum licenses and popular frustration due to 
price hikes in food staples and basic commodities, faced tall odds heading into the 
contest. The AIADMK coalition enlisted the support of communist parties (CPI(M), 
CPI) and Vijayakanth’s DMDK, which had demonstrated a 10.1% statewide vote 
share in the prior election, facing off against a DMK coalition comprised of the 
Congress (INC), PMK, and VCK. For the first time, the alleged sociability between 
the VCK and PMK was put to an electoral litmus test. The DMK coalition suffered a 
poll debacle, winning 31 of 234. While the VCK drew a blank across all ten of its 
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assembly segments, the PMK bagged a paltry 3 of 30 contests and Congress won a 
dismal 5 out of 63 seats. The AIADMK coalition walked away with a clear majority in 
the assembly with its coalition prevailing in 203 of 234 seats.81 
  The DMK’s poll debacle turned heads not merely as a popular verdict against 
DMK and Congress rule, but also due to the sheer magnitude of their defeat. Although 
the DMK, PMK, and VCK independently enjoy substantial electoral support across 
the state’s northern districts, their candidates fared poorly. While pundits attributed 
the electoral results to the 2G spectrum scam alongside recent price hikes among basic 
food items and essential commodities, electoral data suggests that poor vote-transfer 
among allies compounded the coalition’s woes. Although Thirumaavalavan and 
Ramadoss spearheaded joint action espousing Tamil nationalism, their bonhomie failed 
to transcend the stage and percolate the grassroots, where party cadre declined to cast 
their ballots for caste-rivals-turned-coalition-partners. Whereas VCK candidates lost 
by margins greater than 25% in four constituencies, their average margin of defeat was 
21.87%.82 VCK General Secretary Sinthanai Selvan recorded the party’s only single-
digit margin, trailing in his bid by 9.08%.83 The results corroborated prior logic that 
the VCK and PMK are best pit against each other, calling into question the viability of 
a common platform. 
  In 2014, the VCK remained with the DMK to face the 2014 Lok Sabha Election. 
As detailed at length in Chapter Five, the 2014 parliamentary election featured an 
unprecedented five-way contest. The AIADMK coalition’s prudent decision to stand 
independently paid handsome dividends and nearly ran the table, winning 38 of 40 
seats across Tamil Nadu and the union territory of Pondicherry. In contrast to the 
AIADMK’s good fortune, the DMK coalition, which boasted an alliance of caste and 
religious minorities, drew a blank.84 The VCK contested two seats, losing both: VCK 
General Secretary D. Ravikumar lost in Thiruvallur (SC) and VCK Chairman Thol. 
Thirumaavalavan suffered a hefty defeat in his re-election bid in Chidambaram (SC). 
The PMK, which had aligned with the VCK in the previous assembly election, 
contested from the BJP coalition, winning a single seat, Dharmapuri, where recent 
anti-Dalit violence had polarized the electorate. Following the 2014 Lok Sabha 
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Election, the VCK found itself without representatives in the state legislature and 
national parliament.85 
  Amidst more than fifteen years of electoral politics, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers have tasted marginal success on the campaign trail. Despite demonstrating 
substantial sway among Dalit-Paraiyar voters in northern districts, the party has been 
dogged by its popular reputation as an exclusively Dalit organization, a title that 
political pundits and Dravidian leaders widely interpret as an electoral liability, fearing 
that the presence of a “Dalit outfit” may jeopardize its support among critical 
backwards caste communities. Moreover, as the party has struggled to acclimate to the 
rising cost of election campaigns, VCK leaders profess a reliance on Dravidian 
coalitions to access the financial resources and organizational support required of a 
competitive campaign. Hence, political coalitions in Tamil Nadu do not merely consist 
of the aggregation of vote-banks, but involve tense negotiations over seat allocations, 
campaign finance, and electoral infrastructure. As Tamil Nadu is widely reputed to 
host some of the country’s most expensive campaigns, this places smaller parties such 
as the VCK at a disadvantage when negotiating the terms of coalition politics with 
prospective allies. Whereas the concluding chapter provides a firsthand account of an 
election campaign that explores these issues in ethnographic detail, the remainder of 
this chapter calls our attention to how VCK leaders recount their experience of 
electoral politics and explores how this exposure informs their understanding of 
democracy. 
 
‘Now we only fight in front of the mic’  
On a small family farm nestled a short distance from the national highway passing 
through Villupuram, one of Tamil Nadu’s bustling transit junctions, Sinthanai Selvan 
leans forward in a wicker chair on his house veranda. A thatched canopy overhead, 
assembled with a motley assortment of bulrush, coconut fronds, and political banners 
from years past, mitigates an oppressive afternoon sun as livestock roam the grounds, 
occasionally entering the veranda to interrupt our conversation. The house functions 
as a family home as well as a political office, bearing witness to a constant stream of 
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party workers and community members filtering in and out; making requests, seeking 
assistance, and, depending on the season, delivering wedding invitations. As an 
afternoon shower begins to saturate the grounds, an intermittent stream of water 
trickles through the roughshod roof, sending us scuttling inside to resume our 
conversation. As we resituate ourselves atop a small mat strewn across the concrete 
floor, Selvan, an early organizer and current General Secretary of the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, savors a sip of tea and recollects his thoughts before our conversation 
turns to his movement’s tenure in electoral democracy. Casting the movement’s 
electoral politics in stark relief to its earlier social radicalism, Selvan opines, “Today, it 
seems as if we only fight in front of the mic.”86 
  Over the following hour, Selvan shares his perspectives on how the pressure 
generated by electoral participation has clashed with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s prior 
disposition for robust Dalit advocacy. Reflecting upon his fifteen-year tenure in 
electoral democracy, Selvan voices concern that electoral calculations have tempered 
his movement’s ability as well as its incentive to advocate Dalit causes and respond 
decisively to instances of caste violence. VCK organizers acknowledge that they must 
strike a delicate balance that addresses Dalit concerns without ‘alienating’ upper caste 
votes or jeopardizing coalition prospects. Selvan describes this in terms of a tradeoff 
between electoral viability, which, he argues, compels his organization to join 
Dravidian coalitions and appeal for electoral support from the backwards castes, and 
what he terms principled politics, which he discusses through allusions to his 
movement’s earlier social activism in the 1990s. Whereas popular media frequently 
harps on endemic corruption (uuzhal) in electoral politics, Sinthanai Selvan professes 
that electoral calculations press his movement to “compromise,” using the English 
term, which he discusses in terms of moral corruption, that is a dilution of its earlier 
principles. “The present political context forces compromise,” he underscores, adding, 
“the electoral field is a compromised field.”87 
  Prior to contesting elections, Selvan recalls that VCK organizers exhorted their 
supporters with impassioned slogans, chanting: “adagga maru, attumiru, timiri ezhu, 
tiruppi adi!”, or, “refuse to submit, transgress all barriers, rise up, and hit back!” “In 
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those days,” he recollects, “we vehemently opposed the casteist forces,” noting that this 
opposition occurred regardless of the official posts or professional titles that these 
individuals may have held.88 He elaborates: 
 
Before entering electoral politics, we would proclaim, ‘Where is 
Panneerselvam? We demand to speak to the MLA!’ Even though he may be a 
powerful minister, we would pressure him, ‘You must not act against the 
interests of Dalits. If you continue to do so, we will not allow you to walk 
peacefully in the streets of Tamil Nadu!’ In this manner, we won the people’s 
support behind our movement.89 
 
But, Selvan claims that electoral calculations overwhelmed this early program and 
tempered his movement’s politics. When facing elections, he concedes, “we were 
required to collaborate with the very individuals against whom we were previously 
opposed because we now had to take in account their official positions and political 
affiliations. We were suddenly pressed to work with them; to work for them.”90 Alluding 
to the VCK’s inaugural campaign amid the 1999 Lok Sabha Election, Selvan recalls, 
“Suddenly, the local union president, the town secretary, the very individuals who we 
earlier regarded as caste fanatics, became our allies. Now I am expected to approach 
them and express my greetings, ‘Hello, sir.’ I should pay my respects and perform 
kaaltodu,” gesturing as if touching someone’s feet.91 “The electoral field,” he reiterates 
once again, “is a compromised field.”92 
  In addition to what he describes as “demeaning performances,” Selvan relates 
how these compromises assumed alternative forms. When Selvan recalls his 
experiences as an assembly candidate, he recounts instances when coalition partners 
implicitly advised or explicitly pressed him to rescind legal cases that he had filed 
under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act (1989): 
 
When a VCK affiliate becomes the coalition candidate he will need to 
compromise his stance. If he has lodged cases under the SC/ST Act, he will 
need to compromise these cases to enter upper caste settlements for 
electioneering purposes. Otherwise, the upper castes would say, ‘You are the 
man who lodged the complaints against us and pressured the police to take 
action. It was only at your insistence that the police filed cases against our 
people. With these cases underway, they will not vote for you.’93  
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Selvan stresses that electoral calculations require key compromises to secure critical 
backwards caste votes, which has undermined prior attempts to safeguard Dalit 
security through recourse to law and litigation.94 “This electoral system compels us to 
compromise,” he claims, asserting, “We could not win a single seat without 
compromising.”95 
  Selvan’s candid reflection illuminates what many of my respondents regard as 
the principle quandary that minority parties confront in electoral politics. For instance, 
Mu. Arivudainambi, an organizer in Cuddalore District, reiterates many of Selvan’s 
concerns. “As a political party,” he postulates, “we are unable to address casteism as 
vigorously as we once did due to alliance and vote-sharing considerations.”96 As 
Arivudainambi elaborates, he claims that his sentiment does not justify any alleged 
dilution of VCK politics, but rather is intended to call into question why its once robust 
social advocacy has ostensibly waned following its integration into electoral 
democracy. From my reading, his account points to structural constraints imposed by 
electoral calculations as principal impediments to robust Dalit advocacy. His response 
warrants further consideration:  
 
Today, I see the error in our decision to enter electoral politics. As a social 
movement, we fought tirelessly for our people’s rights. But, I sense that this 
intensity has decreased nowadays. Today, we compromise with others; we 
conduct diplomatic politics because we require votes from the backwards castes 
to win elections. Due to this, we are unable to fight as vigorously as before. I 
envision electoral politics as a critical shortcoming for the common SC/ST 
people because only the petite bourgeoisie among them benefit; that is, those 
who are already somewhat economically developed stand to benefit most from 
the emergence of a political party. Now, as party affiliates, they can secure 
promotions, transfers, and other benefits in government, but the common 
people do not benefit.97 
 
Arivudainambi argues that electoral competition contains social radicalism, which 
featured as a recurring theme in my conversations with Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
organizers. When discussing the movement’s electoral phase, my interlocutors refer to 
a double bind that they describe in terms of a trade-off, often deploying the English 
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term “compromise,” between electoral viability and what they perceive as principled 
politics. 
  In our conversations, VCK organizers such as Selvan and Arivudainambi 
acknowledge the irony of their present impasse. As social activists who once 
proclaimed “therthal paadai, tirudar paadai!”, meaning “the electoral path is the thief’s 
path,” and cut their teeth on exposing what they deemed rampant anti-Dalit bias 
across the political establishment and state bureaucracy, today they align with the 
Dravidian parties and leaders they had initially set out to oppose. Recounting this 
earlier, pre-electoral phase of VCK politics, VCK Spokesperson Vanni Arasu 
emphasizes, “When we spearheaded an electoral boycott and refused to cast our votes, 
lakhs of people stopped to looked at us… the principle of electoral democracy was 
shaken. We declared to the politicians, “ungalil evanum yookkiyaṉ illai, engaḷ ooṭṭu 
ungalukku illai,” meaning, “As none of you are persons of integrity, you will not receive 
our votes!”98 But, upon entering the electoral arena, erstwhile adversaries become 
allies because, according to many Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, Dravidian parties 
presented the best opportunity for electoral success by pledging access to inter-caste 
vote banks, extensive party infrastructure, vote-canvassing expertise, and the financial 
means necessary to spearhead competitive election campaigns. 
  In an article on VCK electoral politics, Hugo Gorringe observes an upwelling 
of criticism among VCK cadre who are unable to palate the movement’s obsequious 
behavior to Dravidian parties upon entering the electoral field.99 I encountered similar 
perspectives during fieldwork. Take for example, the comments of an early VCK 
organizer who stated resolutely, “What I once feared has now become reality. Today, 
we sit with our oppressors, our exploiters, those who sell illicit liquor, and we are told, 
‘Here, work with this gentleman.’ How can I accept this?”100 Castigating the VCK’s 
present electoral strategy, he conjures a poignant idiom drawn from Dalit life-
experience to convey his criticism:  
 
We once declared, ‘adanga maru,’ proclaiming that we would refuse to yield, but 
upon entering electoral politics we felt compelled to join a coalition. Then, 
regardless of the coalition, the question naturally arises, ‘How many seats will 
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they allocate?’ In earlier days, our people begged for bread, but now we are 
begging for seats! What purpose is there in having struggled for so many 
years? We never imagined that we would yield, but this is submission, electoral 
politics is a form of submission.”101  
 
Juxtaposing the electoral platform with the movement’s early social activism, he adds, 
“Even in the 1990s, we knew that if we entered elections our model of pressure politics 
would forfeit votes from other caste communities.”102 Or, as phrased by another 
organizer, the VCK’s earlier reputation for Dalit advocacy not only limits its popular 
support in the electoral arena, but its entry into electoral politics has benefited the 
Dravidian parties by consolidating Dalit support, which it now brokers in exchange 
for lucrative coalition pacts at the time of elections. “What benefits have we gained?” 
inquires the former Viduthalai Chiruthaigal leader ‘Tada’ Periyasami. Following a short 
pause, he responds, “I’m not sure anymore. We consolidated our people, but the 
cumulative effect is that their votes are now available for purchase by the DMK.”103 
 
On Democracy and Majority 
When Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers recall their experience of electoral democracy, 
they roundly criticize the myriad compromises folded within electoral participation. 
Yet, throughout our conversations, they nonetheless continue to discuss democracy, 
often on a theoretical basis, as a harbinger of equality, rights, and pluralism. Why do 
figures who profess palpable disdain for the current electoral system continue to hold 
democracy with such regard? Initially, VCK organizers were bemused when I 
inquired about their democratic transition. As I soon realized, they were at first baffled 
by my conflation of democracy with electoral politics, an awkward construction of 
therthal jananayagam, literally “electoral democracy,” which they found jarring on the 
tongue and limited to lexicon of media pundits. Instead they preferred to use 
jananayagam in reference to its political principles and therthal arasiyal when referring 
to political competition. Distinguishing between the two elements, they informed me 
that while they may have entered electoral politics, they had not yet experienced 
democracy and, in fact, theirs was a struggle to realize unmaiyana jananayagam, a 
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genuine democracy. In what follows, I juxtapose divergent perspectives of democracy, 
first attending to conversations with Dalit Ezhilmalai, the founding General Secretary 
of the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), an ex-Member of Parliament (MP), and the ex-
Union Minister of State, Health and Family Welfare. Next, I reflect upon a discussion 
with M. Abdul-Rahman, a former MP and state executive of the Indian Union Muslim 
League (IUML) in Tamil Nadu. Upon presenting different impressions of democracy, 
I then consider these perspectives alongside those offered by VCK leaders. 
  On May 4, 2014, Ezhil Caroline, Chairperson of the VCK Lawyers’ Wing, 
facilitated an interview with her father, Dalit Ezhilmalai, a prominent Dalit politician 
and former union minister who served as the founding PMK General Secretary. In the 
1998 Lok Sabha Election, one year prior to the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s electoral turn, 
Ezhilmalai contested from within the AIADMK-BJP coalition and emerged victorious 
in Chidambaram. The BJP-led Vajpayjee government appointed him to the post of 
Union Minister of State, Health and Family Welfare. When internal feuds fractured 
his early bonhomie with PMK Chairman Dr. S. Ramadoss, the latter appointed E. 
Ponnusamy, also a Dalit, to replace him in the party ranks and, eventually, in the 
union cabinet.104 After his departure from the PMK, Ezhilmalai joined the AIADMK 
and soon thereafter won his second parliamentary berth in the 2001 Tiruchirappali 
(Trichi) By-election.105 When we discussed his political career, Ezhilmalai, a retired 
army veteran, spoke candidly about his experience in the PMK and why its early 
experiment in social engineering, an attempt to consolidate Dalits and Vanniyars in a 
single party, proved to be a futile exercise.  
 Recounting the social and political climate surrounding the formation of the 
PMK in 1989, Ezhilmalai recalls, “At that time, the animosity, the rivalry between 
[Dalit-]Paraiyars and Vanniyars was like a battle between serpent and mongoose, but 
it was a fight between unequals and the Dalits were squarely on the receiving end.”106 
After the 1989 Vanniyar Sangam road roko razed thousands of Dalit huts, Ezhilmalai 
remembers thinking, “If this situation were to persist, it would be detrimental to both 
groups.”107 He recounts that his entry into electoral politics stemmed from a conviction 
that “constitutionalism and legislation alone could not uplift our people. We require the 
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mutual support of other communities.”108 Acknowledging that his appointment as 
PMK General Secretary was, at least in part, a political overture intended to woo 
Dalits with an eye toward electoral calculations, he professes indifference, stating, “If 
the backwards castes and the Dalits band together, they could form a great strength 
and share political power.”109 Despite seething tensions between the two caste 
communities, he accepted Ramadoss’ invitation to serve as the founding PMK General 
Secretary.  
  Although the PMK emerged through a consolidation of the Vanniyar vote 
bank, Ezhilmalai estimates that, by the late 1990s, it had reached an impasse and 
began appealing to Dalits with an aim to augment its vote share and secure an outright 
majority, nothing that, if consolidated, these groups would form an electoral majority 
in constituencies across the northern districts. Discussing his decision to join hands 
with Ramadoss, Ezhilmalai states frankly, “From the very beginning, the PMK was an 
experiment: could ‘touchable’ Hindus and the ‘untouchable’ Dalits band together to 
make their move? We tried for the collective benefit of both communities, but we soon 
realized that oil and water cannot be mixed so easily.”110 “It was all stage-managed,” he 
confesses, “After bringing both sides together for a conference, the caste Hindus would 
return to their uur (settlement) and the Dalits to their cheri (colony). Everything 
remained the same. It had all been staged.”111 When he describes the motivation for his 
politics, Ezhilmalai recalls, “My intention was to give Dalits a hope that we can 
prevent violence,” alleging that, in those days, Dalits in the state’s northern districts 
were besieged at once by state-sponsored violence as well as caste atrocities.112 “At that 
time, the government was very hostile to our community,” he recalls, “but, between 
caste and the state, you cannot fight both; you must befriend one. We befriended the 
caste group,” adding tersely, “That’s all. It didn’t work.”113  
  When Ezhilmalai discusses early attempts to woo Dalit voters into the PMK, 
he proffers an evocative description of electoral democracy. Without mincing words, 
he contends, “In India, politics means caste politics. The dynamics of caste is this: see 
how far you can run the table against the other castes; you see how far you can travel 
on your own numerical strength.”114 Ezhilmalai stresses that this core dynamic of caste 
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politics, that is, the aggregation communities in a relentless pursuit of electoral 
majority, serves as a defining attribute of Indian democracy:   
 
Democracy means votes. A vote implies a number. The largest number 
produces the winning party. How does one garner the maximum quantity of 
votes? You must maximize your community’s support and then enlist more 
members among the general population. Is that not true? So, your voters 
cannot only be from your community; you must secure support from other 
communities. That’s how it is. This is how you can gain more votes.115 
 
Although Ezhilmalai bluntly conveys his perspective on the realpolitik of caste 
calculations, he concedes its limitations. Deploying a shared motif with Sinthanai 
Selvan, Ezhilmalai claims, “If you want to gain more votes, you have to compromise; 
you must forfeit some of your spirit, you should avoid some of your rhetoric, you must 
compromise some of your main issues. Naturally, this is happening; the vibrancy goes 
and then you are gone,” referring to what he envisions as the limited future prospects 
for caste-based parties.116 After a punctuated silence, he adds, “It’s temporary like a 
summer rain; they will come, stay for some time, and then they will have gone.”117 
Almost as if an afterthought, he adds, “The system is fine, but the man is wild.”118 
  During our conversation, Ezhilmalai routinely conflates democracy with 
electoral politics. In his perspective, democracy did not provide a new set of ideas or 
political principles as much as a platform that integrated rival communities into a 
competitive, electoral process and, as an effect, intensified caste competition within 
state institutions. Ezhilmalai offers a viewpoint that recognizes the centrality of values 
and principles to initial stages of political mobilization, yet he acknowledges that these 
ideals often factor among the earliest casualties of electoral politics. Values inherent to 
the democratic process are notably absent from our conversation, instead, he describes 
how democracy sets the parameters for caste competition and provides a new avenue 
of political mobility for all caste groups regardless of their traditional status; their 
success is not contingent on heredity, but the size of their community, their prowess in 
leveraging political support, and their aptitude to effectively manage their affairs vis-à-
vis other parties. Ezhilmalai suggests that electoral democracy has not disrupted, but 
rather restructured the nature of caste; that is, while caste may not have conformed to 
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the high ideals of liberal theory, it has proven a malleable substance in adapting to its 
institutions. 
  When I discussed the topic with M. Abdul-Rahman, a former Member of 
Parliament (MP) and state organizer of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), he 
similarly professed that electoral politics centers on a what he refers to as a “calculative 
rationality,” yet he expressed concern that this impetus for electoral politics all too 
often conflicts with core values ascribed to democracy. Acknowledging the unresolved 
tension between electoral politics and democratic principles, Abdul-Rahman discusses 
the fine line that minority elected representatives such as himself must tread in the 
electoral arena, always keeping a wary eye on the next election:  
 
Today, democracy is a principle that is universally celebrated, but within a 
democratic society there are all kinds of adverse habits and mannerisms, both 
virtue and vice co-exist. If I, as a member of the ruling party, take serious 
action against any particular individual, the community that he belongs to may 
turn against me and I may lose crucial votes in pockets densely populated by 
that community in the next election. This is the calculative rationality that 
guides electoral politics.119 
 
Recognizing that democratic values and electoral politics make odd bedfellows, Abdul-
Rahman reticently concedes that electoral calculations take precedence as politics 
always occurs with an eye towards the next election. For example, he notes that 
political leaders routinely intervene in local affairs in order to prevent authorities from 
taking action against the individuals hailing from electorally influential castes. 
“Politicians in the ruling party will regularly come forward to stop authorities from 
acting against the fellow; if such activities were to rake up trouble, it would affect their 
election strategy. So, they will instruct the authorities, ‘Don’t do it!’.”120 
  Considered together, the accounts provided by Ezhilmalai and Abdul-Rahman 
corroborate academic scholarship on modern Indian politics that accentuates the 
“plasticity” of caste in its encounter with democratic institutions.121 Caste has both 
transformed and been transformed through its interaction with democracy, giving rise 
to what scholars have referred to as the “horizontalization” of caste, that is, a 
permutation of caste from a vertical system premised on hierarchy into horizontal 
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solidarities that have adapted to the quantitative demands of electoral politics.122 While 
conceding the centrality of caste to political competition, VCK organizers project 
electoral politics as the antithesis of a “genuine democracy.” As opposed to interpreting 
democracy in terms of electoral procedures and core institutions, VCK leaders describe 
what they envision as its underlying principles, arguing that the ideals ascribed to 
democracy cannot so easily be pared from its political practices. In effect, they 
articulate a perspective that frames electoral politics as antithetical to the project of 
democracy. Attempting to recover democracy as a set of core principles that exist 
independently of electoral procedures and state institutions, VCK leaders evoke 
democracy at political rallies in a manner that harnesses its powerful social imaginary 
and draws upon its potent political vocabulary to energize their political program. 
 
Recalling Democracy 
In conversation, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers profess that caste is integral to 
electoral politics in contemporary India, but they remain apprehensive to equate 
electoral politics with democracy. In fact, most of my interlocutors insist that the two 
cannot be combined. Take for instance M. Yallalan’s declaration at the opening of this 
chapter that the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal entered electoral politics “to show that there 
was no democracy,” a sentiment that formulates an antagonistic relation, pitting both 
caste and electoral politics against democracy. In a separate conversation, VCK 
Headquarters Secretary Gopinath, more commonly known by his moniker ‘Che 
Guevara’ conveyed a similar perspective, stating, “The electoral system is not 
democratic. We selected the electoral path because we lacked viable alternatives. Still, 
our key objective is to achieve genuine democracy.”123 Echoing these perspectives, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers most often distinguished electoral politics, which they 
equate with the relentless pursuit of electoral majority through vote-bank politics, from 
democracy, which, for them, represents something altogether different, inseparable 
from its core principles of equality, rights, and pluralism. In what follows, I draw upon 
conversations with party leaders and recent political oratory to consider how these 
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individuals envision a democratic society and why they perceive electoral politics to be 
its antithesis.  
  Although allusions to an Ambedkarite theory of democracy factor as a 
recurring element of VCK oratory, the frequency of these references has increased 
over recent years. For instance, during a May 2015 seminar organized by the Tamil 
Nadu Untouchability Eradication Front (TNUEF), a wing of the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist), or CPI(M), VCK General Secretary D. Ravikumar discussed what he 
perceived an unresolved tension between electoral politics and democracy. Ravikumar 
called our attention to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s premonition that India should not 
replicate the blueprint of western democracies, cautioning that such a model would 
foster communal, or sectarian, majoritarianism. Ravikumar stated: 
 
Prior to joining the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar shared his 
perspective on how the Indian Constitution should be designed. Among the 
insights that he shared, one idea is especially salient for India’s parliamentary 
democracy. Ambedkar declared, ‘In India, we should not establish a 
parliamentary democratic system mirroring those in western countries. Such a 
system is not suitable for us in the way that it vests authority in the hands of the 
majority. The majority community in western countries is a political majority – 
that is, it is established by individual preferences that are subject to change. 
Therefore, in those countries, the majority possesses an open quality. In 
contrast, the majority in India is not a political majority, but a communal 
majority. It is determined by birth; it does not change; it retains its closed 
quality.’ Ambedkar explained, ‘If we were to follow the blueprint of western 
nations here in India, it would vest power in the hands of a communal majority, 
resulting in dictatorship, in despotism. Therefore, the challenge before us lies in 
how we keep the majority in check.’124 
 
Ravikumar proceeded to argue that “communal majority” is, at once, an organizing 
principal of electoral politics as well as a primary obstacle to democracy. In his view, 
democracy must serve as a corrective force to electoral politics, tasked with checking 
the omnipresent potential for “a government of majority to transform into majoritarian 
rule.”125 
  Two weeks later, on June 9, 2015, VCK leaders convened a symposium prior 
to the coming Tamil Nadu Assembly Election that proposed a fresh approach to 
coalitions politics. Attracting leaders from a range of smaller political parties including 
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the Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M), 
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), 
and Manithaneya Makkal Katchi (MMK), or the Humanist People’s Party, an offshoot 
of the Tamil Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam (TMMK), or Tamil Muslim Progress 
Federation, the seminar critiqued the current approach to alliances and expounded a 
platform of shared governance intended to augment the stature of minority parties 
within state politics.126 Noting that electoral coalitions are formed solely on the basis of 
vote-sharing, VCK organizers beckoned smaller parties to consolidate themselves and 
pool their collective strength to press their hand and pressure their Dravidian 
counterparts into a more equitable distribution of political power. Henceforward, they 
would demand guarantees for kuṭṭarasu, or collective governance, as a prerequisite for 
alliance negotiations. In his speech, VCK Chairman Thol. Thirumaavalavan argued 
that the present approach to coalitions was misguided, charging that these efforts had 
sustained Dravidian rule without integrating allied parties in administration. Instead, 
he proposed that minority parties collectively leverage their vote-banks and stake a 
claim for post-poll governance as a precondition for electoral support.127 
  In his address, Thirumaavalavan offers a two-fold critique of electoral politics. 
On the one hand, as discussed earlier, he charged that electoral politics buttresses the 
traditional authority of the majority, which he alleged served to reinforce the 
customary dominance of backwards caste groups already entrenched in state power. 
Further, Thirumaavalavan questioned whether electoral democracy had, in fact, 
afforded greater opportunity for minority representatives to air grievances and 
generate ameliorative solutions for their community. To this end, he alluded to early 
arguments posed by Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) leaders when they wooed him to 
join their electoral coalition ahead of the 1999 Lok Sabha Election. At that time, Peter 
Alphonse, who was in attendance at the seminar, referred to the political career of 
Jagjivan Ram, arguing that Dalit leaders must integrate within the government in 
order to deliver concrete benefits to their constituents.128 With more than fifteen years 
having passed since these conversations took place on Marina Beach, 
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Thirumaavalavan disputed the degree to which Dalits have integrated into the political 
system, distinguishing electoral victory from political empowerment:  
 
In contemporary politics, in the present electoral system, marginalized 
communities remain unable to grasp political authority. There is no chance. 
Individuals may rise within the present system. Jagjivan Ram rose to the level 
of deputy minister. But, still, cheris (Dalit colonies) upon cheris continued to 
persist in the same state. In the political field, Thirumaavalavan, a Dalit hailing 
from an oppressed community, rose to the level of deputy minister. But, still, 
the cheris are set ablaze… Whether Dalit, Muslim, woman, or working class, an 
individual may secure a post in a political party and, through that, attain an 
official position; they may come into power. But, the society from which they 
hail continues to exist in a state of repression. It may be feasible in the current 
electoral system for such individuals to attain an official position, but it is not 
possible for their society to grasp political power.129 
 
Noting that a “ceiling” had been imposed by the electoral system, Thirumaavalavan 
proceeded to distinguish mere presence in government from influence in governance, that 
is, from a capacity to shape policy agendas and impact political outcomes. Citing 
Ambedkar, Thirumaavalavan argued that “minority empowerment,” deploying the 
English phrase, requires that minority representatives must enter government not only 
as elected officials, but also as authorities with sufficient latitude to make their 
presence felt.130 
  Though the idiom of “panmaivatta jananayagam”, or pluralist democracy, 
Thirumaavalavan points to an unresolved tension between what he terms the 
parliamentary electoral system and core democratic principles. “Democracy does not 
exist in the mere casting of a vote,” he emphasizes, “it requires the distribution of 
political authority among all the people.”131 “The present electoral system is opposed to 
democracy,” he states, because it successively installed oru katci aatci, or single party 
rule, in state governance, which, he alleges, is tantamount to “autocracy” and 
“despotism”—noting that political power had strictly changed hands between two 
party heads over the past five decades.132 Instead, Thirumaavalavan argues, 
“democracy is founded on pluralism,” which he interprets not only as a social precept, 
but also an organizing principle for governance.133 Presenting it as the jananayaga 
kadamai, or the democratic duty, of marginalized groups to break up the concentration 
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of state power, he argues, “The oppressed people must be transformed into a political 
force; that alone will sustain democracy; that alone will safeguard democracy… This is 
the struggle that lies before us.”134 Denoting an evolution of movement politics, he 
emphasizes that his party was no longer merely demanding the delivery of rights, but 
seeking to grasp authority and, therein, the capacity to deliver rights and wield 
influence in governance. Harkening back to his party’s inaugural parliamentary bid, he 
recalls, “In the 1999 General Election, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal raised the slogan, 
“kadaisi manidanukkum jananayagam; eliya makkalukkum adihaaram,” which translates, 
“Extend democracy to the very last person and authority even to the poorest people.” 
“This is not a mere political demand,” he stresses, “It’s theory.”135 
  To illustrate this point, Thirumaavalavan invokes an evocative metaphor of 
Dalit life-experience: temple entry struggles. “When we demand that our people enter 
a temple,” he says, “we do not view this only as rights-based struggle. It is also a 
demand for a share of authority—authority to administer the temple; authority to 
conduct festivals inside the temple; authority to worship gods inside of the temple.” 
Hence, temple entry is framed not strictly as a matter of rights, but as a component of 
a broader struggle to access points of authority and acquire a stake in state power. This 
example taps into a powerful idiom of Dalit experience and provides a suitable 
metaphor for political action—a struggle for authority that connects the temple board 
to the statehouse. Signaling an evolution of minority politics, Thirumaavalavan argues 
that the VCK is no longer only demanding rights, but staking a claim for an equitable 
share of political authority; that is, the capacity to administer rights, shape policy 
directives, and influence governance. He conveys this demand through a familiar 
idiom, beckoning Dalits to regard political authority as a material asset, or sottu, 
comparable to wealth and property. “We must view political authority as an asset,” he 
presses the audience, “Our people identify a house and a plot of land as an asset; we 
recognize that jewelry, livestock, and wealth are assets; Now, we must also regard 
political authority as an asset. It’s time to claim our share.”136 
 
Conclusion 
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In an early address on Voice of America, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar pondered, “Is there 
democracy in India or is there no democracy in India?”137 When formulating a 
response, he proposed that an answer in the affirmative is possible only if we were to 
equate democracy with a “Republic” or “Parliamentary Government.” Ambedkar 
countered the quotidian view in which “democracy is understood to be a political 
instrument and where this political instrument exists, there is democracy.” Instead, he 
opined, “The roots of democracy lie not in the form of Government, Parliamentary or 
otherwise. A democracy is more than a form of Government. It is primarily a mode of 
associated living. The roots of Democracy are to be searched in the social relationship, 
in the terms of associated life between the people who form a society.”138 The chief 
mandate of a democratic state, in his view, was to cultivate the conditions necessary to 
foster the realization of such a society. Upholding democracy as an alternative to a 
society structured around caste inequality, Ambedkar surmised that democracy had 
not yet taken root in post-Independence India, a viewpoint that endures in 
contemporary Dalit politics. 
  When movement organizers discuss their complicated tenure in electoral 
democracy, they concede that exigencies of electoral politics may have sapped their 
earlier radicalism and come at the expense of their movement’s prior disposition for 
robust Dalit advocacy. Whereas these individuals had once approached elections as a 
political platform to represent their concerns, the optimism characteristic of these early 
projections has visibly waned in recent years. While democracy continues to evoke 
appealing principles, electoral politics has proven of limited use in fulfilling the political 
aspirations of these leaders, who reminisce fondly on their pre-electoral politics and 
now question the utility of the electoral platform in representing their concerns. At the 
end of the 1990s, many VCK organizers envisioned electoral democracy as a battlefield 
that demarcated a new locus of political struggle, but, in the years that followed, they 
reassessed this early appraisal. In fact, their palpable anxiety of electoral politics today 
appears as if to have been presaged in an early slogan, “atikaaram aayutankalaal 
mattumalla, alakaana poykalaalum tannai nilai niruttikoliratu,” meaning, “Power 
establishes itself not only by weapons of war, but also through beautiful lies.”139 
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Although democracy projects a commanding idea that energizes their political 
program, party organizers have grown increasingly skeptical of its allure. 
  In my interviews and translation of party speeches, VCK organizers distinguish 
democracy from electoral politics, routinely pitting one against the other. Whereas 
they interpret electoral politics in terms of a majoritarian institution that operates with 
a quantitative logic, they argue that democracy is premised upon fundamental values 
that cannot operate independently from society. Party organizers articulate a view that 
casts democratic politics not strictly in terms of electoral procedures or formal 
institutions, but as a set of governing principles, namely rights, pluralism, and equality, 
with a popular mandate to vest real, and not merely nominal, authority in minority 
representatives. In our private conversations as well as their public oratory, my 
interlocutors conveyed their interpretation of democracy through a familiar idiom that 
taps into popular sentiments and ratchets up the expectations of their Dalit supporters. 
In speeches, they project democracy as an evolving struggle, selectively drawing on its 
political imaginary and potent social vocabulary to mobilize their community and 
ignite popular aspirations. Although VCK politicians may have tasted only marginal 
electoral success, their politics has undoubtedly heightened Dalit expectations, which 
are unlikely to subside in the future.140 
  Whereas this chapter has explored how VCK organizers recall their firsthand 
experience of electoral politics and why they perceive its present form as antithetical to 
“genuine democracy,” the following chapter provides an ethnographic account of 
electoral competition, drawing upon fieldwork from the campaign trail where I tailed 
VCK General Secretary D. Ravikumar amidst his parliamentary bid during the 2014 
Lok Sabha Election. As such, it provides an ethnographic vantage point from which to 
consider how the VCK experiences coalition politics and navigates the contested 
terrain of an election campaign. In particular, Chapter Five considers how caste, to 
which direct electoral appeals are banned by the Election Commission of India (ECI) 
as stated in the Model Code of Conduct for Elections, surfaces during the election campaign 
to inform vote-canvassing strategies, shape political rhetoric, and structure a division 
of campaign labor. In effect, I present instances where direct electoral participation 
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appears to silence the voices often presumed to be ‘surging’ within India’s expanding 
democratic arena and investigate what this may bring to bear on our study of minority 
representation in modern democracies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Expressing Reservation: 
Representation, Reservations, and an Election Campaign 
 
Introduction 
Amidst the 2014 General Election, VCK parliamentary candidate D. Ravikumar 
stands atop an open-air jeep barreling down rickety rural roads linking disparate 
villages across Tiruvallur District of northern Tamil Nadu. Today, an impressive 
entourage flanks his campaign vehicle, including roughly twenty-five SUVs followed 
by a sea of motorcycles with, of course, monitors from the Election Commission of 
India (ECI) nipping at their heels. This particular afternoon, the caravan loses its way 
and a wrong turn ushers the convoy into the neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh. The 
mistake becomes evident when a polite bystander informs the candidate’s driver that 
he is, in fact, no longer in Tamil Nadu. The candidate’s mic is cut mid-speech once 
DMK party leaders have been informed of the predicament. The navigator is cursed as 
engines roar to life and the caravan lurches back towards Tamil Nadu. A mounting 
anxiety is palpable due to the sheer number of villages left to visit before ECI 
monitors, frequently lurking nearby, bring the day’s activities to a screeching halt at 
10:00pm; sharp. But, if a village is omitted, there is a prevalent concern that local 
leaders waiting with firecrackers and shawls may interpret their absence as a political 
affront and reappraise their allegiance to the candidate. 
 Engulfed in a two-week blitz across Tiruvallur District, the motley caravan of 
rugged jeeps, SUVs, motorcycles, and auto-rickshaws (vehicles vary by the day 
depending on local terrain) traverses half a legislative assembly constituency per diem. 
As parliamentary districts typically consist of six legislative assembly constituencies, 
this entails twelve grueling days of dawn-till-dusk electioneering during which the 
candidate greets voters across the district. Electioneering begins by 8 or 9am and 
concludes promptly at 10pm; that is, when election monitors are visible. A festive 
atmosphere welcomes their entrance in remote villages and congested urban areas 
alike: crackers burst to announce the entourage’s imminent arrival, the caravan halts 
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anywhere from thirty seconds to fifteen minutes depending upon the size and electoral 
significance of the area, during which the candidate and DMK leaders accept and 
bestow a reciprocal economy of shawls with local organizers and address the crowd. 
Then, just as Ravikumar clasps his hands in the ‘vanakkam’ gesture to entreat the local 
community for their support, he abruptly sets off for the next destination. Impromptu 
delays impede our progress along the way; the candidate faints in the scorching 
midday heat; the PA system’s battery dies and cannot be resuscitated despite a party 
engineer’s most animated antics; a residence catches fire due to an ornery cracker as 
party workers scatter to fetch water and extinguish the blaze. 
 When D. Ravikumar, a Viduthalai Chiruthaigal General Secretary, invited me to 
accompany him on the campaign trail, I readily obliged. I was engulfed amidst the final 
stages of dissertation fieldwork and keen to observe what is often regarded as the 
quintessential democratic exercise: the election campaign. In India, campaigns are 
multifaceted endeavors that often run the gamut from the mundane to the extra-legal, 
encompassing door-to-door canvassing and direct cash distribution to voters. In this 
chapter, I provide an ethnography of electoral participation to shed light on challenges 
confronting minority representation in electoral democracy, examining how the 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal experiences an election campaign as small player in a powerful 
coalition. In particular, the chapter examines how caste, to which direct electoral 
appeals are banned under The Model Code of Conduct governing elections, manifests on 
the campaign trail to inform vote-canvassing strategies, shape political rhetoric, and 
structure a marked division of campaign labor. The parliamentary campaign entailed a 
continuous bracketing of persons and interests that re-inscribes the boundaries of 
political community, a public enactment of who can speak and on what issues. While 
democratic politics is frequently expressed through a discourse of popular sovereignty 
and the idiom of a common good, a view from the campaign trail enables us to envision 
how election campaigns may compound existing forms of inequality and provides a 
window into how electoral participation sometimes works to silence the very voices 
presumed to be ‘surging’ in India’s expanding democratic arena. 
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India’s Silenced Revolution? 
In the late twentieth century, lower caste voters redrew the contours of democratic 
politics in modern India. Following the initial submission (1980) and partial 
implementation (1990) of the Mandal Commission Report, the 1990s experienced 
what Yogendra Yadav heralded as “a new phase of democratic politics.”1 He observed:  
 
Although overall turnout figures have not increased dramatically, the social 
composition of those who vote and take part in political activities has 
undergone a major change. There is a participatory upsurge among the socially 
underprivileged, whether seen in terms of caste hierarchy, economic class, 
gender distinction or the rural-urban divide.2 
 
Corroborating Yadav’s account, Zoya Hasan similarly detected “a dramatic upsurge in 
political participation,” which she discerned particularly “among the socially 
underprivileged in the caste and class hierarchy.”3 Next, Christophe Jaffrelot 
examined how these trends altered the social composition of state assemblies and the 
national parliament. Borrowing an expression from ex-Prime Minister V. P. Singh, 
Jaffrelot trumpeted a “silent revolution,” referring to a mostly peaceful transition of 
political authority whereby “plebeians” began to dislodge an entrenched, upper caste 
elite from elected office.4 When taken together, these scholars captured a seminal 
moment in the history of Indian democracy, tracing a fundamental transformation in 
the social composition of elected representatives, which they conveyed through an 
ostensibly optimistic lexicon, an admixture of “silent revolution,” “democratic 
upsurge,” and “democratic revolution.” 
 In recent years, renewed debate has scrutinized the merits of descriptive 
representation, or when representatives ‘mirror’ key attributes of those represented, 
prompting some scholars to reconsider the often sanguine tenor characteristic of 
earlier work on the subject. In particular, these scholars interrogated the limitations of 
descriptive representation, often citing as evidence instances where institutions 
promoting descriptive representation such as electoral reservations had failed to 
ameliorate chronic deprivation among its presumed beneficiaries. Recently, Niraja 
Jayal bemoaned what she calls a “fetishization of representation,” contending that 
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institutions of descriptive representation, which she terms ‘mirror’ or ‘microcosmic’ 
representation’, have hitherto failed to address enduring inequalities facing India’s 
most disadvantaged communities.5 Referring specifically to the Scheduled Castes and 
Schedule Tribes, Jayal writes: 
 
Institutional quotas appear to have failed to substantively address the 
disadvantages that mark the condition of the vast majority belonging to 
disadvantaged social groups. The persistence of poor human development 
indicators for disadvantaged groups is clear testimony to the fact that greater 
opportunities for expressing grievances have not led to material improvement.6 
 
In sum, Jayal contends that the ostensible ‘democratization’ of elected bodies including 
state assemblies and the national parliament has failed to generate substantive gains for 
India’s most downtrodden communities, who continue to lag behind in key 
development indices.  
 Curiously, Jayal’s account stops well short of querying why current institutions 
designed to promote minority representation appear inept to ameliorate chronic 
material inequalities among India’s most downtrodden communities. Moreover, she 
offers little by way of evidence to support her claim that electoral reservations have 
actually afforded “greater opportunities for expressing grievances.”7 Further, does this 
necessarily signal an inherent failure of institutions of compensatory representation or 
merely point to shortcomings in the existing framework? In a recent essay, Rupa 
Viswanath, pace Jayal, observes that critiques of political reservations often pivot on a 
similar line of argumentation, noting that despite the presence of such institutions, 
their presumed beneficiaries continue to lag behind in most development indicators.8 
This, some critics suggest, signals the failure of descriptive representation or, as Jayal 
argues, of electoral reservations.9 In response, Viswanath proposes that we interrogate 
why Dalit representatives sometimes fail to deliver substantive benefits to their 
community and encourages us to examine the constraints under which they operate. 
Her position is supported by others who have studied the political careers of Dalit 
elected politicians.10   
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 Prior to deliberating the effectiveness of institutions providing for minority 
representation, I suggest that we investigate the processes whereby these 
representatives are selected.11 While studies have scrutinized the democratic formation 
of caste organizations and their subsequent politics, often highlighting the ability (or 
lack thereof) of such parties to gain preferential access to state resources, less attention 
has considered the campaign itself, that is, the primary hurdle separating democratic 
integration from political empowerment.12 Moreover, whereas academic scholarship 
has surveyed the changing landscape of democratic politics in detail, less attention has 
been paid to this “silent revolution” vis-à-vis a parallel, disquieting growth in gross 
electoral expenditure. At a time when social minorities exercise their franchise at an 
unprecedented rate, campaign spending has risen sharply from one election cycle to 
the next. Estimates provided by the Centre for Media Studies (CMS) project that 
aggregate spending in parliamentary elections more than doubled from 2004 to 2009, 
rising from ₹4,500 to ₹10,000 crore, before tripling to a staggering ₹30,000 crore, or 
nearly US $5 billion, in 2014.13 And, as M.V. Rajeev Gowda and E. Sridharan observe, 
political parties appear to have responded to rising campaign expenditure with a 
penchant for fielding wealthy “crorepati” candidates able to self-finance their 
campaigns and pad party coffers.14 Although expenditure does not outright determine 
electoral outcomes, politicians recognize the impact of what is known colloquially as 
“money power,” affirming that viable candidates must cross a spending threshold. 
 This chapter contributes an ethnographic account of electoral participation to 
our study of minority representation, examining how VCK candidates experience an 
election campaign in a reserved constituency. Reserved constituencies, which produce 
the overwhelming majority of Dalit representatives in India, are a remarkably 
constrictive affair for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal. First, the chapter investigates how 
Dalit politicians, who most often lack independent access to critical sources of election 
finance, mobilize sufficient resources to fund a competitive campaign. And, second, it 
considers how these fiscal constraints affect the democratic participation of Dalit 
parties in India today. To explore this topic with ethnographic detail, I draw upon 
conversations with party organizers and vignettes from the campaign trail to consider 
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electoral processes by which Dalit representatives are selected, investigating the 
impact of “money power” on electoral procedures before examining how election 
campaigns navigate the question of caste. As we shall see, while financial constraints 
incentivize parties like the VCK to join coalitions spearheaded by more their 
established counterparts, these arrangements do not strictly entail a quid pro quo 
exchange of vote-banks for financial resources and vote-canvassing support, but entail 
complex negotiations that may affect candidate selection and set the terms of 
democratic participation. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The following chapter examines tensions between coalition politics, election 
campaigns, and political representation in modern India, placing ethnography from the 
2014 General Election in conversation with personal interviews taken with Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal organizers, both on the campaign trail and over the past eight years (2009-
2016). Foremost, the chapter draws upon ethnographic fieldwork on the campaign 
trail of the 2014 Lok Sabha Election where I tailed D. Ravikumar throughout his 
parliamentary bid. In supplement to the ethnography, I incorporate a wide breadth of 
primary and secondary materials that were circulated during the campaign, including 
election handbills, political pamphlets, media reports, and materials provided directly 
to party representatives by the Election Commission of India (ECI). The chapter 
examines how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal candidates experience an election campaign in a 
reserved parliamentary constituency, illustrating how party organizers navigate the 
uneven physical, fiscal, and social terrain of electoral competition. An account of an 
election campaign in reserved constituency, that is, a contest in which only Dalits may 
contest, uncovers how caste, to which direct electoral appeals are banned under the 
Model Code of Conduct for Elections, surfaces on the campaign trail to structure vote-
canvassing strategies, political rhetoric, and a division of campaign labor.  
  The chapter opens with an overview of coalition politics and election finance in 
Tamil Nadu, assessing why smaller parties such as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal have 
most often relied on the financial and organizational support of erstwhile political 
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rivals. While existing scholarship has extensively mined psephological data to explore 
the dynamics of caste in electoral politics, little more than anecdotal evidence has been 
offered to convey how these new political actors respond to the costs of electoral 
competition and what this brings to bear on minority representation in Tamil Nadu, a 
state reputed to host to some of the country’s most expensive election campaigns. 
Fiscal constraints not only affect the nature of political practice, rendering smaller 
parties reliant on more established counterparts, but also set the terms of electoral 
participation. In exchange for leveraging their support behind allied partners, the 
coalition leader finances and administers the campaigns of allied parties, extending 
critical vote-canvassing expertise and marshalling its extensive infrastructure in 
support of their candidates. This opening section provides a general overview of 
campaign finance in Tamil Nadu and outlines financial aspects of coalition politics 
before turning to ethnographic fieldwork from the 2014 Lok Sabha Election. Due to the 
sensitive nature of these conversations, I have protected the confidentiality of my 
sources. 
 Next, the chapter presents three vignettes drawn from the campaign trail in 
order to explore how party organizers and candidates navigate the conflicts occasioned 
by electoral competition. First, I present an account of coalition formation, examining 
an instance when seat sharing talks went awry and tensions spilled beyond the 
bargaining table into public streets. Second, I attend to the visual spectacle of an urban 
procession, assessing how the VCK is publicly represented during the rally. In doing 
so, I bring into focus how the VCK is often physically present without necessarily being 
visually represented amidst electioneering practices and examine how a conflict in 
interests affects cooperation between coalition partners. Third, I shift our attention to 
vote-canvassing strategies to shed light on how caste informs political rhetoric and 
structures a marked division of campaign labor. These vignettes illustrate how 
electioneering strategies consist of a constant bracketing of persons and interests, a 
public enactment of who can speak and on what issues that, in effect, reifies the 
boundaries of the political community. In providing a viewpoint drawn from the 
campaign trail, I consider why election campaigns features among the most stifling 
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moments for Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers, sometimes even rendering them, as 
Ravikumar quips, “mute spectators” of their own campaigns.15 
 In conclusion, the chapter conveys how Viduthalai Chiruthaigal leaders envision 
the system of electoral reservations, conveying their perspectives as to why the current 
approach stipulates compromises that ultimately undercut the capacity of elected Dalit 
representatives to advocate for their community’s concerns. Alluding to the thoughts of 
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on democratic politics and minority representation, VCK 
organizers reflect on why Dalit representatives often appear inept to generate 
ameliorative solutions for their community. They discuss constraints under which 
Dalit representatives are currently selected and offer an alternative view of “true 
representation,” which they denote by syntax, emphasizing that robust minority 
representation cannot be ensured through the mere selection of representatives from 
minority communities, but must provide an institutional framework that enables them 
to function as representatives of minority communities. The chapter provides an 
ethnographic study of electoral participation, investigating how VCK candidates 
experience an election campaign in a reserved constituency and what this perspective 
reveals about the challenge of providing for robust minority political representation in 
modern democracy. 
 
Navigating Fiscal Constraints 
Just prior to the 2014 Lok Sabha Election, I met with Gowthama Sannah, VCK 
Propaganda Secretary, in his shared office at Madras High Court. Casually perched 
on a rolling chair seated across a cluttered desk, his silhouette is set against a towering 
bookshelf featuring an archive of legal volumes intermixed with the conspicuous blue 
tomes of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s writings and speeches.16 “Our democracy is very 
expensive,” he says as he leans forward across a wooden desk cluttered with legal 
cases.17 Sannah continues, “For a developing party like ours, money is a critical factor 
when fighting elections and a shortage of funds compels us to align with more 
established parties,” referring to the Dravidian parties. “We have worked hard to 
consolidate our people,” he claims, “but we lack sufficient resources to contest 
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elections on our own and this deficit poses a key dilemma.” In response to these 
financial limitations, Sannah discloses, “We have come to depend upon Dravidian 
parties. They have been in power and possess ample resources, enjoy wider financial 
networks, and draw upon a much broader economic base.” Ruing this dependency, 
Sannah stresses that Dravidian parties provide necessary campaign resources, 
monetary and otherwise, that bolster the prospects of VCK candidates. “We hold clear 
principles,” he asserts, “but, frankly speaking, principles do not necessarily sell in such 
an expensive system.” “Electoral victory is critical for running a party,” he continues, 
“Once you enter electoral politics, you must win elections. If you fail to do so, you 
cannot survive.” 
  Election campaigns in Tamil Nadu are extravagant affairs reputed to be among 
the costliest in the country, but assessments of gross electoral expenditure are 
inherently imprecise as money flows into campaigns in staggered phases and from 
multiple sources. Electioneering commences well in advance of the notification period, 
that is when the Election Commission of India (ECI) fixes polling dates and begins to 
monitor candidate expenditure. Prior to notification, Dravidian parties ink lucrative 
contracts with public relations firms and media consultants to gear up for the polls.18 
For example, DMK Treasurer M. K. Stalin launched his “Namakku Naame” (We for 
Ourselves) yatra, a well-choreographed journey that traversed all 234 assembly 
constituencies and addressed crores of voters, nearly a full year ahead of the 2016 state 
assembly elections. In local villages, Dravidian parties and their prospective candidates 
sponsor religious festivals and community fairs, organizing sporting matches alongside 
artistic and literary competitions, dispersing cash awards and prizes to participants.19 
As the campaign machinery begins to hum, political organizers distribute party attire 
such as banyans, saris, towels, dhotis, and mufflers among cadre, form booth-level 
planning committees, and cross-check voter lists to identify core and swing voters, a 
move said to facilitate cash distribution just prior to polling. 
  While the floodgates open well ahead of polling, spending intensifies once the 
ECI fixes polling dates and candidates file nomination papers. In Tamil Nadu, 
Dravidian parties ply voters with cash, gifts, and alcohol during the campaign and woo 
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public support with ‘freebie’-filled manifestos financed by tax revenue. In recent years, 
promises ranged from consumer electronics, including mobile telephones and personal 
computers, to kitchenware, livestock, bicycles, and gold coins.20 Moreover, the day-to-
day expenses incurred by a campaign require significant investment. Candidates 
traverse their constituencies in sprawling motorcades and host mega-rallies that may 
attract tens of thousands of supporters, a majority of whom are paid to attend. 
Whereas VCK candidates estimate that a budget campaign requires a minimum 
expenditure of ₹50,000 per diem to meet basic expenses and keep cadre on the ground, 
they project that Dravidian parties often spend upwards of ₹1 crore per week. In fact, 
a VCK General Secretary contends that it is not uncommon for major parties and their 
candidates to collectively spend ₹5 crore in an assembly segment and ₹25 - ₹30 crore 
per parliamentary constituency to cover campaign costs ranging from food and wages 
(batta) for party cadre, rally expenses, vehicle hire, petrol, salaries for booth agents, 
and what is sometimes referred to as “influence money,” cash payments doled out to 
entrepreneurs in rival parties, neighborhood and caste associations, and religious 
institutions.21  
  Then, there is the question of cash distribution, which is often glossed in media 
accounts as “bribing” or “vote-buying.”22 Although the practice dates back to the early 
post-Independence period, the salience of cash in state elections surged from the early 
2000s.23 First, during a 2003 by-election, AIADMK party allegedly flooded rural 
pockets in Santhakulam assembly segment with cash and gifts.24 Then, in a survey of 
the 2006 Tamil Nadu Assembly Election, the Center for Media Studies (CMS) 
estimated that cash distribution had reached nearly 40 percent of the electorate, 
although political insiders informed me that, in 2006, Dravidian parties concentrated 
cash distribution among known party supporters in an effort to retain existing vote-
banks and in select swing constituencies where they hoped to tilt the scales in their 
favor.25 But this all changed in 2009 when DMK operatives upped the ante during a 
state assembly by-election in Thirumangalam, where they reportedly covered the 
entire constituency with cash, distributing newspapers stuffed with ₹5,000 per vote in 
what has since been dubbed the “Thirumangalam Formula.”26 Although this sum could 
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not be replicated at a statewide level, the DMK’s inaugural attempt at blanket cash 
distribution signaled a new normal in Tamil Nadu politics. In recent years, Dravidian 
parties have fine-tuned their cadre-based cash distribution networks, which are said to 
reach a substantial majority of registered voters.27 
  Although media pundits and politicians alike readily concede that election 
campaigns are a costly affair, the sheer depth of their extravagance remains an open 
question. Not only does money flow into campaigns in staggered phases and from 
multiple levels in the party structure, but expenditure varies according to what my 
respondents refer to as “candidate capacity” and, moreover, depends on the strategic 
value and competitiveness of a constituency. Following the 2016 Tamil Nadu 
Assembly Election, one political commentator averred that Dravidian parties must 
have collectively dispersed a bare minimum of ₹1,000 crore in cash payouts directly to 
voters, whereas another pundit notched this figure between ₹6,000 and ₹9,000 crore.28 
Of course, both figures pertain solely to cash distribution and exclude costs incurred 
by campaign activity. When I raised the matter with a prominent VCK official, he 
stated confidently that Dravidian parties may spend upwards of ₹10 crore apiece in 
assembly segments and as much as ₹50-60 crore in parliamentary contests, all-
inclusive figures that corroborate those reported by media outlets.29 Commenting on 
how Dravidian parties muster profuse resources, he relates, “Dravidian parties collect 
an election fund prior to elections. They first gather donations among their own party 
members that generate crores worth of rupees and then amass far greater wealth upon 
soliciting contributions from corporates, media conglomerates, and industry.”30 
Moreover, both parties rely upon “crorepati” candidates who finance the bulk of their 
own expenses. 
  Lacking political leaders of comparable means as well as independent access to 
key sources of election finance, the VCK has relied foremost on electoral coalitions 
with Dravidian parties to bankroll its campaigns. In exchange for the support of allied 
parties such as VCK, Dravidian financiers shoulder the lion’s share of campaign 
expenditure, covering costs related to coalition propaganda, print and digital 
advertising, vehicle and equipment hire, political rallies, food, transportation, daily 
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batta (informal wages) for party cadre, and additional day-to-day expenses incurred by 
campaign activity. Further, the Dravidian patron administers the campaigns of allied 
candidates, extending extensive party infrastructure and vote canvassing expertise. 
Although Dravidian parties may earmark crores of rupees to finance the campaigns of 
allied partners, this cash circulates through its own party infrastructure, requiring 
allied partners to remunerate their cadre and finance party-specific expenses. In effect, 
Dravidian benefactors commission their party apparatus to finance and administer 
allied campaigns, extending critical expertise in vote canvassing, marshalling their 
party infrastructure, and supplying cadre for electioneering work. Many of these 
expenses are remunerated in a closed feedback loop through lucrative contracts 
awarded to businesses associated with the party.31 
  In our conversations, former VCK candidates commented on coalition finance 
with marked candor, acknowledging the importance of financial support yet cognizant 
of the compromises entailed. For example, a former assembly candidate recounted his 
failed 2011 bid, recalling:  
 
In 2001, the DMK supplied ₹1 crore to support our [assembly] 
campaigns. In 2006, the AIADMK supported us during assembly 
elections and then, in 2011, we contested alongside DMK. In 2011, the 
DMK allocated ₹2 crore to finance my [assembly] campaign, but this 
sum was managed strictly by DMK office bearers under the category of 
my election expense. Every day, they may disburse some ₹5,000 directly 
to me for canvassing activities, fuel, posters, and related expenses, but 
they alone administer my election fund. On a daily basis, they may 
circulate ₹10 lakh among their party cadre for vehicles, fuel, food, 
propaganda, batta (daily wages), and other expenses. 
 
Despite the coalition-leading party allocating a handsome sum to finance their 
campaigns, VCK candidates nonetheless shoulder a share of the burden. They 
remunerate VCK cadre, purchase party-specific propaganda (i.e., handbills, flags, 
posters, etc.), and cover miscellaneous expenses incurred by day-to-day activities that 
are not channeled through the leading party. Casting a wry grin, the candidate shrugs 
off the irony that despite strong financial backing he nonetheless accrued personal 
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debts. He quips, “Even though ₹2 crore had been allocated to finance my campaign, I 
had to sell my personal vehicle to raise funds to cover my expenses!” 
  Rather than an isolated case, this personal anecdote corroborates accounts 
shared by other party candidates. For instance, when another former candidate recalls 
that AIADMK allocated a generous sum to finance his 2006 assembly bid, he confirms 
that its office bearers alone strictly managed the money, dispersing funds through a 
combination of personal and party networks, with the district secretary serving as the 
primary conduit. He recounts, “In 2006, AIADMK spent the money through its own 
party structure; AIADMK office bearers handled all the expenditure. Although their 
party provided substantial support to alliance partners such as myself, AIADMK 
leaders managed the money themselves and, as alliance partners, we also bore many of 
our own expenses.” To supplement the financial assistance of the AIADMK, the 
candidate mobilized an additional ₹17 lakh through a combination of party funds, 
personal sources, and external contributions, yet he recalls having been saddled with 
considerable post-poll debt. Pointing to the irony of campaign finance regulations, he 
grins when he confirms that even his personal spending, which amounted to a fraction 
of his AIADMK financier, exceeded the ceiling fixed by the Election Commission of 
India (ECI). Unfamiliar with the precise limit at that time, he fumbles for the figure, 
“The expenditure limit may have been around ₹8 lakh. Actually, it was probably ₹5 or 
₹6 lakh; I don’t recall.”32  
  Despite financial support from allied parties, VCK organizers admit that 
monetary concerns factor among the “important criteria” taken into account when 
selecting party candidates, even stating a preference for “economically developed 
candidates.” “Can this person spend for their campaign?” one organizer asks 
rhetorically, before adding, “If so, he will have an edge in a tight race.” “When we 
select candidates,” another party leader adds, “we ideally seek individuals with their 
own financial means; those who own a car and can spend on their own without 
expecting party money.” Yet, what some party leaders describe as a pragmatic 
accommodation of “money power” has generated resentment among the party’s rank 
and file who, following decades of committed activism, today feel shunted by party 
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organizers when their candidacy applications are bypassed in favor of wealthier 
aspirants. Longtime cadre contend that the party’s nouveau riche joined only after 
Thirumaavalavan dissolved the party structure in 2007 and conducted a fresh 
membership drive designed to court non-Dalits and religious minorities in an effort to 
broaden its social base, eschew the ‘Dalit’ label, and lend credence to its self-
designation as a common party of “democratic forces.”33 But, friction between 
grassroots activists from lower class backgrounds and the recent tier of middle and 
upper-middle class office bearers has grown more pronounced in recent years.34 
  The financial hurtle of electoral competition provides a perennial challenge for 
Tamil Nadu’s largest Dalit party, which has typically relied on election coalitions to 
finance its campaigns. As we have seen, Dravidian coalitions provide allied parties 
with the financial, organizational, and technical support necessary to administer 
competitive election campaigns. Moreover, these electoral arrangements enable them 
to ‘piggyback’ in other areas of expenditure including print and televised media, 
statewide political marketing, and digital canvassing efforts. However, although 
monetary concerns incentivize electoral coalitions, these arrangements do not strictly 
entail a quid pro quo exchange of vote banks for financial support and campaign 
assistance because, as principal financiers, Dravidian parties set the terms of electoral 
participation. Commenting on the predicament faced by small parties, a leading figure 
in the Tamil Nadu Congress stressed, “Any small party that enters this electoral 
system, whether a caste-oriented or regional outfit, must find their way through the 
Dravidian parties simply to win a few seats in parliament or the state assembly.”35 The 
next section provides ethnographic insight into how smaller parties such as the VCK 
navigate tensions that arise through electoral competition. 
 
2014 Lok Sabha Election 
Across four weeks, I accompanied VCK General Secretary D. Ravikumar throughout 
his parliamentary bid in Tiruvallur District of northern Tamil Nadu. The following 
vignettes afford ethnographic insight into electoral competition, examining how VCK 
candidates experience an election campaign from within a major coalition and 
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attending to tensions that surface amidst electioneering procedures. In the following 
section, I examine instances where direct electoral participation sometimes appears to 
silence the voices often presumed to be ‘surging’ in India’s ever-expanding democratic 
arena, exploring political negotiations and inter-party occasioned by electoral 
competition. The section opens with an account of coalition formation, describing an 
instance where seat sharing talks went awry and tensions spilled beyond the 
bargaining table into the vernacular press and public streets. Next, the paper unpacks 
two vignettes from the campaign trail, opening with an account of a mass urban 
procession followed by a description of day-to-day vote canvassing procedures. 
Drawing on ethnography from the 2014 Lok Sabha Election, these vignettes afford 
ethnographic insight into how Dalit candidates representing autonomous political 
parties experience an election campaign in a reserved constituency and navigate the 
disputes that arise through coalition politics. 
 
Assembling the Cast 
On March 6, 2014, the VCK inked a seat sharing deal with the DMK for the 
forthcoming parliamentary contest.36 In the previous 2009 Lok Sabha Election, the 
DMK allotted two seats to the VCK, Chidambaram and Villupuram constituencies, of 
which the party won the first handily by nearly one-lakh votes while suffering a 
narrow defeat in the latter, coming up short by less than half of a percentage point.37 In 
2014, VCK organizers sought to increase their yield, requesting five parliamentary 
constituencies: four seats across its stronghold in the northern districts of Tamil Nadu 
along with Dharmapuri in the western districts where recent anti-Dalit violence had 
effectively polarized the electorate and consolidated the Dalit vote-bank.38 While the 
VCK did not realistically expect to reap all five seats, it anticipated brokering a deal for 
three or, at the very least, retaining its previous allotment of two ‘winnable’ seats. 
Instead, the DMK extended a solitary seat, Chidambaram, where VCK Chairman 
Thirumaavalavan served as the presiding Member of Parliament (MP).39 After 
protracted albeit futile negotiations, VCK organizers begrudgingly accepted the 
DMK’s offer.40 Why had they settled for less? 
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 Days earlier, the AIADMK expelled the beleaguered communist parties, CPI 
and CPI(M), from its electoral coalition.41 In what many speculated to be an ill-advised 
bout of hubris but was later recognized as political genius, the AIADMK released an 
unprecedented declaration that it would contest the elections across Tamil Nadu and 
Pondicherry independently without brokering seat-sharing arrangements with allied 
partners.42 Wary that the DMK might embrace the exiled Communists as prodigal 
sons, thereby prompting its own exodus from the coalition, the VCK reluctantly 
accepted the DMK’s proposal.43 This, VCK organizers acknowledged, was less than 
ideal, but they emphasized that a growing party such as theirs relies upon financial 
support as well as campaign assistance from an affluent, established party in order to 
conduct competitive campaigns.44 Unsatisfied with the DMK’s offer yet lacking viable 
alternatives, the VCK signed the seat sharing deal, accepting the solitary seat. 
 Much to the chagrin of DMK party leaders, this pronouncement incensed a 
sizeable portion of VCK cadre who interpreted the paltry offer as an affront to the 
party’s rising popularity, with some individuals even going so far as to dub the affair an 
instance of “political untouchability.” In pockets across the state’s northern districts, 
VCK activists, likely at the behest of district leaders who harbored electoral ambitions, 
ripped DMK flags from flagpoles and effaced metal placards affixed to their 
pedestals.45 At crowded intersections in Villupuram and Tindivanam, VCK supporters 
staged road rokos (blockages) and set ablaze effigies of DMK Chairman M. 
Karunanidhi as well as his son M. K. Stalin, DMK Treasurer and presumed heir-in-
waiting.46 Ushering the protest into print media, a media savvy VCK organizer 
facilitated an interview between party chairman Thirumaavalavan and Dinamalar, a 
popular Tamil daily, arranging for the article to run adjacent to a bolded caption 
proclaiming, “We are ready to contest alone.” The DMK, whose Democratic 
Progressive Alliance touted strong support from minorities, particularly Dalits and 
Muslims, mollified the situation by allotting a second seat, Tiruvallur District situated 
just north of Chennai and bordering Andhra Pradesh.47 
 The DMK surrendered Tiruvallur, in part, because party leadership forecast 
dim prospects in the constituency. Despite losing the previous Lok Sabha election in the 
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constituency by a slim margin, recent intra-party squabbles had fractured the DMK’s 
district administration into warring camps with little chance for pre-poll 
reconciliation.48 Short on alternatives, the VCK, which altogether lacked a grassroots 
presence in Tiruvallur, accepted the seat on condition that the DMK finance both 
campaigns.49 With the coalition assembled, the VCK understood that it faced an uphill 
battle in Tiruvallur, where it hoped to stitch together a collage of Ambedkarite 
organizations strewn across the district, all the while relying on DMK office bearers to 
mobilize their cadre and influence behind the VCK candidate. Mindful that an 
unprecedented five-front electoral contest would soon engulf Tamil Nadu, VCK 
leaders exuded cautious optimism on their prospects of winning both seats and, 
thereby, securing recognition from the Election Commission of India (ECI), but 
remained cognizant that their party could just as easily draw a blank, as it eventually 
did. 
  In private conversations, VCK organizers acknowledge that their party relies 
upon financial support to face elections, pointing to the previous Lok Sabha contest as 
emblematic of how fiscal constraints impact election time decision-making. After 
reviewing internal nominations for the party’s second seat in 2009, VCK leaders 
expressed concern that current office bearers did not possess the financial clout 
necessary to finance a parliamentary campaign in Villupuram. Upon soliciting external 
nominations, the party initially fielded S. P. Velayudham, a party outsider and real 
estate mogul who pledged to spend generously, but VCK leadership rescinded his 
candidacy following media reports that detailed an ongoing inquiry by the Central 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into an alleged land scam to the tune of ₹171-crore.50 
Pressed for time, the VCK fielded K. Swamidurai, a retired Madras High Court justice 
and known DMK sympathizer, on the final day of nominations.51 Describing the 
eleventh-hour nomination, party insiders profess that they selected the retired justice, a 
party outsider, at the behest of DMK leaders in exchange for, according to multiple 
sources, “more generous campaign support.” One VCK leader, who stated his 
displeasure for the nomination without reservation, nonetheless underscored the 
 
 
233 
pragmatic need to field a wealthy candidate, recalling, “At the time, we felt that we 
could only win with money on our side.” 
 Viewed against this backdrop, the 2014 Lok Sabha Election signaled 
improvement for some cadre as both candidates, Thirumaavalavan and Ravikumar, are 
respected, core party leaders rather than outside nominees. Still, the consequences of 
financial constraints on the party’s electoral participation provided a recurring motif in 
our conversations. Former party candidates acknowledge that their party, a relative 
newcomer in India’s expanding democratic arena, relies heavily on financial support 
from established parties to finance its campaigns. Estimating a baseline expenditure, 
they project that, when supported by an affluent coalition partner, party candidates 
should nonetheless spend between ₹50 lakh and ₹1 crore to finance a parliamentary 
campaign. Despite underscoring the prominent role of what they refer to in English as 
“money power,” they nevertheless recognize that their challenges exceed economic 
constraints. While the financial imperative of a competitive election campaign plays an 
important role, the VCK’s challenges exceed well beyond economic means and are 
rendered visible through tensions that surface during campaign execution, to which I 
will now turn. 
 
Negotiating Allies 
On the morning of April 13, 2014, I accompany Ravikumar to the local office of S. M. 
Nasar, the burly, loquacious chairman of Avadi municipality. His smile radiates from 
beneath wire-rimmed spectacles when he boasts that this municipality, his 
municipality, is the largest in Asia, an apparent hyperbole. He hails from political 
pedigree, an established lineage of DMK office bearers, and, on the side, controls an 
expanding share of Tiruvallur’s garment exporting business, fulfilling contracts and 
dispatching brand-name merchandise including Armani and Billabong across the 
globe. Recently, Nasar diversified his business portfolio to include brick kilns, thereby 
joining an already sizeable list of DMK organizers with a firm foothold in the district’s 
burgeoning construction industry. Considering Tiruvallur’s strategic location in 
northern Tamil Nadu encompassing the industrialized outskirts of north Chennai 
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replete with defense manufacturing, industrial production, and special economic zones 
(SEZs), construction provides a constant stream of revenue, aside from when it stalls 
during election campaigns.52 
 Today, Nasar will parade his prestige through the crowded streets of urban 
Avadi, publicly conveying his support for Ravikumar’s candidacy while also displaying 
the sheer depth of his political clout, and, not to mention, keenly reminding those 
within earshot of his service to the constituency. Nasar orchestrated a massive urban 
procession that clogged the municipality’s dense arterial roads. Cars, motorcycles, 
auto-rickshaws, bicycles, and even a few horse-drawn carriages eked a path through 
the town center at a snail’s pace, waving colorful party flags and donning masks of 
DMK Chairman “Kalaignar” (the ‘Artist’) Karunanidhi as well as his son and assumed 
heir-in-waiting “Thalabathi” (the ‘General’) Stalin. The procession brought the city to a 
standstill for several hours as police cleared the pre-approved route and media 
personnel scurried across overpasses and rooftops to capture the best viewing angle, 
struggling to cram the entire spectacle within a solitary camera frame. 
 Ravikumar acknowledges that his campaign provides a prime opportunity for 
DMK office-bearers to demonstrate their influence and, moreover, ‘grease’ their cadre-
base. But, he also admits that the Avadi rally achieved little by way of bolstering the 
public standing of his party as it was DMK imagery that captured the limelight: red 
and black flags fluttering in the breeze, cadre of both parties donning paper masks in 
the likeness of DMK leaders, and loudspeakers broadcasting DMK party songs. As 
the day-to-day execution of his campaign is financed and managed by the leading 
coalition partner, the candidates of smaller parties, Ravikumar quips, often feature as 
little more than “mute spectators” of their own campaigns. Many VCK cadre were 
unreserved in their criticism of the day’s procession, charging that the VCK was present 
yet not represented during the event, galled that DMK iconography subsumed their 
party’s visual presence. But, while these cadre bemoan that such spectacles merely 
augment the stature of the leading coalition party, they admit that mega-rallies 
generate unparalleled public visibility and media exposure that enables them to reach a 
mass audience and publicize their election symbol to the electorate.53 During our 
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evening commute, Ravikumar confirms that such rallies, despite being “a public 
nuisance,” generate the needed political visibility to bolster his candidacy. Still, the 
flustered candidate estimates that more than a thousand motorcycles draped with 
DMK party flags accompanied the procession, ratcheting up the rally’s ostentatious 
display of DMK politics as well as the cost assessed to his campaign expenditure 
report.54 
 Although the Avadi rally augmented the visibility of Ravikumar’s candidacy, it 
generated financial tensions that surfaced as the campaign progressed. Many DMK 
leaders, Nasar included, utilize campaign rallies to bolster their personal stature, 
shoring up support among their constituency and maintaining their vote bank. 
Although the candidates of small parties rely on the Dravidian-style electioneering to 
ensure media exposure and project electoral viability to the electorate, such political 
spectacles accrue on the candidate’s expenditure report, which the Election 
Commission fixed at ₹70 lakh for the 2014 Lok Sabha Election.55 Although candidates 
routinely flout the Model Code of Conduct governing electoral proceedings and evade 
prescribed spending limits, recent ECI monitoring procedures including video 
surveillance limit a candidate’s ability to grossly under-declare the cost of public 
canvassing activities captured on film.56 The pinch of financial monitoring became 
evident toward the end of the campaign when Ravikumar, caught between personal 
egos and campaign finance regulations, implored local DMK leaders to send back their 
fleets of SUVs wary that their presence might attract ECI video teams and press his 
assessed expenditure beyond the prescribed limit, prompting fear of disqualification. 
 In the aftermath of the Avadi rally, Ravikumar learned that the ECI had 
assessed ₹2.5 lakh to his expenditure report. With only ten days remaining in the 
campaign, and his expenditure blossoming, this posed a serious cause for concern. To 
further complicate matters, Avadi was in the final stages of preparation for a mega-
rally, slated to draw the attendance of DMK state executives including its Chairman 
Mu. Karunanidhi, and projected to exceed ₹10 lakh in assessed gross expenditure. 
This poses a serious dilemma for the candidate as the office-bearers of the DMK, the 
principal financier of his campaign, display a clear tendency to organize ostentatious 
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displays of political spectacle, a politics of presence that projects their own authority, 
but which accrue on his expenditure report.57 Tensions intensified as the campaign 
progressed and, at times, the candidate implored local leaders to send home their 
‘fleets’, wary that ECI monitors, always lurking in near proximity, would record their 
presence and tip his assessed expenditure over the prescribed limit. Although, 
campaigns are often projected to spend upwards of ten times the sanctioned limit, the 
presence of video monitors heightened the already formidable challenge confronting 
campaign accountants tasked with maintaining ‘clean books’.58 At the same time, the 
self-interest of leading coalition figures to parade their prestige often overtakes the 
candidate’s control of campaign execution. 
  While some DMK office-bearers utilize the campaign period to service their 
vote banks and gauge the public pulse, treating it as a mid-term progress report ahead 
of assembly and local body elections, not all party leaders are keen to bolster what they 
call a “non-party candidate.” Whereas DMK executives finalize seat-sharing 
agreements with allied parties intent to bolster their electoral prospects by tapping 
additional vote-banks, district-level party organizers, those effectively tasked with 
administering the campaigns of allied candidates, may not share these incentives. 
Instead, local DMK leaders often regard allied candidates and cadre with suspicion, 
mindful to maintain their local support and wary to cede ground to a newcomer and 
potential future rival. Upon arriving in Tiruvallur, Ravikumar’s first order of business 
is to solicit support from district DMK leaders including current and former MLAs 
and MPs. Aware that many of these individuals had vied for the seat he would contest, 
Ravikumar exercises a delicate finesse in these interactions, acting with deference 
toward DMK leaders and pledging to collaborate should he be elected. But, VCK 
campaign organizers sense their reluctance to deliver votes and express concern that 
local DMK organizers may pocket funds allocated by the party executive. Should the 
VCK win the seat, its victory would only augment the party’s leverage in future 
negotiations to retain Tiruvallur. Expressing skepticism over the commitment of local 
allies to his campaign, Ravikumar muses, “Why would they even want to create 
another power-center in the district? It’s not in their interest.” 
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‘You canvass your votes, we’ll canvass ours…’ 
Ponnivalavan stands a hair above 5 feet tall, his modest stature belied by a bellowing 
voice that reverberates throughout the vehicle he deftly maneuvers across rickety rural 
roads. Initially jovial, Ponni grows increasingly riled as the campaign progresses. 
Although he is Ravikumar’s personal assistant, our car is routinely pressed to the tail 
end of the entourage. He curses the cavalier demeanor of DMK bigwigs whose freshly 
minted Toyota SUVs blaze past the candidate’s aged Mahindra Scorpio and chides 
their ability to wax poetically on Ravikumar’s merits as the “DMK coalition candidate” 
while keeping a miserly finger on the purse strings. Despite his occasional rancor 
during our daily commute across the constituency, Ponni nevertheless acknowledges 
the critical importance of his party’s alliance with the DMK. In particular, Ponni 
emphasizes that the DMK not only offers financial support and lends critical 
infrastructure but, moreover, mediates the contested physical and discursive terrain of 
caste in an electoral campaign. 
 Throughout rural Tamil Nadu, Dalits most often reside in a separate colony, or 
cheri, spatially segregated from the upper caste settlement, or uur; a caste geography 
that compartmentalizes the electorate and structures vote canvassing efforts. 
Ponnivalavan’s observation materializes as we pass through a rural Vanniyar village, 
Tamil Nadu’s single largest backwards caste community that is widely perceived to be 
at loggerheads with Dalits. As we proceed through a settlement marked with 
Vanniyar-caste iconography such as caste movement flags and freshly painted wall 
murals, I ask Ponni, “Would you canvass votes in this area without the DMK’s 
presence?” He emits an uncomfortable chuckle, “No, no, we rely on the DMK to enter 
these areas. Without them, it would be difficult to canvass votes in OBC communities 
across the countryside and, in particular,” he concedes, “among Vanniyar 
settlements.”59 For instance, in a later conversation, the Ravikumar acknowledged that 
the Vanniyar Sangam and PMK cadre can physically bar the VCK’s entry into Vanniyar 
settlements, which the VCK can reciprocate to PMK candidates in Dalit colonies, but 
neither party can bar entry to the Dravidian parties and allied candidates.60 On 
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multiple occasions, vehicles and motorcycles bearing VCK flags and banners stall at 
the entrance of these settlements, awaiting the candidate to proceed through the village 
accompanied by DMK leaders before rejoining the entourage as it departs for the next 
destination.61 When I inquired about this practice with the candidate, he 
acknowledged that caste provides a basis for vote canvassing techniques in rural 
segments and confirmed, “the DMK doesn’t care about caste, only winning,” 
intimating that DMK organizers perceive VCK cadre as an electoral liability outside of 
Dalit colonies.62  
 In private conversations, DMK organizers conveyed a nagging concern that the 
VCK’s reputation as a Dalit party may forfeit coalition votes, especially among OBC 
communities. As Dalit voters never form a political majority, OBC votes are critical for 
their electoral prospects, even in a reserved constituency where only Dalit candidates 
may contest. In their calculations, DMK organizers regard the VCK more as a liability 
than an asset in attracting Tiruvallur’s non-Dalit electorate, and, in light of this, they 
carefully stage-managed the VCK’s physical presence on the campaign trail, a 
concerted effort rendered visible through a marked division in spatial and rhetorical 
aspects of vote canvassing. In varying registers, DMK organizers advised VCK party 
workers, ‘you canvass your votes, we’ll canvass ours,’ referring to a clear bifurcation of 
electioneering efforts. Twice daily, in morning and evening sessions, party workers 
flocked to communities across the district to engage in door-to-door canvassing. 
Knocking on doors and calling into open entryways, they distributed party flyers, 
interfaced with the electorate, and requested the community’s support. Often, VCK 
cadre entered Dalit colonies harkening the merits of Ravikumar and their VCK party, 
whereas DMK party workers canvassed votes in the adjacent uur, or upper caste 
settlement, soliciting votes for the “DMK coalition candidate.” 
 Vote canvassing relies heavily on local experts to navigate caste geography. As 
our aged Mahindra Scorpio maneuvers rickety rural roads, it develops a revolving 
door through which local DMK leaders file in and out. These individuals possess close 
familiarity with local geography, dictating which roads to navigate and specifying 
those to be avoided. More importantly, these guides possess intimate knowledge of the 
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caste and religious composition of local communities. A key piece of information is 
ascertained prior to our arrival in each settlement, “What is the main community 
residing in this area? This block? This colony?” The guides advise, ‘Here is a Muslim 
enclave. Now we are approaching a Dalit colony. Next is the caste settlement.’ These 
notes are scrawled on a loose sheet of paper and delivered by hand to the open-air jeep 
where the candidate, flanked by DMK organizers, greets local party leaders and 
community members assembled in a public space. While caste provides a basis for a 
division of canvassing efforts, it also shapes the rhetorical content of stump speeches. 
Political speeches are tailored to the audience, presenting targeted welfare schemes 
and identity concerns to Dalits, accentuating an anti-hindutva politics to religious 
minorities, and outlining an economic development program for those referred to 
collectively as “non-Dalits.”  
 As we proceed through the village, the master of ceremony (MC) tailors the 
candidate’s introduction accordingly. The MC waxes poetically on the merits and 
accomplishments of Ravikumar, but his affiliation differs according to local 
demographics. As we pass through an upper-caste settlement, the MC rattles off: 
“Ravikumar, our DMK candidate selected by our most esteemed Kalaignar (‘Artist’)! 
Ravikumar is Thalabathi (‘General’) Stalin’s candidate! Ravikumar is Kavignar (‘Poet’) 
Kanimozhi’s candidate! He is our DMK candidate! Ravikumar, candidate who will 
attain victory!” All the while, the MC elides mention of Ravikumar’s political party, 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, as well as the party’s popular chairman, Thol. 
Thirumaavalavan. Upon entering a Dalit colony, the MC flips the script: “Ravikumar 
is the candidate of Ezhuccitamizhar (‘Surging Tamilian’) Thol. Thirumaavalavan! He is 
Puratciyaaḷar (‘Revolutionary’) Ambedkar’s candidate! Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi 
candidate, Ravikumar! Our victorious candidate, Ravikumar!” In effect, the 
candidate’s affiliation with the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi is carefully tailored to local 
caste and religious demographics. While the VCK brand reverberates across the cheri, 
it is muffled beyond the confines of Dalit colonies. 
 When we discuss vote canvassing techniques, the candidate confirms, “Despite 
being in a DMK coalition, VCK cadre will not canvass votes in many areas,” noting 
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that DMK organizers “assume full control of the campaign and take charge of 
canvassing procedures outside of the cheri (Dalit colony).”63 Similarly, Nilavanathu 
Nilavan, VCK Campaign Manager in Tiruvallur, stated that in many areas, and 
particularly rural pockets, Dalits focus on canvassing colony votes while DMK cadre 
concentrate their activities in non-Dalit settlements. Saying that this division is less 
pronounced in cities and large towns, he avers, “Depending on the local context, the 
VCK may or may not accompany the DMK to canvass non-Dalit votes in those 
areas.”64 In a separate conversation, VCK Headquarters Secretary Balasingam claims 
that party cadre will occasionally canvass votes in non-Dalit settlements, but only 
when accompanied by the DMK, inferring that VCK cadre most often limit their 
canvassing efforts to Dalit colonies. After a pause, he adds, “Otherwise problems may 
arise,” intimating that their presence may aggravate communal tensions that jeopardize 
the party’s prospects.65 
 In the Model Code of Conduct governing electoral procedures, the Election 
Commission of India stipulates: “There should be no appeal to caste or communal 
feelings for securing votes.”66 While explicit reference is generally avoided, caste 
maintains a near ubiquitous presence on the campaign trail. Stated candidly in private 
conversations, DMK organizers professed their view the VCK factors more as a 
liability than asset in constituencies where its candidates contest and, moreover, 
expressed general concern that the VCK’s popular reputation as a Dalit outfit would 
forfeit coalition votes from OBC communities. In response, the DMK strategically 
mediated the VCK’s physical and visual presence throughout the campaign, adhering 
to warily scripted division of vote canvassing labor and established blueprint for 
political rhetoric. While the VCK brand was ardently broadcast in Dalit colonies, it 
was conspicuous by its absence beyond these settlements. Ironically, a prime 
opportunity for the VCK to represent Dalit concerns under the gaze of incessant 
media scrutiny and public attention, instead, factors among the organization’s most 
constrictive moments, DMK organizers advising in different registers, ‘you canvass 
your votes, we’ll canvass ours.’  
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 Through its enactment, the campaign conceived of and discursively produced 
the electorate in terms of three distinct groups: caste minorities (i.e., Dalits), religious 
minorities (i.e., Muslims, Christians), and a broader caste society referred to by DMK 
organizers simply as “non-Dalits” or “the caste people.” This tripartite partition of ‘the 
people’ provided the basis for a spatial and rhetorical division of vote canvassing 
practices that bracketed the bodies and interests of social minorities and reified the 
notion of a caste society as a coherent entity, producing ‘a people’ who are perceived as 
standard-bearers of general concerns. When I interviewed VCK organizers over the 
course of the campaign, my interlocutors referred to an apparent incongruity between 
the quantitative logic of electoral politics and the principle of strong minority 
representation as conceived by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. This distinction was embedded in 
syntax; they observed that the present system of electoral reservations provided for the 
selection of representatives from Dalit communities yet questioned whether these 
elected officials could serve as representatives of Dalit communities. While 
reservations, in principle, promote the political representation of Dalits, my 
interlocutors argue that the present method through which Dalit representatives are 
selected serves as an impediment to its realization. To examine this issue in 
ethnographic detail, I turn to how these VCK organizers conceptualize the present 
system of electoral reservations, conveying their impressions, experiences, and 
critiques. 
 
Expressing Reservation 
Wooden sticks strike taut leather, warmed only moments earlier over an open fire, 
emitting tight rhythmic beats that shatter the stillness of a sultry spring evening. A 
frontline of drummers furiously pound their parai, or traditional drum, as they guide 
our procession through the main street of a bustling Dalit colony in rural 
Gummidipoondi.67 Our motley caravan swells as local residents, whose excitement is 
palpable, pour into the narrow lane to accompany us as we progress gradually through 
the colony. To their rear, an open-air jeep carrying the candidate tails the crowd 
followed by a caravan of SUVs and motorcycles waving colorful party flags that flutter 
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in the breeze. The parai is not struck lightly, but beaten aggressively to generate in 
unison tight metrical beats that crescendo steadily until suddenly peaking and then 
falling silent, returning stillness once again to the evening air. From behind the 
florescent glow of halogen lights affixed to the jeep’s crossbar, Ravikumar stands 
adjacent to the master of ceremony, who broadcasts over the loudspeaker in a 
deafening roar, “Ezhuccithamizhar (the Surging Tamilian) Thol. Thirumaavalavan’s 
candidate, Puratciyaalar (Revolutionary) Ambedkar’s candidate, our very own 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi candidate, Ravikumar!”68 Following a momentary pause, 
Ravikumar lifts the microphone to an uproarious cheer from the crowd. 
  Addressing the audience, Ravikumar first discusses his accomplishments as an 
ex-Member of the state legislative assembly (2006-2011) elected from 
Kattumannarkoil, Cuddalore District, and details a housing scheme he implemented 
for Dalit families that replaced thatched and mud huts with concrete houses.69 
Ravikumar pledges, if elected, to deliver the same benefit to Dalits in Tiruvallur 
District. Then, following a brief pause, he implores the audience to acknowledge the 
weight of the present election on Dalit communities across Tamil Nadu. He 
emphasizes, “A vote for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal is not simply a vote for yourself and 
your personal interests. A vote for the VCK is also a vote for Dalit communities across 
Tamil Nadu.” Presenting his candidacy as that of a surrogate representative for all 
Dalits and the VCK as a party built upon the preservation of Dalit rights and the 
community’s development, he underscores the necessity of sending Dalit 
representatives to parliament who are not beholden to separate interests.70 Ravikumar 
accredits the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s status as an autonomous political party for its 
ability to meaningfully address Dalit issues.  
  During our evening commute back to the residence-cum-election-office, 
Ravikumar elaborates upon his earlier statement and pinpoints a tension that inheres 
between Dalit representation and electoral reservations. Although electoral 
reservations were conceived on the basis of community to ensure that political 
minorities are represented within the general body politic, elections are conducted on 
the basis of territory, through spatially delimited joint electorates where Dalits are 
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insufficiently preponderant to elect a representative of their choice.71 This, Ravikumar 
points out, creates a scenario such that Dalit representatives are elected not by Dalits, 
the presumed beneficiaries of electoral reservations, but by a popular majority that 
often prefers a candidate who will, to quote another VCK organizer, “take a soft-
corner on Dalit issues.”72 Ravikumar emphasizes this distinction, questioning whether 
such elected officials are representatives of Dalit communities, from Dalit communities, 
or both. In effect, he asserts that, although reserved constituencies may ensure the 
selection of a Dalit candidate, Dalits never comprise an electoral majority and, 
therefore, lack the numerical strength to elect a candidate of their choice.73 Elaborating 
his critique, Ravikumar guides our conversation to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s 
conceptualization of electoral reservations and minority representation. 
  Amidst a broader discussion of political franchise before the Southborough 
Committee in 1919, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar proffered a prescient critique of traditional 
joint electorates in which representatives are selected through territorially delimited 
constituencies. Presenting a distinction between a “government for the people” and a 
“government by the people,” Ambedkar underscored the importance of composite 
representation for India’s depressed classes, who are today referred to legally as 
Scheduled Castes or, in common parlance, as Dalits. Ambedkar stressed, “…it is not 
enough to be electors only. It is necessary to be law-makers.”74 In premonition that 
communal affiliation would structure voting preference, he anticipated that the 
concerns of electoral minorities would fail to garner sufficient political imperative in a 
system of territorially delimited joint electorates. In response, he averred, “Territorial 
constituencies fail to create popular Government because they fail to secure personal 
representation to members of minor groups.”75 While minority communities, if 
politically consolidated, may possess sufficient voting strength to influence electoral 
outcomes, such communities lack the ability to select their own representatives.  
  This observation, in turn, triggered a contentious political debate between Dr. 
B. R. Ambedkar and Mohandas Gandhi regarding the electoral system best suited to 
provide for the political representation of minority communities. The dispute pivoted 
on whether Dalit representation was best served through reserved constituencies or 
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separate electorates. Gandhi lobbied for reserved constituencies in which, while only 
Dalit representatives may contest elections, their representatives are elected by 
popular suffrage in joint electorates. In staunch opposition to Gandhi’s proposal, 
Ambedkar argued that joint electorates would effectively limit the role of Dalit 
communities to that of “electors” and reduce their so-called representatives to 
“bondsmen” who, in being elected by popular majority, would be most beholden to 
dominant political parties and the non-Dalit majority.76 From Ambedkar’s perspective, 
Gandhi’s model would, at best, afford “nominal” representation for Dalit 
communities.77 
  In contrast, Ambedkar advocated for a system of separate electorates such that 
Dalits received a dual-voting right, casting ballots alongside the general population in 
joint electorates sans reservations as well as in separate electorates where they alone 
cast ballots to elect at-large Dalit representatives. A key distinction between the 
Ambedkarite and Gandhian models lies not only in the design of the electoral system, 
or in how a Dalit representative is selected, but on the basis of their selection, namely 
who elects Dalit representatives and, in implication, to whom they will be beholden. 
While reserved constituencies would stipulate that Dalit representatives be elected by 
popular suffrage in joint electorates, separate electorates provided for Dalits to both 
engage in the general body politic and ensured that the community elected 
representatives of their choice.78 From Ambedkar’s perspective, the purpose of a 
reservation policy was to “enable a minority to select candidates to the Legislature who 
will be real and not nominal representatives of the minority,” stressing that Dalit 
representatives must be elected by their own community members in order to afford 
the necessary autonomy for these individuals act as “freemen.”79  
  Before the Southborough Committee, Ambedkar argued that the allocation of a 
mere handful of legislative seats would not suffice for India’s Dalits because “a 
legislative Council is not an old curiosity shop,” but rather holds “the powers to make 
or mar the fortunes of society…”80 In effect, Ambedkar stated forcefully that political 
representation did not provide an end in itself and, rather, underscored that “the 
effective use of political power” afforded a means through which to promote social and 
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economic development.81 Ambedkar underscored, “The Depressed Classes must be 
given sufficient political power to influence legislative and executive action for the 
purpose of securing their welfare.”82 Further, he stressed that the “chief significance of 
suffrage or a political right consists in a chance for active and direct participation in 
the regulation of the terms upon which associated life shall be sustained.”83 Hence, for 
Ambedkar, meaningful political representation requires not only the presence of 
minorities within bodies of government, but moreover their capacity to wield sufficient 
influence and shape policy outcomes.  
  Ambedkar asserted that only separate electorates could ensure that these 
conditions be satisfied. In premonition that caste affiliation would structure voting 
preference, Ambedkar forewarned that joint electorates would create a scenario such 
that Dalit representatives could be co-opted by party politics and beholden to the 
interests of the political majority, which would, in effect, severely undermine their 
envisioned role as Dalit representatives. Ambedkar wrote: 
 
A joint electorate for a small minority and a vast majority is bound to result in a 
disaster to the minority. A candidate put up by the minority cannot be 
successful even if the whole of the minority were solidly behind him. The fact 
that a seat is reserved for a minority merely gives a security that the minority 
candidate will be declared elected. But it cannot guarantee that the minority 
candidate declared elected will be a person of its choice if the election is to be 
by a joint electorate. Even if a seat is reserved for a minority, a majority can 
always pick up a person belonging to the minority and put him up as a 
candidate for the reserved seat as against a candidate put up by the minority 
and get him elected by helping its nominee with the superfluous voting strength 
which is at its command. The result is that the representative of the minority 
elected to the reserved seat instead of being a champion of the minority is really 
the slave of the majority.84 
 
This premonition, while proposed by Ambedkar more than fifty years earlier, bears a 
striking resemblance to the electoral impasse that Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers 
describe today. Taken collectively, their personal accounts of the party’s electoral 
experience lend further credence to Ambedkar’s premonition and, moreover, continue 
to animate his early critiques of the present system of electoral reservations.  
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  “I’m telling you,” Sinthanai Selvan says, “a reserved constituency is a humbug. 
In a reserved constituency, the candidate may be Scheduled Caste, but this sends the 
wrong impression that the Scheduled Castes have their own representative. These 
candidates are not representative of the SC community because they were not elected 
by our community.”85 Selvan, a VCK General Secretary, retrieves a book of 
Ambedkar’s writing from the cupboard, emphasizing that only Ambedkar’s model of 
separate electorates and dual-voting rights could ensure that Dalit communities receive 
“true representation” in state assemblies and the halls of parliament, whereas the 
present system of reserved constituencies within joint electorates prevent Dalits from 
electing their own representatives.86 Selvan concedes, “Although the government has 
allocated reserved constituencies in which only SC candidates may contest, a popular 
majority will elect the candidate. Who is the majority? The majority is always caste 
Hindus.”87 So, he asks, “How can we refer to them as representatives of Dalits?”88 As 
another party leaders stated, “In reserved constituencies, non-Dalit voters prefer to 
elect Dalit candidates that they perceive as their proxies—the weaker the candidate, 
the better his electoral prospects.”89 
  Selvan reverts our attention to the blue tome of Ambedkar’s writings and 
speeches by his side and then proclaims, “In the present electoral system, Dalits cannot 
be elected as true Dalit representatives.”90 Proceeding further, he contends, “Under the 
current system, there are no Dalit representatives in Parliament and the State 
Assembly. Although a Dalit may be elected, we cannot call him as a Dalit 
representative because he is not elected by the Dalit people.”91 Pointing to his 
experience as a VCK candidate for the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (2006, 2011), 
he emphasizes, “The caste Hindus will only select a representative who will adjust with 
them. They want a candidate who will take a soft corner and accept their views, or 
who is willing to work under the agenda that they set. Only such a candidate will be 
elected in the present system.”92 While narrating his experience, Selvan refers to 
instances when, prior to the election, he was pressed to drop pending cases against 
upper castes that were filed previously under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 as a prerequisite to coalition partners 
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consenting to canvass non-Dalit votes on his behalf.93 Over the course of our 
conversation, he continually returns a core acknowledgement, “Electoral politics 
compels compromise,” which, as he underscores, undercuts the ability of Dalit elected 
representatives to meaningfully address Dalit concerns.94 
  When I juxtapose this early conversation with a more recent discussion, which 
occurred nearly five years apart, Selvan’s position on electoral alliances altered 
markedly upon further experience. In 2009, he accentuated the necessity of “capturing 
power” to justify electoral alliances with Dravidian parties, referring to such 
arrangements as a pragmatic solution that bolstered the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
probability of dispatching its members to the state legislature and national parliament. 
Selvan emphasized that electoral alliances did not imply ideological congruence with 
allied parties, but merely served as a strategic platform to strengthen electoral 
performance. At the time, Selvan suggested: 
 
Through the electoral process we can consolidate the Dalit people and, in doing 
so, we can influence the results. To gain political power we must forge alliances 
with Dravidian parties… Aligning with the DMK does not mean that I 
subscribe to their ideology or their objectives; an electoral alliance strictly 
implies an arrangement for power sharing. That’s all. We have taken this 
stance.95 
 
Further, Selvan emphasized the practical necessity of electoral alliances to finance and 
facilitate the campaign, but underscored that such alliances do not imply ideological 
congruence between allied parties. Rather, he emphasized that these temporary 
arrangements are strictly forged on the basis of “power sharing.”96  
  When we revisited this topic nearly five years later, Selvan’s critique of the 
current system of political reservations had remained consistent, namely that it does 
not produce strong Dalit representatives, but he had revised his position on the present 
strategy of electoral alliances. He acknowledged that many party members feel that “in 
order to grasp political power you should band together with a dominant party; you 
must share with them and only then you can attain some degree of authority.”97 But, he 
proceeds to admit, “This method is not yielding success. Last election we lost all ten 
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seats! We were defeated in ten seats!”98 Today, he acknowledges, “When we share 
power, we cannot take the same stand that we previously took against [caste] atrocities 
or state terrorism.”99 He stalls and, after a temporary pause, continues, “Power sharing 
entails a constant compromise. We once spoke of capturing power, but our present 
scenario cannot even be called power sharing, rather, it’s begging.”100  
 
Conclusion 
Ethnography from the campaign trail affords a unique vantage point to question what 
work electoral democracy does for the wide range of new actors populating India’s 
rapidly expanding political sphere. As elaborated earlier, Christophe Jaffrelot 
captured fundamental shifts in the social demographics of elected representatives, 
which he interpreted to signal a democratization of India’s once closed political arena. 
But, more recently, skeptics including Niraja Jayal have alleged that this ‘descriptive’ 
democratization of state assemblies and the halls of parliament has failed to generate 
improved developmental outcomes. Moreover, Yogendra Yadav corroborated Jayal’s 
contention when he claimed that a “deepening of ‘descriptive representation’ co-
exists… with a thinning of ‘substantive representation’.”101 But, these scholars based 
their arguments on measures of developmental outcomes without investigating why 
descriptive representation may appear inept to yield more equitable patterns of 
development. Scholars have responded to this contention with historically sensitive, 
ethnographically informed analyses that foreground the political experience of Dalit 
representatives in order to investigate the constraints under which they function, when 
and if elected. Further, as Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany observe, elected 
Dalit representatives are often discouraged from “taking too active a political interest 
in issues of greatest relevant to their own people.”102 This chapter has provided an 
ethnographic lens into electoral competition to further nuance our understanding of 
the procedures through which Dalit representatives are selected and, thereby, to 
investigate the fraught relationship between electoral democracy and robust minority 
representation. 
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 Democratic politics, elections, and political representation, a triad that assumes 
center stage in scholarship on modern India, are often clubbed together as if a natural 
triumvirate. I suggest that we interrogate the relationship of these three pillars of 
political theory without assuming a natural congruence. Taken collectively, the 
democratic trajectory of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal signals that integration into 
electoral democracy need not imply assimilation within the political community. In 
fact, in the direct experience of VCK party candidates, electoral campaigns entail a 
constant bracketing of persons and interests, a public enactment of who can speak on 
what issues. When the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal honed its politics on issues surrounding 
land rights, caste violence, social justice, and economic development as a social 
movement in the 1990s, it developed a reputation as forceful representatives of Dalit 
causes and as a political alternative to existing political parties. But, following the 
movement’s transition into electoral politics, this reputation has routinely factored as a 
primary obstacle to electoral success, even in reserved constituencies where candidates 
are widely presumed to be representatives of Dalits. 
 In this chapter, I have investigated how VCK candidates experience an election 
campaign in a reserved constituency as a smaller player within an influential political 
coalition. By way of contrast, Mukulika Banerjee recently lent an ethnographic 
perspective to the study of elections in which she “focuses on ordinary Indians’ 
experience of elections, and on what elections mean to them.”103 She writes, “For these 
voters, Election Day creates a time out of time, a carnival space, where the everyday 
reality of inequality and injustice is suspended, and popular sovereignty asserted for a 
day.”104 From the perspective of VCK activists and candidates, Election Day and, more 
broadly, election campaigns may project the façade of “a carnival space,” but are 
highly scripted events that mask rather than suspend everyday realities and, thereby, 
actually serve to undermine their struggle to secure equal recognition within 
democratic politics. Further, canvassing strategies themselves are sometimes premised 
upon the presence and reproduction of not only inequality, but also exclusion. My 
ethnography corroborates Michael Saward’s observation that “elections can, in some 
circumstances, act to restrict the nature and range of representative perspectives and 
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voices, and that these restrictions can be democratically troubling.”105 Or, framed 
differently, it offers ethnographic insight into Ravikumar’s quip that Dalit candidates 
often feature as “mute spectators” of their campaigns, illustrating how elections may 
work to constrain rather than promote robust minority representation. 
 Six months before VCK General Secretary D. Ravikumar descended beneath 
the halogen glow and media buzz of the election campaign, he reflected upon the 
challenges of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s democratic transition and, when he did so, 
deployed the same motif as Banerjee, albeit in a remarkably different way.106 
Cautioning against the fanfare that sometimes celebrates  the Dalit occupation of the 
political sphere as if it signaled a triumph in and of itself, Ravikumar instead describes 
such forays into the public domain as carnivals that generate “a temporary effect” 
among the people.107 Citing Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on “the carnivalesque,” 
Ravikumar describes the democratic challenge confronting Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
politics as a struggle to harness and concretize these temporary effects and, in doing so, 
to convert the carnival into a rebellion.108 He recollects, “Earlier, we worked like that,” 
reminiscing about how the movement consolidated Dalits en masse across the 1990s as a 
stout political force.109 But, Ravikumar fears that the compulsions of electoral politics 
have sapped the movement’s earlier radicalism, causing him to question whether the 
rebellion has devolved back into a carnival. “It has all become a carnival, a festival; it’s 
a political spectacle,” he says, “and I am not able to see the same effect.”110 Reflecting 
upon the party’s shortcomings in the electoral arena, Ravikumar surmises, “A Dalit 
party must have a vision beyond elections. We have to return to our basics.” 111 Then, 
he adds, “I want to re-commit myself to Dalit politics; maybe it’s time to quit 
elections.”112 
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CONCLUSION 
Whither Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Politics? 
 
This dissertation has presented an empirical study of political representation drawn 
from an ethnography of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics in Tamil Nadu, India. As a 
diachronic account of political formation, the project has examined a layering of 
strategies deployed by Viduthalai Chiruthaigal organizers to represent Dalit concerns 
over the course of nearly three decades. Established in 1982 under the leadership of A. 
Malaichamy, the early movement, comprised of a small collective of Dalit lawyers, 
government employees, and student activists, embraced legal advocacy as an 
instrument to represent Dalit concerns. These individuals submitted formal legal 
petitions through official government channels that advocated for the realization of 
what they considered to be their fundamental rights including demands for equitable 
access to social and economic development. When these petitions failed to garner a 
satisfactory response from state authorities, the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal turned to the 
public sphere as a complementary forum to air grievances and make political claims. 
Espousing contentious street politics as a technique to force state authorities to reckon 
with or, at the least, to acknowledge their demands, movement activists engineered 
tactical obstructions of critical transportation infrastructure, a corporeal politics that 
blockaded major roads and railway lines with the deliberate intent to attract media 
coverage to amplify their voice and visibility, and, thereby, to broadcast their political 
demands. Confronted, at once, by the selective use of preventative detention laws and 
the transformation of backwards caste associations into political parties, Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal leaders tentatively waded into electoral democracy in 1999, seeking to 
convert their upwelling of popular support into a viable vote-bank that would augment 
their leverage with state authorities. 
  The transition of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal into electoral democracy need not 
be interpreted as a radical aberration from its earlier platform as much as a natural 
extension of party politics that recognized electoral democracy as the formative site of 
political struggle. By the late-1990s, VCK leaders envisioned the state less as a 
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recipient of petition (i.e., Chapter 1) or as the object of protest (i.e., Chapter 2), but as 
an ensemble of institutions that demarcated the new locus of political struggle (i.e., 
Chapter 3). In effect, democratic politics was reimagined as the frontlines of a 
‘battlefield’, echoing the evocative motto of the Black Panthers of America, which 
defined politics as a “war without bloodshed.”1 While the opening three chapters 
chronicled the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s transition from boycotts to ballots, the latter two 
chapters provided an ethnographic lens into how VCK movement organizers 
experience democratic institutions and navigate electoral competition. The Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal, which had earlier pledged “to turn the history of Tamil Nadu on its head,” 
found itself mired in an intricate web of political negotiations that its leaders describe 
in terms of a steep trade-off between robust Dalit advocacy and electoral viability. 
VCK leaders initially justified the ostensible dilution of their earlier platform under the 
pretense of “capturing power,” but today these figures profess that electoral politics 
sapped their early radicalism and undercut their capacity for robust advocacy. Instead 
of affording greater latitude to express grievances and represent Dalit concerns, party 
organizers today argue that electoral democracy instead contained their early program. 
  Analysis of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s tenure in electoral democracy fills a 
lacunae in the literature on caste politics and democracy in modern India, which all too 
often presents electoral democracy as a telos, the natural end-point for caste 
mobilization. As a counterpoint, this study examines democratic integration in 
retrospect, through ethnography of political leadership that conveys how these figures 
understand their transition today, now with the benefit of more than fifteen years of 
hindsight. A study of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics illustrates that democratic 
integration does not inherently bolster the representation of minority interests, but, 
from the perspective of movement organizers, it mired their party within a web of 
compromises in response to electoral calculations that compromised its early platform 
and undercut its capacity for robust Dalit advocacy. The study cautions against a 
general theory of democratization, one that implicitly (or explicitly) correlates 
democratic integration with political representation, but queries what work democracy 
does for historically marginalized groups. A close study of the VCK demonstrates that 
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democratic politics does not erase, but may compound existing forms of inequality as 
its experience is necessarily mediated by pre-existing disparities premised upon caste, 
class, gender, and religion. From this perspective, there is no master narrative to 
capture the implications of democratic integration; only manifold different vantage 
points from which to approach its study. The political trajectory of the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal presents one example through which to study these processes and consider 
the afterlife of democratic integration. 
  How can an ethnography of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics inform our general 
theory of representation? A close analysis of the VCK presses us to reconsider our 
approach to political representation, stretching it beyond its traditional moorings in 
elections in order to examine and evaluate its manifold forms. This project perceives 
representation not only in terms of voice, but the capacity to effect an audience and, 
thereby, to be heard. Of course, this is not without a lengthy historical precedent, as 
Paul Woodruff notes, Athenian democracy not only afforded its citizens the “right to 
speak their minds,” but moreover, “they had the right to be heard by the governing 
body.”2 Representation, when understood not in terms of a natural fact or concrete 
relation between two already constituted entities, but as an event, that is, as a dynamic 
process that assumes variable forms, provides an alternative vantage point from which 
to consider how marginalized communities advance political demands and make claims 
on state authorities. An ethnographic study of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics reveals 
that, although electoral politics may provide improved access to state institutions, it 
does not in itself enhance the opportunity for movement organizers to articulate their 
grievances and represent their concerns; rather, it may constrain their voices. When 
VCK activists reminisce about their political trajectory, they argue that mass 
agitational politics provided the most efficacious means to effect an audience. This 
perspective echoes Timothy Mitchell’s argument that techniques of disruption are 
sometimes integral to substantive democratic practice, claiming that such acts provide 
marginalized groups with “an effective way of forcing the powerful to listen to [their] 
demands.”3 Although the VCK gained the opportunity to speak before the state 
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legislature and national parliament, this has not necessary bolstered its capacity to 
represent Dalit interests.  
  Finally, a close study of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics challenges common 
assumptions in academic scholarship as well as the popular representation of Dalit 
movements in modern India. Accounts of Dalit politics are often framed in terms of a 
dichotomy, interpreting its objectives as premised either on a struggle for dignity and 
equal recognition or, alternatively, as a politics for material access and economic 
redistribution. A recent study of Uttar Pradesh accentuated this tension, arguing that 
Dalit parties “have overwhelmingly pursued an agenda of recognition, calling for equal 
respect, rather than one of redistribution.”4 On the contrary, Dalit politics most often 
straddles both sides of this equation, advancing collective demands for recognition and 
redistribution. Although studies that focus on struggles for dignity afford a lens into an 
integral component of Dalit mobilization, they often constrict their analysis to identity 
politics without sufficient attention to demands for social and economic justice, not to 
mention the challenges of achieving redistribution. A study of Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
politics drawn from a longitudinal ethnography as well as its own documentary 
evidence demonstrates that economic development and social justice served as 
enduring planks of its political program. Dating back to its origins in Madurai, 
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal politics advanced demands for equitable access to social and 
economic development, basic provisions for physical security, and the administration 
of law. To constrict Dalit politics to a struggle for recognition without accounting for 
its radical social and economic agenda merely breathes new life into an old stereotype.  
  Before concluding, the structure of this dissertation imposes several limitations 
that warrant mention. Firstly, the study provides an empirical study of the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal that draws principality on the perspectives and experiences of party 
leadership and long-term organizers; the study does not claim to capture the myriad 
perspectives of local communities, supporters, or voters, which have been studied in 
detail by other scholars.5 My research has instead focused on political leadership to 
contribute a viewpoint that is notably absent in the current literature. Additionally, the 
project is constrained by the availability of source materials. Whereas the early 
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chapters of the dissertation draw heavily on primary materials and rare vernacular 
publications, the availability of these sources was often limited to fragmentary personal 
archives compiled by early activists. While I have worked to triangulate available 
materials to construct a narrative, most early documents did not weather the 
sweltering climate, falling prey to an admixture of insects, humidity, and monsoon 
rains. The study does not offer a set of bullet-point solutions or recommendations to 
afford greater latitude to minority representatives, but rather provides an account of 
how Dalit activists in Tamil Nadu recall their experience of electoral democracy. I 
have sought to nuance to our understanding of how democracy is experienced, 
understood, and, at times, contested by marginalized social groups, accounting for its 
powerful social imaginary and potent political vocabulary while still remaining 
attentive to its limitations as a platform for marginalized groups such as India’s Dalits 
to represent their concerns.  
 
1 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black 
Panther Party. Oakland: University of California Press, 2013 (2016). 
2 Paul Woodruff, First Democracy: The challenge of an ancient idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 
67. 
3 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. New York: Verso, 2011, p21. Also, 
see: Timothy Mitchell (2009), “Carbon Democracy” in Economy and Society, 38:3, pp.399-432. 
4 Radha Sarkar and Amar Sarkar (2016), “Dalit Politics in India: Recognition without Redistribution.” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 51, No. 20, p14. 
5 Hugo Gorringe’s collective work has brilliantly captured the political dynamics of VCK politics, 
affording close attention to the perspectives of local organizers and a broad range of political leadership. 
Drawn from recent fieldwork, Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve have provided an incisive study of 
Dalit electoral participation in western Tamil Nadu. Also, recent years have witnessed the growth of 
Dalit studies as an independent field of scholarship for which Ramnarayan S. Rawat and K. 
Satyanarayana’s edited volume captures the development of the field. In addition to Hugo Gorringe’s 
collective body of work, see: Grace Carswell and Geert De Neve, “Why Indians Vote: Reflections on 
Rights, Citizenship, and Democracy from a Tamil Nadu Village.” Antipode 46, no. 4 (2014): 1032-1053; 
Ramnarayan S. Rawat and K. Satyanarayana (eds.), Dalit Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2016. 
																																																						
 
 
262 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Viduthalai Chiruthaigal flyer distributed prior to the movement’s airplane roko agitation on July 22, 
1994. The title reads: “Airplane roko war: We do not want 69%! Extend it even further!...” 
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Viduthalai Chiruthaigal wall poster circulated following the movement’s airport roko agitation on July 22, 
1994. The Poster Reads, “A DPI airplane roko in Madurai over the reservations issue; R. 
Thirumaavalavan and 5000 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal arrested.” 
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A Viduthalai Chiruthaigal wall poster distributed in Dalit colonies publicizing the “Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s 
mass condemnation military parade in Chennai [related to the] Melavalavu assassination.” 
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A Viduthalai Chiruthaigal wall poster, which publicized the movement’s upcoming protest march in 
Chennai, reads, “Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s mass condemnation military parade [related to the] Melavalavu 
assassination.” 
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A photograph published in Dinamani on July 24, 1997, depicted thousands of Dalits participating in a 
protest march in Chennai condemning the violence in Melavalavu. The caption reads, “The protest 
march conducted by the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal, a Dalit organization, in Chennai on Wednesday to 
condemn the murder that occurred in the Madurai-Melavalavu area.” 
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A photograph from Dinamani displaying a portion of the police battalion monitoring the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal’s protest march in Madurai on November 24, 1997, demanding stringent government action 
in response to violence in Melavalavu. The caption reads, “Police engaging in a protection force on 
Monday in Madurai’s Goripalaiyam area for the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’s walking procession.” Today, 
the photograph provides a source of amusement for movement activists who jest, albeit with a shade of 
truth, that its sometimes seemed in the 1990s as if more police attended Viduthalai Chiruthaigal rallies 
than movement supporters. 
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